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Abstract
The decade 1968-78 saw three major developments in
Middle East politics these were the Arab defeat in the
Six-Day War in 1967, the British withdrawal from East of
Suez in 1971 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 These events
stimulated the United States increasingly to involve itself
in regional politics in an attempt to maintain stability
and continued access to oil As a major oil producer and
the one with the largest proven reserves, Saudi Arabia
sought to ensure its security by trading oil for American
assistance.. This thesis examines Saudi-United States
relations from the Six-Day War to the Camp David Agreement
of 1978 and the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran and
concludes that Saudi Interests were not obtained but rather
those of the U.S.. secured. The thesis looks in particular
at Saudi security interests, American arms sales and the
political tensions produced by the pervasive Arab-Israeli
conflict. It draws extensively on official documentation in
both Arabic and English, while recognising the highly
personal nature of Saudi political reaction to the
constraints and opportunities of the period under review..
In the final analysis Saudi leaders paid a very high price
for a very limited commitment to their own security while
the U..S.. was able to maintain and enhance its political
commitment to the state of Israel.
1Chapter One
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, lying between the Gulf
and the Red Sea, occupies a significant area between Africa
and mainland Asia, close to the Suez Canal
It covers approximately 80 per cent of the Arabian
peninsula, which has an area of slightly over a million
square miles. Eecause some of the Saudi boundaries are
undefined, the exact size of the kingdom is unknown.
Estimates vary between 864,000 square miles and 869,774
square miles. 1 Saudi Arabian government sources indicate an
area of 2,240,000 square kilometres.
Saudi Arabian territory stretches from the Gulf of
Aqaba and the Red Sea on its western shores, to the Gulf in
the east. It shares borders with eight countries: Jordan,
Iraq and Kuwait to the north; the Yemen Arab Republic
(North Yemen) and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen) to the south; Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates to the east; and the Sultanate of Oman to the
south-east. Across the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia faces
Nyrop, Richard F. and others, Area Handbook for Saudi
Arabia, 3rd edition, Washington D.C..: U.S.. Government
Printing OfFice, 1977, p. 45.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information, Kingdom
cDf Saudi Arabia: fact and figures, Riyadh: Foreign
Information, p. 6.
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Irar, with Jahrain off its east coast, whilst across the
Red Sea are Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.. (See Figure 1.i.)
The kingdom is divided into four major provinces Asir
in the south-west; in the west, Hejaz, which contains the
two principal holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina; in
the centre, NaJd, in which is located the capital city of
Riyadh; and Hasa, containing the country t s oil fields.
(See Figure 1..2.)
Saudi Arabia is noted for its desert climate, being
mainly dry and hot.. Summer temperatures can e>iceed 12
Fahrenheit, but from mid-November to mid-March, the climate
is generally pleasant.. The country has neither lakes nor
rivers, and wit.h the e>tception of a limited area, rainfall
is insufficient to support agriculture.. (Only about 1 per
cent of the land is suitable for agricultural purposes)
One of the largest empty deserts in the world, known as Rub'
1-!ha1i ("the Empty Quarter") , lies within its boundaries..
Th.ji!L±bJaag.cLc!qi
As suggested by the very name of Saudi Arabia, the
emergence of the state in contemporary history can be
understood only through reference to the history of the
Saudi family.
The provinces off i ci al names are the Western , the
Eastern, the Northern, the Southern and the Central
Provi rces. For obvj ous reasons, the Saudi Arabi an
government has attempted to obscure reference to the
fc:rmer Ki ncjdom of HeJ a and to the Emi rates of Hasa,
Asir, and NaJd..
c:ongressional Qua....lerly, I!a
	
States
2nd edition,
Whinqt.on r.c.	 1975, p. 52..
Li
Fi qur	 1 2	 (dtni ni trLiv Di Vi i
	 c,f Saudi Arabi a
wrce	 Ki gd.'rn	 f S.di Arabia, Hir i.try of .ti1.'rrnatiori
aud	 !:l..d	 kL°r14., R.iyadh 1979, p.21.
In the early 18th century, the house of Saud was one
of fami ii es arid tn bes, each of which ruled various and
],ivnited parts of the area. The founder of the current
dynasty, Mohammad Ibn Saud, ruled Al-Dir 'lyyah, a small
town in the province of Najd. Towards the middle of the
century, under the influence of Sheikh Mohammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, he became an adherent of the Wahhabi sect, which
called for a return to the original conservative principles
of Islam embodied in the Hanbli teachings. (Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, having met with an unfavourable reaction in his
native town of Uyaynah, had been received into Al-Dir'iyyah
at the time of Ibn Saud's rule.)
Mohammad Ibn Saud and Mohammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
established a theocratic state, ruling Jointly over Al-
Dir'iyyah.. The latter received the title of Sheikh,
reflecting his religious role, whilst the former received
the title of Imarn, one of the titles of the head of early
Islamic communities.. The new state called for the "oneness
of God" "AL DA1AN ILA AL-TA WHID'> and in 1744, which is
accepted as the year of its creation, the two Mohammads
jointly swore an oath to support and further this cause
beyond Ai-Dir'iyyah.'
It was this potent alliance of the House of Saud and
the Wahhabi teaching, together with their Joint spirit of
conquest, which was to be central to the formation of the
' Nyrop ,
	
p. 121.
Rerit, Georqe,	 LcL1c1i.i'1fli, in Flel i ng, Wi 1 lard A.
(o.:I) Kinq	 a	 of
Ar.bia, C:oi orado t4estvi iw Pr p ';s, 198w, p. 17 Sal
Amoon,	 (in Arabic The
, Vol.. 1, 8eirut Arabic
WrIter Press, n.d. , p 41.
6modern state of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, to this day, the
Saudi and Al ci -She:L kh (1 e. Abd ci -Wahhab) fami lies
continue to play a key role in the affairs of the nation.
In cccorc:ance with tribal tradition, the relationship
between the two families was cemented by inter-marriage,
the most important being ibn Saud's marriage to Abd ci-
Wahhab's dat..tghter at some time during the 1740's.7
By the time of Mohammcd Ibn Saud's death in 1765, the
ciii ance had conquered and gci ned control of most of the
central area of the Arabian peninsula (Naid), thus acting
as a unifying force.
Ibn Saud was succeeded by his son, Abd Al-Aziz (1765-
1803). The alliance between the two families was renewed
and succeeded in gaining control of the city of Riyadh. The
movement faced many enemies on all sides: to the east, the
powerful Bani Khalid to the south-west, the Sharifians of
Hejaz and the Zaidis of Yemen; and to the north, the
Emirates of Muntafiq. Despite the fact that these powers
were politically threatened by the religious Wahhabi
movement, they failed to contain its expansion to the Najd.
By the time of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's death in 1792, Wahhabism
had spread over most of the peninsula.
In 180,1, the movement attacked Karbala, an Iraqi city
some 200 miles south of Baghdad. Mindful of the
significance to the Muslims of the two holy cities of Mecca
and Meclina, the (Jahhabi were also attempting to gain
Nyrop,	 p. 25.
" L.cincj, David E, SaucJi Arah ,j , , London: Sage Publ I cati otis,
1976, p. 19.
' Hobday, Peter, Saudi PirabiaTcd ,y An Introduction to the
Richest Oil Por, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978,
p. :I.i3	 Sal 'd, çci, p. 62,
7control of them.. In 1803, the army of Abd al-Aziz took
Mecca.. In the same year, he died, to be succeeded as Imam
by his son, Saud C1803-1914) ,	 o occupied Medina in
1805.. •'
Still in the early nineteenth century, the Joint
influence of the HOUSe of Saud and the Wahhabi teaching was
approaching Damascus and Southern Iraq.. The Saudi army
forced the Sultan of Muscat to pay tribute to them, whilst
in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, their men attacked the
ships of 'non-believers".. The British, who were the
dominant Western power in the area, labelled them pirates,
and the lower part of the Gulf coast became known as the
"Pirate Coast"..
During the 18th century, the two main powers in the
area, the British and the Ottoman Empire, had not concerned
themselves with what had been happening in the interior of
the Arabian peninsula, which they considered to be a tribal
conflict posing no threat to their interests.. By the early
years of the 19th century, however, the government of the
Ottoman Empire was forced to take action, particularly in
the light of the capture by the Wahhabi of the two holy
cities of Mecca and Medina, and its subsequent loss of both
income and prestige..
The Ottoman Sultan requested his viceroy in Egypt,
Mohammad Ali, to invade NaJd to recover their lost
territories.. Mohammad Al i 's forces, led by his son, Tusun,
succeeded in recapturing the two holy cities in 1816.. In
the spring of 1818, another son, Ibrahim Pasha, held siege
i'	 pfljr.	 cp...., p.. 20-21
1.1. L..onq, c......j1L_!,
Sat the Saudi capital, Al-Dlr'lyyah. After five months, Al-
Dir'Iyyah fell and was razed to the ground, and the Saudi
Imain, Abdallah Ibn Saud al-Saud (1S14-1818) , was carried
off first to Egypt and then to Istanbul, where he was
beheaded.
The British, in alliance with the Ottomans, had been
trying - without success - to quell Wahhabi activities in
the Gulf between 1805 and 1819. After the collapse of the
Saudi-Wahhabi state in 1819, they assembled a large naval
and land force at Ras Al-Khaymah, which defeated tJahhabi
troops in 1819.. In 1920, the opposing sides signed a treaty
which marked the beginning of 150 years of British
dominance in the area. '
Meanwhile, during the years of their occupation, From
1818 to 1822, the Ottomans pitched rival tribes and
families against each other, lending their support to those
which opposed the Saudi family. 1'
Ibrahim Pasha, the leader of the Ottoman-Egyptian
troops which had destroyed Al-Dir'iyyah, was more concerned
with protecting the two holy cities from Saudi-Jahhabi
threat than with occupying NaJd. Accordingly he transferred
his troops From the NaJd to the Hejaz province, in which
are located the holy cities.
In 1824, Turki Ibn Abdallah Al Saud (1824-1834)
marshalled his troops and re-established a Saudi capital in
Rents, op. c:it.., p.. 22; Nyrop, op..ci t. , p. 27.
Long, op.ci, p. 20.
united States Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources,	 es to Oi1 the United States
A Report,
95t.h Congress, 1st session.. Washington D.0 U.S.
Government. Printing Office, 1977, p. 35. (Subsequently
referred b as U.. S. Congress, Access to Oil.
9Riyadh, close to the destroyed Al-Diriyyah He succeeded
in regaining control of all former Saudi territories, with
the exception of the Hejaz.
Turki 's ten year-rule ended in 1834 with his
asslnation by a rival member' of his family. His son
Faisal (1834-1838 and 1943-1865), who had been in exile in
Caii'-o since 1927, escaped and became the new Irnarn. In 1839,
another rival claimant emerged, also from Cairo, when
Mohammad Al I Pasha sent hi s troops to gain control of the
Arabian peninsula. He took Faisal prisoner, and exiled him
to Cairo once again. With the help of the Egyptian army,
his cousin Khalid (1838-1841) took his place, hi reign
lastinq just over 'four years, until 1841, when he was
replaced by Abdallah Ibn Thunayan (1841-1843) Less than
two years later, Faisal again escaped from Cairo and
returned to NaJd to resume his position as leader.'6
This second reign of Faisal s, from 1843 to 1865,
marked a remarkable period in the history of the House of
Saud. (The present Saudi 'family is officially known as
"House of Fal sal - House of Saud". )
"..for more reasons than ancestry, Faisal endeavoured
like his father to restore order to the land, and like
his grandson, Abd Al Aziz, was tough enough to curb
the excesses of the bedouins. Pilgrimages could be
made in safety, and agricultural and mercantile
pursuits were encouraged. Faisal, perhaps because he
was so conscientious himself, overestimated the
selfless altruism of his sons. To the present day,
Saudi rule is based on two determinants first the
family must be kept in order, and then the tribes."7
In the words of Lewis Pelly, the British resident in the
Lonq	 p. 20.
1.6	 !ct.	 p.. 21.
'	 Nyrc 'p, cjjt, p.. 28.
10
Gulf, Imam Faisal was -
"a Just and extreme ruler who had been unprecedently
successful in curbing the predatory habits of his
tribes, and who was desirous of inculcating among them
more settled habits, and of turning their minds
towards agriculture and trade.. "'u'
He was also -
"farsi qhted enough to real ± se that he could not
convert the whole world to Wahhabism, and that if he
tried he would again bring ruin on his people and
himself..	 He was a devout Wahhabi, but instead of
attacking Karbala (holy Iraqi city.), he received a
British diplomat in his capital"1
Faisal Ibn Turki died in 1865, having restored order
to the NaJd and reasserted his authority over much of the
Arabian peninsula, from Shammer Mountain in the north, to
Oman in the south
He was succeeded by his son Abd Allah (1865-71 and
1875-89), but the stability that he had built up was to be
destroyed by a conflict between this son and his brother,
Saud (1071-75).. After Saud's death in 1875, his younger
brother, Abd ar Rahman (1875 and 1089-91) assumed power,
but initially only For one year, after which Abd Allah
regained power until his death in 1809.. Abd ar Rahman then
regained power' 1 , but commanded no real authority.. The
House of Saud having already collapsed three years earl i er,
he served briefly as F<ashadi governor of Riyadh, his former
capital, and in 1891 was sent with his family to Kuwait by
Mohammad Ibn Rashi ci Ami r of Shammer. Among hi s family was
his son, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd ar Rahman Ibn Faisal Al-Saud,
commonly known as Ibn Saud. It was through the efforts of
' Rents, op. cit., p.. 25..
'' Wi nder, R, 8..
	
Century,
London Ma:mi 1 lan , 1965, p.. 228.
I....onq, ciP_1;.tt.!	 p. 21.
'' Nyrc:p, up .cit.., p.. 28-29.
11
Ibn Saud that the modern state of Saudi Arabia came into
beinq in the opening years of the twentieth century. 	 (For
the qenealogy of the House of Saud, see Figure 1.3w)
Ibn Saud (1902-1932)
In January 1902, Ibn Saud left Kuwait, returning
to the interior of the Arabian Peninsulas With less than
fifty men, he travelled south and east On the night of
January 16th, he succeeded in defeating Al Rashid and
regaining his family's former capital, Riyadh. This victory
roused the former supporters of the House of Saud, and
within two years, they had reconquered half of the central
area of the peninsula.
The Turks sent troops to support Ibn Rashid and
succeeded in defeating Ibn Saud at Bukairiya in 1904. He
held Riyadh, however, and the struggle continued for more
than eight years, until 1912, when the Turks, being unable
to support their troops, withdrew..
In the years before World War I, Ibn Saud laid the
foundations of his control over central Arabia.. The
Families and tribes were not eliminated, but rather their
loyalty was assured by military force or through
intermarriage, in accordance with the traditions of desert
life.	 Ibn Saud also attempted to unify the families and
Hol don , Davi d nd Johns, Ri chard , It! e of Saud
London Pn BooIs, 1982, p.. 2.
Ki nqdom of Saudi Arabi a, Mini stry of Informati on, Ij
.............	
(in Arabic: 
_Ie Kingdom
Riyadh: 1979, p.. O The New
i.LLniiij, Vol.. 6, 15th edition. , USA:
Th N	 FZm::yc:l opodia Britanni ca, Inc. , 1985, p.. 224..
t.J.S. Conqress, Access to Oil, p. 36..
.1,,
.1. ....
Fl qt.tr	 1. 3 : Th (3en1 c.gy of €h Houc3 of 9ud
Noe: Th.nber. i brackets iiidic1te order of rule
azd dates period of rule.
8aud Ibri Mohammad
I1DI1Inmd (I)	 in	 ,lhd a1-$4ahhhs Vughter
1742-I 765
('bd l-Aiz (2)	 Abd AllIi	 Thuriayyan
1765-1803
	
8iuri (3)
	
Turki (5)	 Abd Allah (B)
	
1803-1814	 1824-1934	 1941-1843
I	 I
Ibd A11I, (4)	 KIilid (7)
1914-lfllfl	 1938-1841
Faia1 (6) (9)
1834-1838 1843-1965
I	 I'	 I
	(Thu Al1ii (10) (13)	 8aud (11)	 Abd ar Rahman (12) (14)
	
1865-1871 1875-1889
	 1871-1875	 1875	 1889-1891
Abd l Aziz (15)
1902-1953
SurJ (16)
	 Fai1 (17)	 Khalid (18)
	 Fand (19)
1953-1964	 1964-1975	 1975-1982	 19B2
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tribes on a religious basis by assuming the title of Imam,
that is a religious leader, and by creating "colonies" (Al-
H.ijrat) which were organized on a non-tribal basis. The
first of these lkht,ar, (or "brotherhood") colonies was
established In 1912. During the following fifteen years,
some hundred more were established in various parts of
NaJd. Each was ruled by Shariah (religious law) instead of
by the customary law of the E(edouin tribes and each had a
Wahhabl standing army.' It is these two elements - the
House of Saud's relationship with the tribes and its
identification with Wahhabism - which remain central to an
understanding of Saudi authority today.
During World War I, the British opposed the Turks and
encouraged Ibn Saud to oppose the forces of Saud Ibn
Rashid, who was in alliance with the Turks. At the end of
1914, a British officer, Captain WH.I. Shakespear, helped
Ibn Saud to plan a military offensive against Ibn Rashid.
The ensuing battle, in January 1915, resulted in a victory
for Ibn Saud, but cost Shakespear his life. In December
1915, the British concluded a treaty of friendship with
Ibn Saud.' Nevertheless, Ibn Saud felt threatened by the
fact that Colonel T.E. Lawrence (the so-called Lawrence of
Arabia) was assisting Sharif Housain of Hejaz to build up
his forces, albeit against the Turks.	 In 1917, Ibn Saud
was persuaded by Sir John B. Philby to attack Ibn Rashid
E.a;.i.g.ac!.t_aaLi, Vol. 12, 14th edition, Great
Britai.r Encyclopedia Britannica Ltd., 1961, p. 36.
Ti"oeller, Gary,
............ 	
London Cass, 1976, pp.
254
cia__cit., p. 36.
14
and to cooperate with Shari f Housai n '' In the autumn of
1918, this attack took place, but without yielding any
clear result. At the end of World War I, Ibn Saud found his
domain still within the same boundaries and his two rivals
within the peninsula, Ibn Rashid and Sharif Housain, still
as powerful as at its outbreak.'
In March 1919, Sharif Housain tried to gain control of
the Utaybah tribal region, adjacent to HeJaz. Two months
later his Hashemite forces were defeated in a clear victory
for Ibn Saud. The following year, Ibn Saud added Asir, in
the south-west, to his dominlons.. In 1922, Ibn Rashid was
definitively subdued by the capture of his capital, Hayil,
leaving all of central Arabia, with the exception of Hejaz,
unified under Ibn Saud's rule.
After World War I, the creation by the British of the
Kingdom of Iraq and the Emirate of Transjordan, headed by
two of Sharif Housain's sons - Faisal and Abdullah -
hampered Ibn Saud's efforts to expand his rule to the
north. The Conference of Kuwait, called by the British in
April 1924, failed to resolve this issue. In September of
the same year, Ibn Saud's forces began to move into Heiaz,
provoked by Sharif Housain having proclaimed himself Caliph
of all Muslims.. By 1926, the occupation of Hejaz was
complete, and Ibn Saud declared himself its king. (In 1927,
his official title was King of Hejaz and Sultan of NaJd and
its Dependencies.1
'' I....onq ,	 p.. 23.
QaS1.itaaLi, p cit, p.. 36.
:	 IbICJ.
' LJ..S.. Coriqr
	 , Access to Oil, p. 36.
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The British held a series of negotiations with Ibn
Sai.td over frontiers shared by him with British allies. In
1927, Sir Gilbert Clayton concluded a treaty, known as the
Treaty of Jeddah, which recognized Ibn Saud's dominlons
from the Red Sea to the Gulf, and which provided for non-
aggression and friendly relations.
Despite this, the Ikhwan, inspired by the belief that
all non-Wahhabi Muslims were infidels, continued their
warring tradition. Ibn Saud failed to prevent them from
carrying out further raids and from invading Iraq in 1927.
In 1929, he had no choice but to crush his formerly loyal
subjects at the Battle of Sibila.
This battle marked the beginning of a new era. The
defeated Ikhwan were now loyal to the Saudi state, In part
because in the early years of the 20th century, the tribal
origins of the Wahhabi movement had regained the ascendancy
over the religious fervour of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Ibn Saud strengthened his control by Intermarriage with
senior members of the tribes, and with religious leaders,
Slt.Acjett, Peter and Faruk-f3lugett, Marion, The F'recarious
Lto.narchy .Jj ain(bd	 z1.Sudan d t h
Najd and_j
1a . l925-t22, in Niblock, Tim, (ed.) Statef
t.Y.12flL_bL?, London: Croom
Hclm, 1982, p.. 52; Philby, Harry St.John, Saudj
rahj.a, New York: Frederick A.. Praeger Inc.. , 1955, pp.
3c:3,
Z3 Kruerhoe, Roman, "Saud Arabi a: Our Conservative
Muslim Ally", Cu etHistoy, January 1980, p. 17
Machal	 1.. R. "A Prospect of Sa.cii Ar-abi a"
.fl.tLfl9L±LL., Vol.. 56, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p..
626..
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particularly the Wahhabi fainily.
	 By 1932, the definition
of Saudi authority was clear. It was a monarchy, influenced
by religious leaders and Bedouin tribal chiefs, but with
Ibn Saud and his family remaining the key figures. Ibn Saud
was at once king, imam - religious leader, and sheikh -
tribal chief..
How had the kingdom emerged and expanded? According to
Fred Halliday,
"no adequate social explanation of this movement has
yet been produced.."
while Tim Niblock surmises that,
"commercial interests in the towns played a more
crucial role in the creation and expansion of the
Saudi state than did the Bedouins"
A more reasonable explanation, however, is arguably as
follows.. In the first place, the creation and expansion of
the Saudi state resulted from tribal conflict in the desert
interior.. Saudi supremacy was owed to the revival of their
forces, which were victorious in their struggle against
rival tribes and families in the peninsula. In the second
place, during the first third of the 2th century, the
British had little interest in the interior of the Arabian
peninsula, concerning themselves mainly with the coastal
Anthony, John 1)uke, Saudi Arabiafl FromTribal Societyo
.State, in El-Maliakh, R..
	 id.Enr.
Devc1
t4a . thincjton D..0 Iath and Co.. , 1982, p.. 94; Al-
Zarakiy, Khair Al Dean,	 Ahd Al-
(in Arabic Ibf1ia4L_!na_i.
reic	 ...F Ki q
	
J	 ') Vol. 3, Eteirut: 197(, p..
956,
	
Hal). iday, Fred,	 London Penguin
1took, 1979, p.. 48.
Ni bi oc:k, Tim,
.............. tnJLWL S.y tjn, in Nib lock, Tim,
(ed..) EMj
L.ondon Croom Helm, 1982, p.. 78.
17
area from Basrah in the north of the Gulf to Aden in South
Yemen.
(1932-1953)
On 18th September 1932, Ibn Saud proclaimed his domain
to be a kingdom and assumed the title of King. Thus did the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (A1-Namlakah A1-Arahiyah Al-
Saud.iyah) come into existence as a state.
Territorial disputes, however, continued. In 1933,
King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud was in dispute with the state of
Yemen over Asir He declared war in March 1934. His two
eldest sons led an invasion of Yemen and successfully
gained control of a large proportion of the country. Imam
Yahya of Yemen was obliged to sign a treaty on 23rd June,
1934, in which he acknowledged Asir to be part of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.7
Relations with its northern - and Hashemite -
neighbour, Iraq, were further strengthened by the signing
of a treaty of Arab brotherhood and non-aggression on 3rd
April, 1936.' The only outstanding border dispute remained
the Buraimi Oasis, which Saudi Arabia was to claim until
1974, when it withdrew its claim against Oman and Abu
Dhabi
Lncosi, Gecwqe,
4th edi U on , Ithaca Cornel 1 University Press, 198,
p. 379.
'"i' IIuwrd, Jimmy, The United States nd Saudi Arab iai
I on
h'1r:tJ2a.at, unpublished M. A. dissertation, Naval
FsLqraduate School , 1981 , p. 18.
L.onçj,	 p. 21.
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During the 30's, it became clear to the king that the
overall situation in the area had evolved and that an
e>tremist religious policy was no longer appropriate. If he
wished his kingdom to survive, he would have to adopt a
moderate policy towards both local powers and greater ones.
Hence, although his rule was based on the Wahhabi sect and
on tribal custom, he ensured that priority was given to the
development of the infrastructure of the state. A system of
government began to emerge, firstly in Heiaz.
Administratively, the kingdom was divided into four
provinces Najd, Hejaz, Hasa, and Asir.. They were governed
by the Crown F'rince Saud, Prince Faisal, Abdullah Ibn
Jiluwi, (a cousin of the king) and Amir Turki respectively.
The latter was a nephew of the king and a member of the
Sudairi clan, which played an important part in the history
of modern Saudi Arabla..
Administrative structures were slowly created and
developed. Several foreign states established legations in
the HeJaz. (The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and
the Soviet Union had recognised Saudi authority in 1927.)
In 1931, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was set up In
Jeddah, headed by Prince Faisal, who continued to hold
this post, including as King, until his death in 1975.
Financial affairs had been managed by Abdullah Sulaiman Al-
Hamdan since 1919, and in 1932, the Ministry of Finance was
created, with him retaining control as minister. Indeed, he
spent freely, treating the country's finances as his
" Nyrop,	 p. 34..
L.ac:ner, Helen, jLuflLLpn_Sand__- A F'olitical
Economjfj, London Ithaca Press, 1978,
p. 29.
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private funL.	 Minister of Defense, Prince Mansur Ibn
Abd a1A.i	 W3 appointed in 1944	 and a Minister of
In1erior In 191. Under pressure from the United
Sties, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (8.A.M.A.) was
founded In i952, mainly to manage the note issue.
In the l930's, however, the main problem facing the
country was shortage of funds. Its income had risen from
approximately £0,000 p..a in the early years of the
century, with a United Kingdom grant of £60,000 p.a. from
1916 to 1924, to some £ million p.a. after the
estabi ishmetit of the Kingdom. There were no apparent means
of stimulating the desert economy, except by increasing
income from pilgrimage, which had fallen with the world
slump.. In 1933, however, the king granted an oil concession
to an American firm for £50,000, thus solving his immediate
financial problems.. 4 Oil in commercial quantities was
discovered in 1935, but World War II delayed the
development of production and it was not until the end of
the war that the kingdom began to reap the benefits of
this.
The countrys official position in the war was
neutral, but King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sauds sympathies were
undoubtedly with the Allies. 	 In 1943, the United States
government declared that the defense of Saudi Arabia is
vital to the defense of the United States." The king signed
].bI ci,
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an agreement allowing the United States airfield base
rights, and construction of an airfield at Dhahran, near
the oilfields, began. (In the event, the base was not
completed until after the war.) Following his meeting with
President Roosevelt, and subsequently with Churchi 1 1, the
king declared war on the Axis powers on 1st March 1945,
thus enabling Saudi Arabia to join the United Nations
conference in San Franci sco.
After the war, oil production was increased, and with
it came a dramatic rise in the country's income, from only
$4 million in 1944 to some $85 million in 1948. Clearly,
this enabled a significant amount of internal development
to take place, but it proceeded slowly. Although the
kingdom was beginning to acquire the trappings of a modern
state, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud himself remained "the
state
"... in no other state in the world is the national
destiny held so completely in the hands of one man,
the king, as in Saudi Arabia...(he) controlled every
aspect of governmental activity... "'
There was no constitution. Members of the royal family
or close confidents occupied key positions in the
government. Indeed, "the government was the House of Saud."
Crown Prince Saud was not only governor of the key province
of Najd, but also commander of the army. Similarly, Prince
Faisal was both governor of another important province,
'	 Hailiday, op. cjt., p. 51; Lenczowski, p. cit., p. 581.
'	 Nyrop,	 p. 34.
' I:)epit.rnen'L of State Foreign Service Despatch No. 362.
Confidential , from Amer ± can Embassy, Jeddah, to the
Department of State, Washington, May 10, 1954. In Al -
Rashid, Ibrahim, (ed..) flj	 jql.etween the T
........
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Heja, and foreign minister. Similarly, the national income
was t-eqarded as the king's, to be spent as he chose. In
October 1953, the king created a Council of Ministers,
which officially had legislative and executive power, and
appointed Crown Prince Saud as its head. A month later, he
died.
King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud had laid the foundations of
modern Saudi Arabia. His state was an absolute monarchy,
patrimonial, but differing from Western monarchies in also
being a tribal state, with religious legitimacy. The king
was a tribal leader, to whom any subject could have direct
access on any matter. Decisions were personal, and taken on
the basis of their effect on the interests and concerns of
the royal family. The mair duty of the king was to maintain
Saudi authority and the security of the kingdom.
The most significant aspect of King Abd al-Aziz Ibn
Saud's reign, however, was his desire for an early American
involvement in the area and a special relationship with the
United States. He did not trust the British, allies of his
traditional enemies, the Hashemite family, and his
religious convictions prevented his developing early
relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the 193's
the Soviet Union could not have provided the financial aid
necessary to support him or to develop the oil industry.
ThereignofKinSdjbnAbdal-Aiz(3-1 964)
King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud was succeeded by his eldest
surviving son, Saud. King Saud found himself facing new
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challenges From both beyond and within Saudi Arabia,
including within the royal family, challenges with which he
was ill-equipped to copes
"Saud's first administrative assignment in the new
kingdom had been the governorship of the Naid, and
this may have contributed to his disastrous rule as
king.. Governorship of the NaJd did not require
learning new ways to approach the problems of
governing. Saud relied on his father's charismatic
leadership and cash to maintain tribal loyalty in the
NaJd and relaxed to enjoy the fruits of royal
privilege and royal incorne.."
He also had no experience of foreign affairs, which
were managed •from HeJaz by Prince Faisal, whose
responsibility they had been since he was 14 years old..
Within Saudi Arabia, there was growing dissatisfaction
over alleged wasteful expenditure, and King Saud ruled
extravagantly.. Spending ws dictated by his whims, and at
times the treasury was almost depleted, despite the
country's vast oil income. He built a number of new palaces
at great cost", and heavily subsidized the tribal leaders
to maintain their loyalty.. It must also be said that he
funded some pr-ojects such as schools and hospitals.. "
Dissatisfaction also grew over the lack of political
participation. Some liberal Saudi princes and a number of
the rising middle class educated abroad were influenced by
the Arab national i st movement, which was extremely
effective in arousing nationalism among the Saudis in the
1950's. In August 1954, a leaflet was circulated in the
U!) Nyrop , op. cit., pp - 35-36.
"' Sheen, Vinr:ent, E	 .JLncLbi _Kingdom,
London University Fress of Arabia, 1975, p. 114.
'	 [...eckrior ,
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eastern province
"the leaflet contains a brief but bitter attack on the
royal family, 'foreign imperialists' and 'American
pigs', and urges the workers to seize the profitable
oil company (ARAMCO)."
King Sauds first response was to issue a royal decree
(fatw) in April 1955, forbidding Saudis from studying
abroad. In 1956, the Saudi ARAMCO workers in the eastern
province called a strike, characterized by political
demands and overtly nationalistic overtones. Another royal
decree was issued, Forbidding strikes and declaring that
any worker taking part in such an action would be
di smi seed.
Such positive achievements as there were during King
Saud's reign came about thanks to the influence of Prince
Faisal, whom King Saud appointed prime minister in 1954.
The Council oF Ministers published a budget, the first in
the country's history. More ministries were created. Plans
for modernization were drawn up, particularly for roads,
schools, and communications, although many of these were
vetoed by the king, who retained full powers over internal
and foreign policy, despite the increasing role of the
Council of Ministers."'
From outside Saudi Arabia, new demands were resulting
from political change in the area. The Egyptian revolution
in 1952 overthrew the monarchy and established a republic.
About a year later, Gamal Abdul Nasser gained ful 1 power in
t' Dopartmnt of State, Foreign Sorvice Despatch No. 12.
Confidential , from American Consul , Dhahran, Saudi
a to the Department. of State, Washington, August
25, 1954. In Al-Rashid, op. cit., p. 197.
Nvrop , op. cit., p.	 6.
'' [bich, pp. 3637.
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Egypt, and by 1954 his nationalistic intentions were clear.
Together with the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Partywhichhad
great influence in Eastern Arabia, he spread a call for
unity, freedom and socialism throughout the whole Arab
homei and.
The situation facing King Saud was considerably more
complicated than in his father's day. His foreign policy
shifted between Pan-Arabism and conservatism. In the early
years of his reign, relations with Nasser were good: King
Saud called for- neutrality, for the independence of
Algeria, for the liberation of Palestine, and opposed the
Eaghdad pact. He strengthened his ties with Egypt by
signing a mutual defense pact in October 1955, and during
the Suez crisis supported Nasser by announcing an embargo
on oil shipments to the United Kingdom and France, and
breaking off diplomatic relations with both. He also backed
Nasser financially.
Relations with the United States at first declined. At
the time of his father's death, King Saud had telegraphed:
"inform U.S. government he was determined continue his
Father's policies including maintenance close friendship
with U.S. (sic)."	 ' Despite this, in 1954, the king
dismissed the United States Point Four mission. Saudi
attempts to transport its oil in Greek tankers were
considered a violation of the American concession
agreement. The Dhahran air-base agreement was not, however,
r-escinded, and was indeed renewed for another five years,
Department of State, Secret: Security Informati on.
Incoming Teleg ram From Jeddah to Secretary of State No
210, November .tø, i953 In Al -Rashi ci, g . . ci	 , p.
146.
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following the kinq's visit in 1957 to the United States to
meet Presi dent El senhower, as a result of which he also
declared his support for the Eisenhower doctrine
Saudi--LJ.. relations were thus improving, but the
kingdom's Arabian policy was fraught with difficulties. In
February 1958, Syr-ia and Egypt declared their two countries
to be the United Arab Republic. Two weeks later, the
Hashemite 'Family in Iraq and Jordan announced a rival Arab
federation under the supervision of Britain. King Saud was
unable to subscribe to Arab nationalist policy because it
called for the "overthrow of all reactionary Arab
kingdoms". Nor could he contemplate a reconciliation with
the Hashemite family, particularly since they had asked
Britain to annex Kuwait in'their federation.
The king was unable to handle this complex situation.
In March 1958, the royal family urged him to transfer power
to his brother and heir apparent, Prince Faisal. King Saud
issued a decree acceding to this, and Prince Faisal assumed
Full powers of government in internal and foreign affairs.
Under the latter's administration, the budget balanced and
the internal situation improved significantly. The role of
the Council of Ministers was increased. A neutral position
was adopted in Arab affairs.' The struggle for power
between the king and Prince Faisal continued, however,
until in December 196, the king refused to sign the budget
Sal 'd, Ameen, Tan	 1-La1aA1-Sauj"ag /Ihd Saud
,ibdelAziz, (in Arabic ,ft _Hijorjajj:he Saudi
Vnl 3, Eirut Dar Al-katib
A]. Arahi., n.d, pp. 182-185 and 192-193; Campbell,
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for the new financial year. He felt his position to be
strong enough to force Prince Faisal to offer his
resignation in January, 1961.'
King Saud formed a new cabinet. He assumed the post of
prime minister, appointed Prince Talal Minister of Finance
and National Economy, and Abdullab Tariqi Minister of the
new Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. 1
 The
former was well known as the leader of the "Free Princes",
and the latter was to be one of the founders of OPEC. New
conflict emerged within the government between the policies
adopted by the "Free Princes" and conservative elements.
Prince Talal and his supporters called for constitutional
monarchy and a parliament. King Saud opposed these, and in
September 1961, he dismissed Prince Talal from the cabinet.
Outside Saudi Arabia, the entire area was entering a
new phase. In January 1961, when Britain announced the end
of its protection treaty with Kuwait, Iraq laid claim not
only to Kuwait Cas part of its southern province of Basrah)
but also to the greater part of Saudi Arabias Hasa
province. As a result, King Saud sent a brigade of troops
to Kuwait. In September of the same year, some Syrian
0f .ficers led a successful coup and announced the secession
of Syria from the United Arab Republic on the same day as
Saudi Arabia recognised the new regime.
'' For more details see E(ligh, Alexander, From Prince to
........2.. 	 the
1n:iJ:LnLai, New York: New York University
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Partly because he was unable to cope with these
internal and e>ternal developments, the king's health
declined. In March 1962, Prince Faisal became deputy prime
minister as well as foreign minister.	 But conflict over
the leadership was not yet resolved..
In September 1962, the army of the Yemen led a
revolution, in which the Imam was overthrown and a new
republic was proclaimed, confronting Saudi Arabia with a
further threat. Within a week, Egyptian troops arrived in
the Yemen to support the republican forces and the
royalists were regrouping on the Saudi border.
The House of Saud recognising King Saud's total
inability to cope with this situation, Prince Faisal. again
regained full power as prime minister in October 1962.
Prince Faisal continued to be de facto leader of the
country until 1964, when King Saud was defeated in his last
embattled attempt to resume power. The ulama, or religious
scholars, the council of the royal family, and the tribal
sheikhs sided with Prince Faisal; King Saud was formally
dismissed and Faisal was proclaimed king on 2nd November,
1964.."
The years of King Saud's reign had witnessed an
evolution of the political system in Saudi Arabia. Whilst
the decisions of King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud had been his own
personal ones, decisions during King Saud's reign became
ultimately the decisions of the House of Saud. Several
factors lay behind this firstly, state affairs had become
Sncn , Vi rc::ent , 'King Fai sal '5 First Year" , Foreign
Affairs, January 1966, p. 306.
Sal 'ci,	 nEon, FaisalAl-Azeern, (In (rabi c Faisal the
t3ret, ) Be . irut Dar l-Katib Al-Arabi , nd, , p. 89.
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'far more complex than in Ibn Saud's time; secondly, King
Saud as an individual did not have his father's ability to
deal with new developments; thirdly, the situation of the
entire area had evolved to the point where King Saud was
driven to abandon his father's policy of isolation; and
finally, the rapid increase in oil revenue affected
relations between the king, the royal family and the
people..
By the end of King Saud's reign, the basis of
relations between the Saudi family, the tribal sheikhs, and
the ulama was clear.. The necessity for the House of Saud
hegemony was apparent. The alliance with the west,
particularly with the United States, was vital to the
interests of the royal family.. The kingdom needed a new
leacJer and a new policy: King Faisal and hi; Islamic policy
fulfilled this need..
(1964-1975)
Since Faisal 's assumption of full powers as prime
minister in 1962, the kingdom had seen significant
developments, despite the government's continuing adherence
to traditional principles. On 6th November 1962, only a
week after taking power, he had introduced his ten-point
programme of modernization, which included the promise of a
constitution and a consultative council. Other points
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included Judicial reform, and education, health and social
devel opment.
After he was proclaimed king in 1964, King Faisal
nominated his half-brother, Prince Khalld Ibn Abd al-Aziz,
Crown Princ:e, thus ensuring a peaceful transfer of power
after him, and maintaining the royal family hegemony. He
also gave high priority to the modernization of the army
and the establishment of an air defense system, in order to
meet the Egyptian threat in the south.
Within the country, his achievements were self-
evident. In education, by 1970 the number of male children
in school had risen from some 113,000 in 1960 to nearly
386,000, and there were over 126,000 girls in state
schools, compared with none in 1960. The health services
were developed. Some social services and more employment,
particularly in administration, were provided by the
government. But despite significant developments in various
sectors, King Faisal sought to ensure the continuation of
social structures which would maintain the dominance of
traditional values.
In 1970, the government drew up its first five-year
development plan, calling for expenditure of *9.2
billion.	 The implementation of this plan met with
oi.' ki , Georqe, "Tradi Ii on and Reform in Saudi
Arabia", PurrentHistori, February 1967, p. 101;
Shean , op. cit., p. 120-121 -
Nyrop, c, p. 39; E'iigh, pcit. , p. 86.
L..acl::ner, op. cit., p. 67-8.
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problems, but it did achieve many qualitative changes in
the country.
At an international level, King Faisal played an
important role in resisting Arab nationalist ideas.. In
196, he called an Islamic summit conference to oppose the
radical states in the area. He visited Turkey, Pakistan,
Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia to seek their support for his
attempt to organise a conservative camp.. At the time, this
initiative failed because of the strength of the
nationalist movement in the Arab homeland, but it was to
succeed after 1967, when the whole situation in the area
had changed..
The main problem confronting King Faisal was the civil
war in Yemen.. Egyptian troops in the Yemen had increased
from e,00 in late 1962 to 7ø,00 in 1966. Egyptian air-
raids on royalist installations and towns were perceived as
a direct threat to the kingdom.. The king imported huge
quantities of arms from the United States and Britain and
launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at securing the
support of the United States and other Western powers. The
(Jnitecl States cancelled its loans to Egypt..
" It was during these years that the American activity
in the area began to constitute a CrLIcial element in
Saudi calculations and policies.
The Yemen crisis was resolved in 1967, when the 6-day
war of June changed the nature of inter-Arab relations. The
Khartoum conference of August 1967 brought to an end the
confrontation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Nasser now
t)aw:ihe, Adeed,	 L± ibi saçj for Secqjj,
L..urdc:ii The InternaL i onal Inst.i tute for Strategic
StitcH ee, 1979,	 :3.
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being dependent on the financial aid of Saudi Arabia and of
other oil-rich states. The political situation of the area
had changed dramatically and Saudi Arabia began to play a
significant role in its policies.
King Faisal occupies a remarkable position in the
history of Saudi Arabia, equal in importance that of his
father, King Ibn Saud. Thanks to him, the country became a
modern - albeit a highly tribal - state. Important
decisions continued to be taken by the king and the
princes' committee within the House of Saud. The religious
leaders remained an essential social and political force.
Increased economic power was translated into political
power both within the kingdom and beyond its borders. Links
with the united States were as strong as they had ever
been.
On 25th March, 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by
his nephew. His brother, Crown Prince Khalid, ascended the
throne.
The reig.n o+ King Khalid IbnAbdal-Aziz(1975-1978)
King Khalids rule represents a period of balance of
power within the royal family. Another brother, Prince
Fand, was appointed Crown Prince and first deputy Prime
Minister, Prince Abdullah retained his position as
Commander of the National Guard, as did Prince Sultan as
Minister of Defense and Aviation. Most of the day-to-day
affairs of the country were conducted by Prince Fand, as a
result of the kings ill-health, but the king was by no
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means without power. He and Prince Abdullah were the
leading figures of the traditionalist elements of the
kingdom, while Prince Fand and Prince Sultan were at the
forefront of the modernist movement
This ruling team continued to pursue the policies of
the late King Faisal, in both internal and external
affairs Within the kingdom, It sought to gain stability by
achieving an equilibrium between Islamic traditionalism and
the desire For- modernization.. Thus in October 1975, the
king expanded the Council of Ministers from fourteen to
twenty members, the majority of whom had higher degrees.7
A second five-year development plan, costing 142 billion,
was brought into effect, also in 1975..
In foreign affairs, whilst pursuing the same policies,
the government adopted a more active role, and improved its
relations with neighbouring states.. In March 1976,
diplomatic relations with the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen were established, principally with the aim of
moderating its policies.. Relations with the United Arab
Emirates were also strengthened, with Ambassadors being
exchanged in June 1975.. In March 1976, the king visited the
small Gulf states to enhance relations with them..
In the third world, it was on Saudi Arabia's
initiative that Somalia ended its alliance with the Soviet
Union.. The kingdom supported the Eritrean movement,
particularly after the Marxist coup in Ethiopia.. It came to
the aid of Zaire's President Mobuto Sese Seko, enabling him
"' El even Iid hi qhr degrees, and one had a bachel or 's
degree. See I3rai bant , Ralph and Farsy , Fuad , "Saudi
(rabi a, Pi Developmental F:ipective'I ,
	
of
...	
Fall 1977, p.. 22.
to put down a Communist revolt It supported moderate
elements in Sudan, and backed conservative regimes in Asia,
giving financial aid to Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
In the Arab world, the Saudi government actively
opposed radical Arab nationalism. It supported the Egyptian
government's endeavours to strengthen its relations with
the (Jnited States and to reach an agreement with Israel and
encouraged Syria to do likewise. It also supported moderate
elements wi ihi n the PLO. In short, using its ability to
give financial aid as the keystone of its diplomacy, Saudi
Arabia played an important role in inter-Arab affairs
during this period.
At the same time, the country's close ties with the
United States continued to strengthen on all fronts. Within
the Saudi royal family, Prince Fand was unquestionably pro-
American, as was Prince Sultan.
By the end of 19Th, the "Saudi era" was coming to an
end as the region entered a new political phase, the advent
of which was marked by the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and
the collapse of the Shah of Iran.
Such limited population data as exist are sketchy, and
estimates of the population of Saudi Arabia in the 1970's
vary greatly. The official Saudi estimate for 1974 was 701
million inhabitants. 	 Most observers, however, place the
lU riqdnm of Saudi. Arahi a, Mini sti'y of Planning, Qp .
p.. iii.
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figure nearer S million In late 1976	 , of whom an
estimated 1 million were foreigners. 7 In sum, the exact
size of the population is unknown.
The main population centres are the capital city of
Riyadh, in the Central Province, with an estimated
po:)ulation of 750,000 the commercial city of Jeddah, in
the western province, estimated population 450,000; the
holy cities of Mecca and Medina, with populations of
250,000 and 150,000 respectively; and Dammam, Dhahran and
Al-Khubar, located in the eastern province, each with some
100,000 Inhabitants.74
The citizens of Saudi Arabia are Arabs. Ninety-nine
per cent of them are Muslims, and over ninety per cent are
of the Sunni sect, which adheres to Wahhablsm. Thereare no
native Christians.. Foreign Christians are allowed to work
in Saudi Arabia, but are forbidden to enter the holy cities
of Mecca and Medina. Jews are prevented from entering the
country, although one notable exception was the U.S.
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.
Thus the citizens of the kingdom are essentially
hosnogenous. They speak the same language and share the same
culture and values. The Shiite of Hasa, who are socially
discriminated against, are the only indigenous minority.
There are, however, recognisable regional differences.
It was from NaJd, In the eighteenth century that the
Wahhabi sect emerged, and it was there that the House of
' WEl 1 es, I:)(::)nai ci ,
Washi ncitc.,n I).. C. American Enterprise Institute for
pul:.) ii C: Fol I cy Researc:h , 1976 , p. 9.
'• Lonq , pp...cfl...., p. 9..
Fl rst. Nkiti onal City Sank
L	 New York 1974, p. 13.
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Saud created its powerfu:1 forces., NaJd has never been
occi.tpled by an outside power, and Naidis believe themselves
to be racially pure Arabs. Absolutely traditional tribal
values still dominate the social life of Najd and the
relationship of Naidis with the king is that of tribesmen
with their E3heikh. Najdis hold political power throughout
the country.
Hejaz was the former kingdom of the Hashemite family.
At one time, it had its own constitution and some modern
institutions. As a result of the H T7 z ( pilgrimage), its
citizens have always had contact with the outside world and
they are more highly educated than the Naidis. The Hejazi
are renowned merchants: their main cities are commercial
centres, and to this day Jeddah is the commercial capital
of the country. Following the Najdi invasion of Hejaz in
1926, the Hejazi were isolated from political power, which
remained in the hands of the Naidis. No major position in
the government has been occupied by the Heiazi.
The eastern province's citizens play no part in the
politics or trade of Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that it
is from there that comes most of the country's oil wealth.
l'he factors underlying this are firstly, that a sizeable
minority of Shiite lives in the area; secondly, that the
popul ati on 's on gi ris are in the small agri ciii tural
communities which formed around the oases, and agricultural
work was despised by the tribesmen; and thirdly, afterthe
discovery of oil, many of them became workers in the ARJ1CO
company, and held two major strikes (in 1953 and 1956). The
Ibri Jiluw.i branch of the House of Saud has always held the
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area under very tight control. Thus, although affected by
oil wealth, the provi rice has remained esseriti ally unchanged
by it..
In the south--west, sir is an isolated mountainous
area.. The Asiris, living mainly in small villages, are
dependent on agriculture for their livlihood. Since the
Najdis conquered their Emirate in the 1930's, they have
played no political part in the country.. Elsewhere, some
tribes inhabit the desert areas of the province.
Thus the spiritual and political supremacy of the
Najdis has remained untouched, despite the economic and
social devel opments which have dramatically affected Saudi
life and significantly reduced the differences between the
regions..
For example, general education has witnessed
phenomenal growth.. During the 1970's, the total number of
schools rose from some 3,000 to over 11,000, that is to say
at an average rate of 2.2 new schools opening every day..
During the same decade, the enrolment of boys more than
doubled, and that of girls almost quadrupled, rising from
approximately 3%0,000 to 781,000, arid from 128,000 to
444,000 respectively. Similarly, by the end of the decade
the number of higher- education students had risen from
7,000 to 48,000 and the kingdom had six universities and
fifty-four colleges arid hi yher educati on institutes.. 	 In
the mi d-70 '5, several thousand students were al so studying
' Ki nqdom of Saudi Arabi a, Mini. stry of P1 anrii nq , p
-p p.. 45 and 66-67.
semi -skilled workers 7 ' -- was poor arid commanded nc
poll hi cal power - 1?ut during the 1960's and 1970's, a sinai 1
seqment. of'the popul ation was rapidly emerging as a Saudi
ml dcii e ci ass This included manager-s, admini strators,
lec:hnicians, c:lei'ks, skilled workers, teachers, army
off i crs, and enqi neers	 In the absence of pol iti cal
irishituhions, (parliament, political parties...), their
impact on Saudi life was unclear, and they had no influence
on the public policy of the country, which remained in the
hands of ......house of Saud.
Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has approximately
25 per cenh of the world's proven resources, and is the
1 argest oil exporter and third 1 argest oil producer,
it was described as late as 1975 as "basically undeveloped
and	 . basically quite poor.""' This, of course, is riot
the case in 1988k
Sudi society is, In short, conservative, traditional,
and tribal, wIth the king acting not only as head of state,
bit also as chief linam arid chief tribal .shelkh.
;	 (i• Cj , ñhtju]. rahmaii II.
a.J.Ji a.
	
, in El -Mal 1 akh, r. (ed.
lic.LLgn, Washi nghon I). C. 5 Heath and Co. ,
J.902, p. iG1
'" fluqh , Wi. .1, ii aim, "Emerqnce of New Mi dcli e Class in Saudi
Arabia", i cJl	 aal, Winter 1973, p. 7.
Ai ns, Janses, U. B. Amiibassador to Saudi Arabi a, statement
in United Shates Conyress, House of Representatives,
Co;mmii ttoe on Iriternat onal Relations, The Persi an Gulf
11Z2 * fti t'unjpui	 )PbP9A	 s, Washing Ion
I). C.
	
U. S. lovernmnerit Printinq Office, 1976, p. 196.
(Buhs.:queiiti y referred to as U.s. Congress, fl
Prrrsi an ui f 1975.
37
in the Western world, 3,000 of them in the United States
alone.
Such developments in education and in other fields
introduced to the country ideas and influences totally
foreign to its society. Nevertheless, traditional
conservative Islamic values remained predominant.
With modernization, however, came foreigners, and
these created a new middle class. During the 1970's,
perhaps 40 per cent of the total population consisted of
foreignersi 80,000 from the Far East; 300,000 from India
and Pakistan; 400,000 from North and South Yemen; 350,000
from Egypt 50,000 from the United States and Western
countries, and 120,000 from elsewhere. They occupied a wide
range of positions in the country, from important posts to
menial jobs.
In general, there is great concern within the kingdom
regarding the potential social and political influence
of these people. The Saudis, therefore, keep them on a
tight rein, isolated, on short term contracts, and
always subject to immediate deportation at the
discretion of the regime. Within the foreign
community, there is resentment regarding this status
and treatment in Arabia. "
Within the country's native population, the social
structure also changed as a result of modernization. Until
the early 1960's, all political and economic power was held
by a very small, but extremely powerful group, consisting
of the House of Saud, the tribal sheikhs and the chief
ulama (religious leaders.) The bulk of the population -
nomadic bedouins, semi-nomadic herdsmen, and unski lied or
L..onçj , op .
	 p. 14.
NrLh 1979.
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Fol itical Infrastructure
From the creation of the Kingdom in 1932 until his
death in 1953, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud ruled the country
directly In the early days of his reign, he did not have
real control throughout the kingdom, but was rather the
strongest amorig the tribal chiefs, his control deriving
from their loyalty to him. This in turn was mainly achieved
through his many marriages, made to strengthen his
relationships with certain tribes, of whom the best known
were the Si.tdairi or the Al al-Sheikh He also gave
subsidies to the tribal chiefs, and after World War II, oil
wealth -
"allowed the king to distribute greater sums than ever
to tribal leaders.. Since this new income came from a
source totally outside the traditional economy and
accrued directly to the royal family, the latter's
power was further increased and other forces
weakened.. "fl"
During his reign, little was done to develop a
political structure within the kingdom.. Modern government
institutions did not exist.. 	 The Heja had witnessed the
setting up of some administrative organisations during the
1920's, but with its capture by NaJdi troops, these
gradually disappeared.. Although he had appointed his eldest
son, Saud, governor of NaJd, King Ibn Saud directed the
province's affairs himself..
The decisions of King Ibn Saud may have been personal,
but the king:
"must make special efforts to display the Bedouin
Sheikh 's attributes of courage, leadership, and
I....c::nei , ! a...Ji;.Lt._!...., i .. 57-5S
I2 L.ur:j ,
	
p	 31
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generosity and must act, ostensibly, on the basis of
tn bai cc:nserisus. "'
In addition, his kingship had a religious character.
"(His) authority rests partly on respect for what is
almost a religious Interpretation.
Indeed, Ibn Saud had assumed the title of Imam (religious
leader) , prior to declaring himself also first Sultan and
then King, and he continued to use both titles until his
death. Gradual 1 y, however, the religious nature of the
position weakened when King Saud's personal behaviour
failed to conform to Islamic teaching.
As has already been shown, the development of
admini strative structures was slow. Although the Council of
Ministers had a purely advisory role,' its creation
represented a significant step in developing the political
structure of the kingdom. Nevertheless,
"neither the death of Abd al-Aziz in 1953 and
assumption of power by the less adept Saud, nor the
introduction of a Council of Ministers in 1953.
substantially altered the political system. "
The Council of Ministers' advisory status continued
i.triti.l 1950, when King Saud was persuaded to permit his
br-other Pr-irice Faisal to be prime minister. The Council was
given some powers to deal with both domestic and foreign
affairs, in the face of the financial and political crisis
confronting the country in the late 1950's. The number of
ministers rose to fourteen in 1970, and to twenty by 1975.
F	 ,	 , ThJ!.1 c	 EitLc1 •, New York: Hol t
RI nehrt nd Winston, 1965, p. 402.
" Caroc, 01 f k ,
	 I	 ±_Jcr:, London: Macmill an, 1951 ,
36.
"' i	 I , I hr ah i in, Eu ..eaucracy anti Sociy in Saudi
Ar&bi, unub.l i. shPd Ph • I).
	 pj s , (Jni versi ty of
Vi.rqinia, 1971, p. 113.
" Ni hi o: 1< ,
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The nature and machinery of the Council of Ministers,
however, had been defined by royal decree, rather than by a
national constitution.
To this day, there is no formal written public
constitution in Saudi Arabia. In 1960, under the influence
of the "Free Princes", the Council of Ministers called for
constitutional monarchy and Parliament, which were opposed
by King Saud and the conservative elements of the House of
Saud. According to Prince Faisal
"Our constitution is the Koran and our law is the
Shari ah of Mohaininad (God's peace and blessing be upon
him) , our system of government is based on the
interest of this country, where such interest does not
conflict with the principles of our religion and the
Shari ah. "7
Similarly, when he came to power, King Faisal 's
response to public demand for Parliament and a constitution
was -
"A constitution, what for? The Koran is the oldest and
most efficient constitution in the world. Elections, a
Parliament? After the unfortunate experiments which
have been attempted in neighbouring countries, it is
better to forget all about it. Selieve me, Islam is a
sufficiently flexible and far-sighted religion to
ensure the happiness of our people. "
In the absence of a constitution, legislation in Saudi
Arabia is by royal decree, and only on minor issues does
the Council of Ministers have power to issue regulations.
Religious teachings are the source of the legislation,"
but where religious teaching does not apply, the icing's
decree has
	
tJP 1
	 The Shariah, which is the
Emb 'sy of Saud:i. Ar abi a, Prince Faial__Sks,
Wah:i.nqton D C. : 1962, p. 41.
" L.eMonde, Par-is;, June 24, 1966, adopted from Lackner,
p. 05.
L.er:zoki , George, Middle Eaet WorlcHCenter, New York:
Harper and Brother, 1950, p. 123.
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basis of Judicial authority, is in turn based on four
sources the Koran, Su;r,a (traditIons) , ljma (consensus)
and Qiyas (analogy.)	 (For the organisatlon of the
JLd1(:iai system, see Figure 1.4
Despite the fact that Saudi rabia has witnessed
important developments in various areas, and that its
government has become highly complex, the main deci si ons
remain with the office of the king, which is not defined by
any constitution The king is thus the chief figure of the
government and the centre of all political activity, and
his powers are extremely wide In Western terms, he is at
one and the same time chief of state, head of government,
religious leader, and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. He also exercises Judicial authority, through the
Ministry of Justice, (created in 1970,) particularly over
cases of political crime. It is the king who appoints all
ministers, nominates all ambassadors, selects all senior
government officials, appoints governors of the provinces
and promotes all military officers above the rank of
colonel. In short, the king ha full authority in all
legislative and executive rnatters. 	 But the nature of his
power depends on his ability and style.
The power of the throne was strengthened during King
Falsal's reign (1964-1975). He incorporated the office of
prime minister into the king's office under his authority,
and thus became not only head of state, but also head of
the Council of Ministers. During his predecessor, King
Saud's, reign (1953-1964), the separation of state from
'	 Niblock	 p. 104.
'	 Ii. S. Conqres, cces to 011, p. 53.
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government had been caused, among other reasons, by the
rivalry between the king arid his prime minister, then
Prince Faisal. The strength of King Faisal 's position
derivec:I from his ability to gain the support of the royal
family, the religious leaders, and the tribal sheikhs. King
Khalid, who suc::ceeded him to the throne in March 197,
remained the head of the government, but commanded less
power than his brother. For reasons of personal ill-health,
he shared power with Crown Prince Fand, who thus became the
most powerful man in the coi.ntry.
The king's authority is limited by a consensus within
the House of Saud. Once he can command its support, his
decisions are final and definitive, but in the absence of
organized political activity in Saudi Arabia, the House of
Saud is the central political actor. It serves as the
kingdom's constituency. A relatively small group within the
royal family participates in the decision-making process.
It was this group who deposed King Saud, replacing him with
his brother King Faisal in 194, and who installed King
Khalid as the latter#s successor eleven years later. The
number of the group, and the manner in which they operate
are unknown. According to the traditions of Arabian tribes,
the man with the most sons (not daughters) or brothers (not
sisters), and the greatest wealth, is accorded more power
within the tribes than others. This provides the only clue
to e>tplaining who wields most influence in the royal
family.
ThoTirncr., Ii&rc:h 26, 19;'5.
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As we have seen, despite the creation of modern
institutions, the political system continues to rest on
traditional relationships between the House of Saud, the
reliqious leaders, and the tribes. As a result of oil
wealth, the influence of the religious leaders and the
tribes is relat.ed to their relationships with the royal
family, rather than with each other. The influence of
technocrats, military officers and businessmen is difficult
to Judge because it too derives From their ties with
certain members of the Saudi family. '
rhe technocrats may be involved in decision-making,
and their views on certain issues are sometimes sought, but
final decisions rest with the king. On highly important
issues, certain Princes must Join the king in taking
decisions. For example, in 1977, a meeting of 250 Princes
was held to agree upon a Crown Prince to succeed Prince
Fand in the event of his assuming the throne. In 1979, the
more influential Princes	 -
-	 opposed the Camp David accord, in
defiance of Prince Fand.
Top Saudi officials are members of the royal family.
In 1975, the prime minister, (since 1964, a position held
by the king,) the first and the second deputy prime
ministers, the latter also being Head of the National
Guard, were members of the House of Saud, as were the
Ministers of Defense and Aviation, Foreign Affairs,
Interior, Municipal and Rural Affairs, and Public Works and
Housing, Three more ministers were from the Al al-Sheikh
u. s. c:;c)flqrE,	 cdui p. 54.
J hj	 p1 umi , L ,	 ptmber 1 7, 19 77, cr1U Apr i i	 , 1979
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religious family closely related to the Saudis. Others were
technocrats. (Gee Table 1.1.)
It must also be emphasized that most of the educated
top Saudi officials had studied in the United States.. As at
1972, of the 32 who had degrees, 21 had studied in the
United States.'
The members of the House of Saud number more than five
thousand.. The weight of their influence, however, varies
greatly. Since the death of King Ibn Saud, the crown has
remained with his eons - Saud, Faisal, Khalid, and Fand -
passing from brother to brother. The most powerful group
within the 'family is Al-Fand, so named after its eldest
member, Fand, and also known as the H Seven Gudai ri &', after
their mother-, who was 'from the Al-Sudairi family. (Indeed,
the Sudairi family's important position and influence in
Saudi politics derives from the fact that King Ibn Saud's
mother, as well as the mother of seven of his sons,
belonged to this famlly.) The seven in question are Fand,
Sultan, Sal man, Abd ar-Rahman, Nayif, Turki, and Ahmed, and
si> of them hold prominent government positions, such as
Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior. During
the 1970's, the "E3even Sudairi, along with their two half-
brothers, King Khalid and Prince Abdullah, and other eons
of King Ibr, Saud dominated the political life of Saudi
Arabia. ' Other branches of the House of Saud, the Saud Al-
Kabeer, the Ibri Jaluwi and the Thunyans, had some
'' Rucjh , up	 cit.., p	 16..
'	 DE	 • Mahn Fl.
unpubi ished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
1. d aho	 1979 ,
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Table 1..1
	 Principal Government Officia1	 (1975)
Sources Long, ocit., pp. 69-70.
Ki. nq anti Pr i me Mi. n i. ster -
Khal i d Ibn Abd al-Az i z Al -Saud
it-t it . pr-i Minister- and Crown Prince -
Fand Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
2nd Depu Ly Pri me Mini ster and Head of the National Guard -
Abdailah Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
Mi iii. st.er of I)eFene and Avi at.i on -
Sultan Ibn Abd al-Az i z Al -Saud
Mini ster of Foreign Affairs -
Saud Ibn Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
Ninisier of Interior --
Nayl f Ibn Abd al-Az i z Al -Saud
Mini ster- of Nuni ci pal and Rural Affairs -
Majid Ihn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
Minister of Public Works and Housing -
Mit'ab Ibn Ahd al-Aziz Al-Saud
Mini stE:'r if Aq.....i cul Lure and Water -
Dr.. Abd al-F:ahman Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-al-Sheikh
Iii ni sLer of Hi gher Educ:ati on -
Hassan Ibn Abdal 1 ah Al -al -Shei kh
IIi ni ster of Juti	 -
]:hrahi m Ibn I1uharnmad Ibn Ibrahi rn Al -al -Shei kh
Fli ni st.er of Commerce -
Dr. Suleiman Abd al-Aziz al-Suleiman
Mi n i s I er of Corn mu n i c at i on s -
Muhammad Umar Tawf i q
Minisler of Education -
Dr Abd Al Az i z Abdal 1 ah al -Khuwai ter
Minister of Finance and National Economy -
Muhammad Aba al-Khail
Mini sler of Heal th -
Dr. Hussain Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi
Mini sler of Industry and Electricity -
Or. Shazi Abd al-Rahman al-Ousaybi
Minister of Information -
Dr. Muhammad Abdu Yarnani
Mi. ni ster of Labour and Social Affairs -
Ibrahm Ibn Abdallah al-Anqari
Mini ster of F'etrol eum and Mineral Resources -
Ahrnad Zaki Yamani
Minister of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Affairs -
Abd al-Wahhab Ab al-Wasi
Mini ster- of P1. anni nq -
Hi sham Muh I al -Din Nazi r
Mini ster f Posts, Tel egraph and Tl ephone -
Dr. Alawl Oar-wish Kayyai
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Influence, as did to a lesser extent the grandsons of King
Ibn Saud who had been educated in the United States and
Elritain, and who could be said to be "royal technocrats".
Apart from the House of Saud, other families played an
important role In the political life of the kingdom. One of
these is the Al al-Sheikh, descended from Mohammad Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab, the religious leader responsible, as we have
shown, for the Wahhabi movement which emerged in the mid-
eighteenth century and for the original alliance between
the Hoi.ise of Saud and the Al al-Sheikh, an alliance which
was further strengthened by Inter-marriage. They were
influential In obtaining King Saud's replacement by his
brother Faisal. As a religious family, they played a
significant part in the judicial process, one of them being
Minister of Justice in 1975.
In addition some of the wealthier families in the
country have some political influence, as do some powerful
Naidi tribes, including the Utaiba, Motair, Shammer, Bani
Khalid, E'anl Hajar etc.'" (See Figure 1.5 For the
distribution of the Saudi tribes.) Their influence,
however, declined over recent years, partly because of the
effect of increased Saudi wealth noted above. Nevertheless,
the Saudi family still relies on the support of the tribes
to maintain internal security.
In conclusion, the Saudi political system can be said
to have several key characterIstics first, the House of
'' Long , c:p. c:it., pp. 29-3L
Al I , Fari Al yami , "The Coming Instabi 1 1 ty in Saudi
Arabia", \k •	 ipok, Vol 2, No 0, September 1977,
p. 2i	 Dij, op.cjk.J, pp. 24-25.
Anthony, op . jj. _, p. 94.
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Saud	 the dominant power second, the loyalty and
cohesi vere	 of the royal family I eentI al to the
stability of the country; third, the authority of the House
of Saud has religious roots, and religion still influences
Saudi life; and finally, the Saudi political system has
seen relative stability, compared with other Middle Eastern
countri es.
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Chapter TWO
SAUI)I-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1928-1967)
Saudi-American relations developed greatly during the
four decades 1928 to 1967, from limited economic relations
with some American companies and individuals, to the full
breadth of a government to government relationship, that is
from private economic interests to national interests,
embracing oil, military, political and economic
considerations.
This is not to say that the United States had no prior
relations with the Arabian peninsula. For instance, the
peninsula's coastal areas, (Basrah, Kuwait, Oman and
Muscat,) were familiar with the activities of American
missionaries before the twentieth century. Certain of these
missionaries, particularly doctors, had contact with the
Saudi family. Although they failed in their religious
objectives, thanks to the cultural and medical nature of
their activities in the peninsula, they created a suitable
climate for the arrival of the American oilmen in coming
years. 1.
1. j) NovE, John A.	 _teresnd Policies in the!IL...:LL.L2i, Minneapolis University oF
Minnesota Press, 1963, p. 35; Malone, Joseph 3.
'America and the Arabian peninsula The First Two
Hundred Years", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 30, No.
3, Summner 1976, p. 145.
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It must be admitted, however, that the relationship of
Ibn Saud with the tJni tEed States was limited before the
1930's, for the following reasons.
In the first place, Britain had been the dominant
foreiqn power in the area since the defeat of the Ottoman
empire in World War 1. During the war, Britain supported
Ibn Saud and gave him financial aid. At the same time
British policy did not address the political situation in
the desert interior of the peninsula, simply because
Britain considered it to be a traditional conflict between
Arabian tribes. The British concerned themselves mainly
with the coastal areas of the peninsula, from E(asrah in the
north to Aden In the south-west. In fact the principal
reasons for the good relations that e>tisted between Britain
and Ibri Saud were firstly the latter's hostility to the
Ottoman government, and secondly his restraining Saudi-
Wahhabi forces from attacking British dominions in the
area.
In the second place, in general the United States had
no active foreign policy until the end of the 30's.
Subsequently, its relations with the area were limited. In
many cases the State Department asked the Foreign Office to
advise it on Arabian peninsula affairs.
In the third place, mindful of Britain's dominant
role, it was under pressure from American oil companies
that the United States adopted the so-called "open-door"
9E	 9Ø	 .i. /29	 The Secretary of State to the
Abactorto Great Bri t.ai n (Dawes) , Washington,
February :L0, 1931.
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policy. This policy aimed to gain an American share in
Middle East oil concessions. It was important that American
companies should have a significant share of Iraqi and
Kuwai t.i concessi one, and monopoly concessi on agreements
with Eahraln and Saudi Arabia before World War U. The
"open door" policy marked the beginning of rivalry over oil
concessions in the area between the United States and
Britain. '
During the period between the two World Wars, the
United States' economic and cultural interests increased,
but the State Department still did not formulate any formal
policy on the area.
It is inlpol-tar)t to appreciate that it was Ibn Saud who
took the first steps to foster a relationship between him
and the United States, his reasons being as follows.
Firstly, Ibn Saud did not trust British policy on the
area. He believed that Britain had supported his rival,
Sharif Hussain, the former King of Hejaz, and then his
sons, who governed in the Transjordan emirate and the
kingdom of Iraq, which lay to the north of Saudi territory,
and persisted in this belief all his life. Hence his
seeking another foreign power to counterbalance British
power in the area. He established relations with the Soviet
Union in the early days of his rule, but the Soviet Union
had neither the capital nor the technical ability to
compete with British oil companies in oil e>ploration.
Stoi:kinq, Leurqo L'J.. Mii1etOj.j, Vanderbit, 1970, p.
1:13.
yEon, T.A. Americ.nDip1omaticRelaUons with the
Netucheru The Scarecrow Press,
.1977, pp. 9-iDEJ.
Secondly, in 1923, Ibn Saud had granted oil
exploration rights to a Er1tish company, the Eastern
3enerai Syndicate of London. After two years' prospecting,
the company was convinced that there was no oil in
commercial quantities. It therefore withdrew and the
concession was officially terminated in 192S
Thirdly, the territories under Ibn Saud's control
extended to embrace what is now knowrt as the kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. The immediate consequence of this extension
was that the limited resources of the Arabi an peninsula did
not meet the expenditure of the new state. Income from
pilgrimage, the basic and principle income of the peninsula
at the time, decreased as a result of the world slump of
the early 1930's. In 1927, the number of pilgrims was
130,000; four years later it had fallen to only 40,000.6
This fall in income forced Ibn Saud to look abroad for
financial aid.
Fourthly, since the nature of Ibn Saud's authority
rested on independence, with religious roots, it resisted
any foreign presence on his territory. Thus it was logical
to look for a foreign power that had no active presence in
the area, and it was the United States who had only
commercial and cultural interests. Furthermore, the United
States was considered to be unimperialistic in the early
part of the century.
Fbi 1 by,	 p.ti.L., p. 329.
L.acknor ,
	
p. 30.
Ki nq Abut al. Pc. i Ibn Saud 'al ways appreci atect the wi sdom
by which t.Iuo bedouifl , if they could choose (preferred
a di:	 ally) on the	 qi' unds that it was less likely
to iniI'-frci? in their own local affairs. ' Lacey,
SufFol 1:: Fontana/Col ii n , 1982,
p. 236.
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These factors then, together with the British policy
on the heart of the peninsula noted already, forced Ibn
Saud to seek an American role in the area at a relatively
early stage. It comes as no surprise that the first Saudi
communication with the United States was in 1928, when the
Sri ti sh oil coricessi on was officially terminated.
On September 28, 1928, the Saudi Minister of Foreign
Affairs, in a letter to the Department of State sent both
directly and via the American legation in Cairo, sought to
obtain diplomatic recognition of the kingdom of Hejaz and
NaJd . The Department of State decided that the time was not
ripe to meet this request, despite the fact that Britain,
the Soviet Linion, France and the Netherlands had recognized
the kingdom in 1927. The main reason behind the American
decision was its limited interests and relations in the
Arabian peninsula.
Ironically, it was a former British officer, a Muslim
convert and advisor to Ibn Saud, Harry St.John Philby, who
played an important role in developing relations between
Ibn Saud and the United States in both political arid
economic fields.' Early in 1931, Philby had a meeting with
the American Ambassador in Cairo, in which he endeavoured
to obtain American diplomatic recognition of the kingdom
arid to establish diplomatic relations between the two
O98 F.0i/i8 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Fqvpt (Gunther) , IJashi ncton , January 7, 1929.
pj 1 by, Harry St. John ,
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countri es. The Ambassador subsequently recommended this to
the Department of State. In February 1931, the American
(inbassador in London requested a meeting with the Hejazi
Ambassador in London, to discuss the Saudi request. The
Department of State also asked the Foreign Office for their
advice on the matter.
On May 1, 1931, the State Department informed the
Hejazi A,nbassarJor in London that the United States extended
full diplomatic recognition to the kingdom of Hejaz and
Najd and Its dependencies.11
American recognition of Ibn Saud's government formed
part of a new general policy towards the area resulting
from its increased economic interests there, particularly
relating to oil. (Hence also the United States'
establishment of relations with the kingdoms of Iraq and
Yemen in 1931.) In the same month, May 1931, Philby
arranged a meeting in Jeddah between Ibn Saud and a former
American diplomat, Charles R. Crane, who had represented
the United States' President, Woodrow Wilson, in the King
Crane commission to the Middle East ten years earlier.
Crane agreed to conduct a survey of the kingdom at his own
expense, the aim being to prospect for water and gold, Ibn
Saud's hope of finding oil having vanished after the
Dr-itish failure some years earlier. Crane employed an
American mining engineer, Karl Twitchel 1, and after several
months, Twi tchel 1 advised the Saudi government that there
was insufficient water to develop the agriculture of the
1t) 090 F0i/29a, n..cij.
11 090 F. 01 /34a Tel eqrain. The Secretary of State to the
Ambasador in Great. DriUain (Dawes) , Washington, May
1, 1931...
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ki nç(:Icm and sone hope of f i ndi ncj commercial quanti ties of
gold, but most importantly that he believed that the
stern area of the country contai ned oil in commercial
qu ant i t	 1
Twitchell returned to the United States to persuade
American companies to invest in the eastern area of the
kingdom. The Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL),
which already had the oil concession in neighbouring
Bahrain, and had struck oil there, expressed an interest in
doing so. One of the company's executives accompanied
Twitchell to Sa..idi Arabia and an agreement was reached with
Ibn Saud, allowing the company a sixty-year oil. concessi on,
one of the largest in the world.1Z
Several months later, towards the end of 1933, the
State Department signed a treaty of friendship with the
Saudi government, giving both countries the most favoured
nation status. 1' This in itself did not represent any
significant advance in the countries' relations, since the
signing of such a treaty was normal State Department policy
at the time. Witness the fact that the American
administration did not at the time consider it necessary to
open a legation In Saudi Arabia..
Sliwadran, Li pnj In1
F'ower., I\Irw York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. , 1955, p.
' Tw:i. tc:hei 1, Karl S. Saudi Arahia With anAccount of th
3rd edition,
Fri nceton Pr-i nceton University Press, 1959, p. 222;
Phiiby, op , c .	 P. 331.
114 71 1.. 9 F2/42 The Secretary of State t.o the Ambassador
in Great Br-i tai n (Di ncjham) , Washi nqton , October 17,
1 933..
' Or ay;on , Ben son Lee,	 jjc:rjRe1atns,
Wa!hi rjton: Uni vei'-si ty Fress of America Inc.. , 1992, p.
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in this parly staqe of bilateral relations, the
Paleitinlan ie was the only one on which the two
countries difered.. In December 1930, King Ibn Saud
informed President Roosevelt by letter of his opinion on
this issue, which was that widespread Jewish propaganda was
deceiving the American people, and thai Jewish immigration
would damage the rights of the Palestinians.
Prior to this, on July 12, 1937, the oil companies had
war ii e d
"that any disposition or the part of this government
to si.ipport Jewish claims	 • might have serious
reperc:ussions on American oil interests in Saudi
Arabia and might even result in their expuision"1
The kinqs letter indicated the Saudi wish for an
early American role In the Palestinian problem, whilst the
companies' warning suggested for the first time the link
between oil and the Pal esti ni an I
On February 15, 1939, the State Department informed
the Saudi government that the United States favoured a
Jewish homeland, but it did not intervene to support the
Jewish claim, because it was the Sritish who had the
responsibility for dealing with the problem1
Two months later, the State Department realized the
need to establish permanent American diplomatic
representation in Saudi Arabia Doubtless, their reason for
doing so was not the difference of opinion over the
Palestinian issue, but rather the increased number of
' 87 Nh t1i /13c4 The Charq in Egypt (r'lerri an) to the
3reiary of State, Cairo December 15, 1938.
r.	 S1:arIrtJ 011 Co. /93 ME?fflorafldum by the Chief
of the Dlvi si on of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) ,
Wash 1 nqLon , 3u1 y 12, 1937
' Or' ayi;on ,
	
p •
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American citizens in Saudi Arabia and the greater American
investment in the ki ncjdom, coupi ed with American of 1
interests, particularly after the discovery of oil in
ct)mmerci ai quanti U es and under pressure from the oil
compani es. '
In July 1939, the American Minister in Cairo was
transferred to Saudi Arabia by Roosevelt. Seven months
later he presented his credentials to the king. This event
marked the end of the early stage of relations between the
two count.ri es
This stage had thus been characterized by limited
political relations, American oil interests, and Anglo
American rivalry over the Saudi ol. 1 concessions.
World War II
World War II greatly affected bilateral relations
between the iJnitd States and Saudi Arabia. The kingdom
declared its neutrality in the war, but was not sheltered
from its impact, which caused it great economic hardship.
The number of pilgrims declined further and the oil
companies simultaneously limited their activities in the
country. Together, these events triggered a financial
crisis in Saudi Arabia.
To tackle this problem, King Ibn Saud requested
financial aid From the oil companies, from the British
government and from the United States. Britain granted a
subs .I dy but its assi stance was limited due to war
:r L±:I
pcdit.ure., Ibn Sai.id t erefore turred to the Cail I f orni a
Ar abi an Standard 0±1 Company (CASOC)
CASOC sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt on
April 1.6, 1941, requesting that he provide the Saudi
government with financial aid. The Justifications for this
were Saudi sympathy for the Allies, American investment in
the country, the huge quantities of oil discovered in it,
and the companys fear of British influence in the kingdom
± nc:reasi nq •
President Roosevelt refused to give direct aid to
Saudi Arabia. He Informed ...... the British of his hope that
the British could take care of the financial needs of King
Ihn Saud.." CASOC came to a financial arrangement with
Britain to give Saudi Arabia that assistance
Despite the fact that the British subsidy relieved
some of the Saudi pressure on American companies for aid,
they feared that British aid might increase British
influence on the king and Jeopardize their chances of
obtaining the oil concession. They therefore continued to
urge the United States to provide direct financial
assistance..
The State t)epartment, realizing that refusal might
harm bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, sent a telegram
.t.2) S9 F,, 51 /B 1. /2 Mr James A.. Moff at 	 President
F<oseve]. ., Wash i ngton , Apr . 1 16 , 1941
G9 F.. 51 /29 Te]. eqram. The Secretary of State to the
lii ni ster i. n Eg ypt (Kirk) , Washinqton , September 26,
1941 l'iosl ey, Leonard, E:. r.iii_Q.i 1 in the Middle
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on September 26, 1941, to the American legation in Cairo,
urging it to do all in its power to notify King Ibn SaucJ of
American concern abo..t Saudi needs The Department proposed
that experts in engineering and agriculture should be
supplied, since these were the areas for which assi stance
hac:I been expressly requested, the cost of such a mission to
he met by the United States government. 	 In the same
spirit, in a letter to the king, President Roosevelt
explained his realization that the war had disturbed the
normal economy of Saudi Arabia, referred to the need to
destroy "the evil Forces of Germany, Italy and Japan," and
expressed his hope that King Ibn Saud would strive towards
t.his goal'
This letter was warmly welcomed by Ibn Saud, who
subsequently, in August 1942, allowed American and British
overflights, which provided a direct route via Iran to the
Soviet Union, who received war material from the Allies.
Early in 1943, representatives of the American oil
companies once again urged the Roosevelt administration to
give Saudi Arabia financial supports In return, they
offered to sell oil to the government at less than the
international rate. 	 Their fear that the United States
might fall into second place behind the British in Saudi
F. 51/29: Tel eqram. The Secretary of State to the
Mini ster in Eqypt (Kirk) , t'Jashinyton, September 26,
194i.
4 q9( F. t1 Ibn Sa..d/3): The Under Secretary of State
(Welles) ho President Roosevelt, Wash I ngton, Februar'y
:12, 1942w
S9 F. 7962/27: Tel egram. The Charq in Saudi Arabi a
(Moc:se) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, August 29,
1942
' Ki. ik , 3eorqe E 	 lel!...........Jfltj3,
London: 1J>f(rcI Universit y Press, 1952, p. 357.
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Arabia was shared by the secretary of State Cordell Hall
and others in the administration. Hull warned,
"If Saudi Arabia is permitted to lean too heavily upon
the British, there is always the danger that the
British will request a qid pro quo in oil. To obviate
this danger, it is recommended tha this government
share the subsidy on an overall basis with the
E'r ± t I
Hence, on February 18, 1943, President Roosevelt's
declaration that 'the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to
the defense of the United States. "
Not only did this declaration make Saudi Arabia
eligible for lend-lease assistance, it also marked the
beginning of a new phase in Saudi-American relations and a
milestone in the development of American policy on the
Middle East.
In addition to this, it suggested the beginning of the
rivalry between the United States and Britain over
political interests in the kingdom. One month before the
declaration was made, the American Minister in Cairo had
advised the State Department that an American subsidy
through British channels would be damaging to American
prestige in Saudi ArabIa. The day after the declaration,
the State Department advised the British Treasury
representative in Washington of the United States'
government's interest in the stability of Saudi Arabia, due
to American oil interests there, and expressed the wish
that the British government might inform it about
Hull, Cnrdell, Memoirs, Vol. 2, London Hodder and
Stouchton , 194F3 , p. i513.
890 F.24/32 President Roosevelt to the Land-Lease
Admi ni strator (Stetti nius) , Washington, February 18,
1943.
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discussions between Britain and Saudi Arabia . on financial
aid, to which America wished to contribute.
The State Department also recognized the need to raise
the level of American diplomatic representation in Saudi
Arabia. In its view, this was necessary because Saudi
Arabia had the largest proven oil reserves in the world,
because en American company held the concession for that
oil, and because the War and Navy Departments had an
interest in having access to it.
1943 witnessed further developments. In April, the
Saudi government forwarded a request, via the British
legation in Jeddah, 'for arms from the United States..
British mediation between Saudi Arabia end the United
States was not acceptable to the State Department, and the
American government informed Britain and Saudi Arabia that
the Saudi government should communicate their request
directly.t
This the Saudi government duly did on July 9, 1943.
The items requested included -
" (1) equipment for the manufacture of cartridges and
arms; (2) equipment for the repair of armsp (3) rifles
and cartridges; (4) tanks, armed armoured cars for use
on plains, on rough terrain, and in sand; (5) light
guns for emergency use; (6) anti-aircraft guns; (7)
airplanes to carry mail inside the country and for
890 F. 51.6/1: Memorandum of Conversation by the Advi ser
on International Economic Affairs (Feis), Washington,
Fehruar-y 19, 1943.
124 90F/31a: The Secretary of State to President
Roosevelt, Washington, March 30, 1943.
500 241.E-2543: The Secretary of State to Admiral. William
D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of
Army and Navy, Washington, May 25, 1943; 50024/981:
Teieçjram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
the United Kingdom (Winat) , Washington, June 19, 1943;
500.24/1000: Telegram. The Ambassador in the United
Kingdom to the Secretary of State, London, July 8,
1943.
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other uses (8) technicians to give instruction in the
use of all equipment.."
The State Department delayed its response, believing
that if it met this request, it would lead to direct
American intervention in the affairs of the area. It also
did not agree that the Saudi government needed this kind of
equipment, nor the quantities requested.. In fact, it needed
only limited equipment to maintain internal stability.
Thus in March 1944, nearly eight months after the
Saudi request was forwarded, the United States sent 1,600
rifles and 30,000 rounds of ammunition to its legatlon in
Jeddah for the Saudi government. The military training
mission followed in April..
The arrival of this mission was the beginning of a
military link between the two countries.. Despite the fact
that oil remained central to bilateral relations, it was
now no longer the only area of mutual interest.
1943 also saw new developments, however, in oil-
related aspects of United States-Saudi relations. The idea
of direct intervention in the activity of American oil
companies working abroad emerged. The Interior and Navy
Departments believed that it was not in the interests of
national security that the United States government should
be dependent on private oil companies to meet its
requl rements..
As a result, the United States government decided in
mid-1943 to establish the Petroleum Reserves Corporation
(PRC), the main goal of which was to obtain total or part
990 F24/41 Telegram. The Appointed Minister Resident
in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State,
Jeddh , July 9, 1943.
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ownership of the Saudi oil concession of the Standard Oil
Corporation of California and the Te>tas Corporation.
This new move was opposed by the oil companies, which
believed that it was not in their interests, and that
"the acquisition of control by the American government
would briny it into the oil business everywhere in the
world.
The government and the oil companies remained fundamentally
opposed on this issue.
In July 1943, President Roosevelt invited King Abd al
Azi or members of the Royal family to visit the United
States..	 The invitation was accepted and the king Informed
the Department of State that his two sons, Princes Faisal
and Khalld, would visit Washington. The event was of
significance insofar as firstly, it was the first high-
level meeting between Saudi and American representatives;
secondly, the two princes were subsequently to become kings
of Saudi Arabia, (Faisal from 1964 to 1975 and Khalid from
1975 to 1952;) and finally, it laid the foundations for
future relations In all fields.
The Princes arrived in Washington in October 1943
They held several meetings with senior officials of the
Department of State and were received by President
Roosevelt. Prince Faisal told the Department of State that
000 63 /i234a Memorandum by the Secretary of State to
Presi dent Roosevelt, Washi ngton, June 14, 1943.
Fei s, Hei"bert, Petroleum and meri can Foreign Policy,
Caiifornia 1944, p. 39.
in fact, the Department of State was coming to doubt the
wisdom of this policy; see its view in 800 F.6363/58:
Tel eqram. The Mini ster in Egypt (Kirk) to the
Secretary of State, Cairo, July 27, 1943.
890 F )Oii/97 The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia
(Moose) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, October 25,
1.943.
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"his father and he were very much interested in
American policy in the Near East ... (King Ibn Saud)
hoped to know something of American opinion, since in
dealing with his friends the King did not like to take
any action which might interfere with their policies."
He also raised the question of Saudi security, saying that
"King Ibn Saud had information that the Hashemite
family was trying to add to the territory under its
control...
The King was also strongly of the opinion that the
Hashemite house (in Iraq and TransJordan) was trying to
surround Saudi Arabia and to strangle it.
"Arnir Faisal made it clear that his father was
especially suspicious of Nun al-Said, Prime Minister
of Iraq, and of Amir Abdullah of Transiordan."
The Department of State informed Prince Faisal that
American policy was
"in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic charter,
that each people should have a government of its own
choosing. "7
The Saudi government mistrusted British policy in the
area, particularly its relations with the Hashemite family
in Iraq and Transiordan. It therefore endeavoured to
improve its relations with the United States in every
field, and in particular in the field of security. For its
part, the United States was concerned mainly with the
kingdoms oil, and it recognized British political
interests within Saudi Arabia. 	 King Ibn Saud, however,
took a different view. In his meeting with the American
Minister, he stated that,
"the British would continue to be his friends because
he is grateful for past aid and because he fears they
S90 F.fWJi1/1S2: Memorandum of conversation by the Chief
of the Division of Near-Eastern A-ffairs (Ailing).
:	 74 øCi1E. Stettjnius Mission/112 1/2: The Under
Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of
State, Washington, May 22, 1944.
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miqht loose their restraint on his enemies, such as
the Hshemite family. But, he continued, their present
policy would ruin his country. His people are sorely
tried b y wartime conditions and progressive
desiccation of Arabia... Therefore additional aid from
friend].y United States of America would be most
welcome. He remarked that one day it might be
necessary for Saudi Arabia to look to the United
States of America for all its requirements."
In September 1944, the United States appointed Colonel
William Eddy its new Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia. In
the course of a long meeting with Shaikh Vussuf Vassin,
Deputy Foreign Minister and Private Secretary to King Ibn
Saud, Eddy was told, "The King is convinced of the personal
friendship of President Roosevelt which he reciprocates."
But,
"when the King sees the great nation of America
content to have its economic activity in Arabia
reduced and defined by its ally, Britain, America in
turn will surely understand that Saudi Arabi a may be
excused if it yields to the same constraint from the
same source, not merely to please an ally, but to
survive."
He added his desire for
"some large area in which Saudi Arabia and America can
collaborate alone, on a basis that leads far beyond
the end of the war."
Despite the fact that the Saudi government did not
explain the nature of the special relationship which it
sought with the United States, the Department of State
realized the importance of its relations with Saudi Arabia
and the need to develop them, given the expectation that
the World War II was about to end and the exceptional
importance Saudi oil would have in the post-war period.
990 F. 24/164: Telegram. The Minister Resident in Saudi
Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah,
Apr i. 1.29, 1944.
890 F.50/9-744. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia
(Eddy) •
	
Secretary of State, Jeddah, April 29,
1944.
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In a memorandum to President Roosevelt, the State
Department e>plained why " an American national interest,
basically strategic in character, exists in Saudi Arabia"
as follows
1. A strong and independent Saudi Arabian
government in the Near East	 is less likely to fall
victim to war-breeding aggression...
2. The vast oil reserves of Saudi Arabia
should be safeguarded and developed in order tD
suppi ement western hemi sphere oil reérves as a source
of world supply.
. The military authorities urgently desire
certain facilities in Saudi Arabia ... such as the
right to construct military airfields and flight
privileges for military aircraft..." 41-
On February 14, 1945, whilst returning from Yalta,
President Roosevelt met King Ibn Saud at the Suez Canal
and shortly thereafter the kingdom declared war on the Axis
powers. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia sent a delegation to the
United Nations Conference in San Francisco. President
Roosevelt told the Congress,
"... of the problem with Saudi Arabia, I learned more
about the whole problem, the Moslem problem, the
Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five
minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two
or three dozen letters."
As a result of the leaders meeting, the United States
government made a comprehensive plan of aid for Saudi
Arabia. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
recommended
"	 (a) The immediate and interim, although indirect,
assistance which can be furnished by the War
Department through (1) the construction of military
1- 890 F.5:L/12--2044: Memorancium by •Lhe Secretary of State
to Prei dent Roosevelt, Washi nqton, December 22, 1944.
For drtaii5 of this meeting see Howarth, David, The
r:.}nJ1Li_Yi_nci_h_A rab1 a, New York:
Mc:Gr--Hi 11 , 1964, pp. 251-256.
E3her.'jood, Robert H. gg	 ncjpkins: An IntimateLir, New York: Harper and Bros., 1948, pp. 871-
872.
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airfields; (2) the improvement of roads; and (3) the
despatching of a military mission; and
(b) the longer range and much more important
direct assistance which may conceivably be supplied
through arrangements relating to the oil resources. I'
On May 13, 194Z, the American Minister in Jeddah
informed the Secretary of State,
"King Abdul Aziz grants permission for construction of
an airfield at Dhahran ..." and "... use of field by
United States forces for period of 3 years after the
end of the war. "
Dy the end of the same month, the new President Truman
gave his approval to the Department of State's plan for aid
to the kingdom.46
In late June, the Department of State told the
Minister in Jeddah that the Dhahran airfield project was
important to American national interests. It was not so,
however, on grounds of military necessity.47
Less than ten days later, King Ibn Saud told the
United States government that he could not accept its
planes on military missions. In the American Minister's
judgment, the reasons underlying the king's decision were
the Saudi reluctance to accept any foreign presence, the
890 F.51/2-2245 Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the
State--War-Navy Coordinating Cornmi ttee
' 090 F.24B/5-1345 Telegram. The Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, May 13,
1945.
890 F.5i/ .... 2845 Memorandum of conversation, by the
Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), Washington,
May 20, 1945.
? 090 F. 240/6,-2545 Telegram. The Acting Secretary of
StaLe to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)
Washington, June 25, 1945.
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king's fear of Hashemite propaganda against him, and
British oL:jections because they had no share in the base.4
The Department of State believed that the Saudi
attitude can be explained only in terms of British
pressure. "'
This was not the case. The real reason was to be found
in the delay In American financial aid. The American
government realizing this, on July 29, 1945, the British
and American governmentE informed the Saudi Minister of
Finance of their agreement to donate $5 million each to his
government. America would also provide an additional $6
millior).' From this event followed the increase in
American influence and the decrease in British influence in
the area.
Less than a week later, the Saudi government "agreed
to the construction and operation of (Dhahran) airbase by
the United States Army" during war time "and for its
continued use by the United States Armed Forces for a
period of three years after" the end of the war.t
890 F. 20 Mission/7-445 Telegram. The Vice-Consul at
Dhahran (Sands) to the Secretary of State, Dhahran,
July 4, 194E5 890 F.20 Mission/7-845: The Minister in
Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah,
July 9, 19.15.
890 F.24E3/7-3Ø45 The Acting Secretary oF State to the
Minister in saudi Arabia (Eddy), Washington, July 13,
1945.
	
'' 890 F: .24,7_3O4	 The Minister in SalAdi Arabia (Eddy) to
the Secretary of Stt p , Jeddah, July 30, 1945.
	
890 F.249/9-84	 The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to
the Secretary of State, Jeddah, August 8, 1945.
Enclosure i The American Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy) to th Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for
Foreign A..F .Fa rs (Yassin) , RiyacJh, August 3, 194S;
End neure I I The Saudi Arabian Acting Mini ster for
Foreign Affai r s (Yassin) to the American Minister in
Saudi Arabia (Eddy), Iiyadh, August 6, 194S
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Despite the war with Japan ending on August 14 194,
the United States government decided that the Dhahran
airbase should be completed.
The war years thus witnessed the real beginnings of
bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United
States, which - despite their limitations - were to form
the basis of future developments in all fields.
But the war years also brought considerable setbacks
over the Palestinian issue. The two governments differed
because of the religious nature of the Saudi authority on
the one hand, and Zionist pressures on the United States on
the other. In March 1943, King Ibn Saud told an American
journal i st,
"1 do not know that the Jews have any Justification
•for their claims in Palestine. 	 The Jews.. .have no
right to the country... It is unjust to the Arabs and
Moslems, and...it only creates friction between the
Moslems amd their friends, the Allies. "
In the course of a meeting with the American Minister
in Cairo, who visited Saudi Arabia in April 1943, King Ibn
Saud told him that hostility had existed between Arab and
Jew since the days of the prophet Mohammed. He also told
him that he was more particularly concerned about the
situation in Palestine than any other ruler in the area,
because the Saudi government had interests in the areas
future. He added that the great wealth of the Jewish
community had a great influence on the policies of the
United States and Britain. The king warned that continued
Record of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot
52-N45 MemoranrJum by the Acting Secretary of State to
Prei dent Truman , Washi nyton , undated; Memorandum by
President Truman to the Actincj Secretary of State,
Washi nqton , September 28, 1945.
The Times, June 22, 1943.
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Jewish immigration to Palestine would damage Allied
interests, especially during the war..
On April 30, 1943, Ibn Saud, in a letter to President
Roocevelt stated his view that the Jews had the support of
the Allies because of the situation which had arisen during
the war.. He asked him to intervene to halt Jewish
immigration to Palestine and suggested that the Allied
countries should allow the Jews to settle in their
territories.	 The President's reply was in general terms.
He expressed the hope that Arabs and Jews would resolve
their differences in a friendly way. He declared America's
opposition to any change in the situation without
consultation with both Arabs and Jews. In July 1943, the
President's special envoy to the Middle East relayed to
King Ibn Saud President Roosevelt's suggestion that he
discuss the Palestinian problem with a representative of
the Jewish Agency, a suggestion rejected by the king.8
On January 12, 1945, President Roosevelt was informed
by the Director of American Economic Operations in the
Middle East that King Ibn Saud felt very strongly about the
Palestinian issue and that there was no middle ground
between them on this. Underlying the king's attitude was
the strength of his religious beliefs, coupled with the
B9 F.0G)/81 Telegram. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to
the Secretary of State, Cairo, April 17, 1943.
890 F.00/09: I<iricj Abdul Aziz lbn Saud to President
Roosevelt, Saudi Arabia, April 30, 1943..
867 N0:I./1997 1/2: Memorandum of conversation, by
L.i eutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoski ns, Washington,
September 27, 1943.
76
fact that his kingdom contained two of the most important
cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.
Two weeks later, the Saudi government warned the
United States legation that if the United States supported
Jewish demaricis, relations between their governments would
b affected..''
When he met King Ibn Saud on February 14, 1945,
President Roosevelt raised the question of the 3ews in
Europe. The king suggested that they should return to their
homes or be given homes in those Axis countries which would
accept them. He expressed his strong opposition to the idea
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The President told him
that he would not support the Jews against the Arabs.
The Director of the Office of Near East and African
Affairs, in a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State
on March 20, 1945, warned that the President's support of
Zionism could lead to bloodshed in the Middle East and
jeopardize American oil interests in Saudi Arabia.
The American Director of Economic Operations in the
Micidie East (Landis) to President Roosevelt. In United
States Department of State, Est1na...flel ati ons and the
Unieç:lS, Diplomatic Papers 1945, Vol. VIII, The
Near East and Afri ca, Washi nçjton D. C U. S. Government
Printing Office, 199, pp. 6G0-682.
867 N.O:i/2--145: Telegram, The Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, February 1,
1945.
711 9F/21445: Memorandum of conversati on between the
I: mg of 3audi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Al Saud) and
Fresi dent Roosevelt, February 14, 1945, aboard the
IJ.S.S, IIflujflcyU
' c37 N.0i/3-1945: Memorandum by the Director of the
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to
the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, March 20,
1945.
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In response to recommendations from the State
t>epartrnent, the President, in a letter to King Ibn Saud on
April 1, 1 q45, stated
"that no decision be taken with respect to the Arabs
and ,jews	 during our recent conversation I assured
you that I would take no action	 which might prove
hostile to the Arab people	 the policy of this
government in this respect is unchanged."6t
A week later President Roosevelt died. His successor,
Harry Truman, ignored this commitments
The significant effects of the war on Saudi-United
States relations can thus be summarized as follows. The
United States administration still failed to formulate a
clear-cut policy on Saudi Arabia, because it continued to
hold the view that Britain was the dominant power in the
area. American oil companies persuaded the Administration
to develop relations with Saudi Arabia, in order to
safeguard it oil interests, this being the prime objective
of tJnited States policy, if any. Rivalry between Britain
and the United States over oil continued. Financial
hardship in Saudi Arabia motivated the Saudi desire to
foster a relationship with the United States, a
relationship which Saudi Arabia then endeavoured to extend
to cover security issues The two countries' differing
stands on the Palestinian issue did not affect their
relations in other fields.
" Maqru;, Ral ph H 'd ) Docum+ntn the NI dcli e East ,
Wahi nyton American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1969, p. 149.
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After World War II, the structure of international
politics was radically different. The United States and the
Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, the greatest powers
the world had ever seen. The ideological rift between them
led each to attempt to create client states and to spread
its influence over the world. This led to the so-called
"cold war" between West and East. Because of its wealth and
location, the Middle East experienced the struggle between
the United States and the Soviet Union to gain influence
there.
The Middle East itself also saw many significant
developments, the most important being the creation of the
Jewish state in Palestine. For Saudi Arabia, this raised
the question of its independence arid security.
The major issues dominating Saudi-American relations
after World War II until the death of King Ibn Saud in 1953
were Palestine, security and oil. The main concern of Saudi
Arabia was its security. The United States on the other
hand was mainly concerned with Its oil interests in the
kingdom. The Palestinian issue, despite the deep concern of
the Saudi government, continued not to affect other areas
of their relations.
Following the war, the United States and Britain set
up a twelve member Anglo-American committee of inquiry on
the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. The
committee's report was published on April 20, 194.
Although it recommended that "Palestine shall be neither a
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Jewish nor an Arab state," it also recommended that
"100,000	 rtificates be authorized immediately for the
admission into Palestine of Jews" and that "these
certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946."
President Truman announced that he was "very happy that the
request which (he) made for the immediate admission of
100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed
by the (Committee)."	 The Saudi government showed its
concern about the report and the American response to it
almost immediately. On May 5, Sheikh Vussuf Vassin, Deputy
Foreign Minister, informed the American Charge in Saudi
Arabia that "the reaction of the I<ing to the report was
very bad'."
On May 28, the Saudi government informed the American
Minister in Jeddah of its protest against the Committee
proposal to admit 100,000 Jews to immigrate to Palestine.
It warned him that because it was "in doubt about the
intentions" of his government towards Saudi Arabia, he
would understand that "no action can possibly be taken
on projects such as TWA proposals or Treaty of Commerce and
Friendship. "
This warning had no effect. In mid-June, President
Truman established the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, headed by the Secretary of State and including
62 !
	 .aiScaamporary_Archives, May 11-18, 1946, p.
7892.
86:7 Nh0i/4-3046 Telegram. The Acting Secretary of Stat.e
to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 30, 1946.
967 N,0:I./5-646. Telegram. The Charq in Saudi Arabia
(Sands) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, May 6,
J. 946.
(367 N,0:i/5-2846: Telegram. The Minister in Saudi Arabia
E:dc:I') to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, May 28,
19.46.
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the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to handle
matters concerning the issue. On June 21, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff warned the Committee that American military
participation in facilitating Jewish immigration would lead
to the possibility that the Middle East could well fall
into anarchy, and that the Soviet Union might replace the
United States and Britain in influence and power throughout
the Middle East.
President Truman's support for the admission of Jews
into Palestine continued, however, and on October 4, 1946,
he called for agreement to immigration without waiting for
the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine.
King Ibn Saud reacted to this by sending the President a
letter reminding him of the American government's promise
that no decision would be taken on the situation in
Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and
Jews.
But in reality, the king had a quite different
attitude. On September 28, 1946, he had asked General
Sues, Regional Director for Trans World Airlines to carry
a secret and urge1t message to President Truman and told
him that "not even Prince Faisal or his Saudi Minister in
Washington were aware of it."
"The King expressed to Sues his great hope and faith
in the United States and declared that he would always
remain ... (America's) friend although on occasion his
''' 867 N.i/7-246 Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
tn the Stte-WarH\Iavy Cocrd i. nt i ny Committee,
W.hi nqton , June 21 , 1946.
:LLL.fl.il.5 Oc:tober 6, 1946.
Tr'umn, Hrry S.. Public P.pers of President Harry S..
:rr.1,.[Lii½., Washi nyton D. C: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1962, p. 467.
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prorurements in regard to the Palestinian issue
might Indicate otherwise. ""
In January 1947, the American Administration issued an
invitation to Crown Prince Saud to visit the United States,
and he arrived in Washington on January 13, 1947. The main
subject of his discussions with the President and other
senior officials was the general situation in the Middle
East. Or the Palestinian issue, he indicated that their
different views would not affect their close ties. This was
confirmed in December 1947, when King Ibn Saud told the
American Minister in 3eddah "Although we differ enormously
on the question of Palestine, but we still have our own
mutual interests and friendship to safeguard." He stated
"1 occupy a position of pre-eminence in the Arab
world. In the case of Palestine, I have to make common
cause with other Arab states. Although the other Arab
states may bring pressure to bear on me I do not
anticipate that a situation will arise whereby I shall
be drawn into conflict with friendly western powers
over this question."
This was the attitude maintained by the Saudis until King
Ibn Saud's death in 1953.
On May 14, 1948, the "state oF Israel" was established
and the American administration announced its formal
recognition of it on the same day. The Department of State
expected this to effect Saudi-American relations, but the
events that followed proved their fears to have been
exaggerated.
590 F. 77/i0-146 Telegram. The Ambassador in Egypt
(ru:k tot he Secretary of State, Cairo, October 1,
194 .
890 F.00/12-447: Telegram. The Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Chiids) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, December
4, 1947,
79
As has already been stated, King Ibn Saud's overriding
and life-long concern was the security of his kingdom.
Security considerations were also the main concern of
Prince Saud in the course of his visit to Washington in
January 1947,71 when he explained them as follows.
In the first place, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia had
had good relations with the British government for many
years and hoped that these would continue, but the close
economic ties which existed with the United States affected
relations with Britain. As a result, the Saudi government
felt that Britain had become less frank with it and feared
that Britain might support other Arab governments hostile
to the kingdom.
In the second place, King Ibn Saud believed very
strongly that the Hashemite family, (which he had ousted
from the Arabian peninsula during the 1920's, only to see
two of its members become heads of state In Iraq and
TransJordan,) was naturally hostile to the Saudi family.
The king had information that the Hashemites planned to
create a "Greater Syria", including Syria, Iraq,
Transjordan, Palestine - or part of it - and perhaps
Lebanon, under the leadership of one of its members. The
Hashemites would be unable to carry out such a plan without
British aid and it was possible that Britain was tempted to
extend its influence in the Arab world by falling in with
suc:h a plan. The Saudi government desired to know the
71 99 F'. 11/2-747: Report on Crown Prince Saud's Official
Visit to America by Richard H. Banger of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, February 7, 1947;
711 9 F/1-1747: Memorandum of conversation by the
Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African
Affairs (Henderson) , Washington, January 17, 1947.
American attitude to the Idea of Greater Syria. Could the
kingdom count on the •full support of the United States if
it was threatened by the establishment of such a state?
The American administration's reply was in general
terms end failed to reassure the Saudi government. It
stated firstly that one of America's basic policies in the
area was to support Saudi independence and territorial
integrity. It would also support the independence and
integrity of other countries in the area. Thus, the United
States would give full and active support to Saudi Arabia
in the United Nations if it was threatened by outside
forces. Secondly, the United States would not support one
group or one state against another, as this could best
maintain peace in the Middle East. Thirdly, the Department
of State had no information that Britain had supportd such
a project as that of Greater Syria, British policy at the
time being to maintain the status quo in the area.
Some months later, King Ibn Saud again raised the
question of his kingdom's security with the American
Minister in Saudi Arabia. He repeated what his son had
explained to the American administration, but in such a way
as to link his security interests and American interests.
He questioned the American attitude towards Saudi Arabia,
asking whether there was an understanding between Britain
and the United States to regard his country as being in the
British political influence zone. He asked the United
States to supply his forces with arms to enable them to
711, 9F/i-l747 ME!morendum of convereti on, by the
D"ctor of t.he Office of Near Eetern and African
Affair	 (lienderson) , We5hingtan, January 17, 1947.
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defend themselves against the possibility of trouble
arising from Communist propaganda and the Hashemite family
on the northern Saudi border
"and precisely to what extent (he) might count upon
assistance from the United States 	 since the threat
was not only involving Saudi Arabia but also vital
American interests. "
The American response was not new. The Department of
State explained Its general policy towards Saudi Arabia and
other At'-ab countries in the area. It told him that "the
position f the Saudi family arising from feared intrigues
of the Hashemite family are primarily a matter for intra-
Arch consideration" and that the Hashemites would not
attack his country because of his continuing friendship
with the United States and the presence of American oil
companies there. The Department of State also assured him
that there was no understanding between Britain and the
United States to recognize his country as being In the
British political Influence zone7
Childs, the American Minister in Saudi Arabia,
reported that the Saudi government met these replies with
"obvious gratification".7 But in reality, the Saudi
government had been see(irg an American commitment to
maintain its security, and this they had failed to
obtain.
890 F.00/12-447. op_cit_
890 F.00/12-947: Telegram. The Acting Secretary of State
to the legation in Saudi Arabia, Washington, December
12, i947
890 F.00/12-i.547: Telegram. The Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Childs) to the Secretary of State, Jeddah, December
1, 1947.
The t>epertment of State documents available indicate no
such commitment.
82
Meanwhile, the main concern of the United States was
oil. Sefore World War II, Saudi oil production totalled
less than half a million barrels; by the end of the war, it
had jumped to over 21 million barrels, and by 1950 had
reached nearly 200 million barrels. (See Table 2.1.) The
Saudi oil industry was developed very rapidly American
companies discovered and e>tploited large new fields; a
refinery was built at Ras Tanura on the coast; and the
American refinery in Bahrain was enlarged to enable it to
cope with increasing quantities of Saudi oil. In 1954, a
year after Ibn Saud's death, Saudi Arabia became the
largest oil-exporting country in the world.7
Moreover, after World War II, American oil exports
decreased and in 1948, for the first time, American
production was outstripped by demand. a
 Saudi oil therefore
became vitally important to the United States and its
allies in Europe. The main development in bilateral
relations in this respect was the December 1950 agreement,
by which the Saudi government shared oil revenues on a
fifty-fifty basis
Other issues touching on the countries' bilateral
relations were of lesser importance. In 1949, the United
States upgraded its legation in Saudi Arabia to full
embassy status. The agreement for the use of the Dhahran
air-base was extended in 1949 for one year, in 1950 for a
"' Mar]. ou', John, IhePr iara 01f ia_the Twentieth
LondOn The Crescent Press, 1962, p 172;
nthe 1'hUUls East, Dhahran
(rabi an imori can Oil Co. , 1968, pp. i34-1.S.
' kwarcI, op.cit.,	
. :.
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Table 2.1
	 Total Annual Crude Oil Production of Arab
American Oil Company (ARAMCO) 1933-1967
Source. ARAI'ICO,	 ffck&..LLLjj' the Nidd1ea5t,
Dhahrar,: 1968, p. 13.
Year	 Million	 Year	 Million
Barrel	 Barrel a
1933
1938
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
0.5
3.9
5.. 1
4.3
4.5
4.6
7.3
21.3
59.9
89.9
142.9
174.0
199.5
278.0
301.9
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
I	 •i
.L 7D.)
1964
1965
1966
1967
303.3
30. B
356.6
366.8
373.7
._j .
421 • 0
481.4
540.7
599.7
651.9
694.8
804.8
950.0
1,023.8
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further year, and in 1951 for five years. 7
 Also in 1951,
an American Point Four technical aid mission was
established in the kingdoms at the time of Ibn Saud's death
in 1953, it had disbursed less than 2 million.
In summary, Saudi*American relations during the period
1945 to 1953 strengthened, key points being as follow. The
main concern of American policy towards Saudi Arabia was
its oil, which became yet more important during the post-
war period. The Saudi government for its part sought an
American commitment to its security, which it Failed to
obtain. Despite the American role in the creation of a
Jewish state in Palestine, close relationships between the
United States and Saudi Arabia were maintained, and
bilateral economic and political relations were expanded.
When King Saud came to power in the 1950's, the
overall situation in the area had Changed. In July 1953, a
republic was declared in Egypt a year after the military
coup there, and a year later, Colonel Gamal Abdal Nasser
emerged as the true holder of power in Egypt. His policies
79 I:>ennet, Raymond (ed. )
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U.s J2.L, Vol. XIII, PrinceLon Princeton
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Grayon, 2p.._çj , p. 83 " 'Point Four' was concei ved as
a wor].d-vide continuing program of helping
underdeveloped nations to help themselves through the
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proved in the Uni ted States . .. consi stent with
(merican) policies of preventing the expansion of
c:osnmLtnl sin in the free world, by helping to ensure the
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food, ci othi nq and living facilities, Also Truman,
Harry S.	 Hope, Vol. II,
New YorI•c r)c)ubleday, 1956, p. 232.
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pursued anti-western themes, such as the withdrawal of
British forces from military bases in Egypt. At the same
time, Saudi Arabia was in dispute with Britain over the
Buraimi oasis. Meanwhile, the United States involvement in
the Middle East Increased because of its fear of Soviet
expansion
King Saud sided with Nasser and his policies within
the Arab world, despite the differences between Nasser's
radi cal Arab national i sm and the Saudi monarch 's
conservatism, for various reasons. Firstly, like his father
before him and for the same reasons, he did not trust
British policy in the area, and moreover considered that
British military plans against the Soviet Union in the area
were intended to expand British and Hashemite influence.
Secondly, the strength of the Arab nationalist movemnt
throughout the Arab land profoundly affected Saudi
policies, (and indeed all aspects of Arab life during the
19tø's,) and even influenced some of the members of the
Saudi Royal family. Thirdly, the rivalry between British
interests and those of the United States became apparent in
the 19ø's, which witnessed the decline of British
inFluenc:e in the Middle East, the last show of British
power being its action over the Suez Canal in 1956.
Finally, the Saudi government's main objective in its
relations with the West in general and with the United
States in particular, was maintenance of its security in
the face of a perceived Hashemite threat, whereas the
United States sought to bolster the Middle East against
Soviet expansion.
86
In April 1954, Pakistan and Turkey agreed a mutual
defense treaty. The United States arid Britain urged Iraq
and Iran to become partners In the following year,
Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan created the
Baghdad Defense Pact
Meanwhile, In April 1954, Saudi Arabia announced its
military cooperation with Egypt, and a year later Syria
joined them in a mutual defense treaty set up in opposition
to the Baghdad Pact, Saudi Arabia also agreeing on a
"unified command" with Egypt. During 1956, Saudi relations
with Nasser continued to be good King Saud supported him
against the invasion of Britain, France and Israel,
breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain and France,
and withholding oil shipments to them.1
Despite this support for Nasser, Saudi Arabia also
intended to maintain good relations with the United States.
American personnel continued to operate the Dhahran
airbase. The operation of ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia continued
and steadily e>panded In 1955, the United States agreed to
the sale of M-41 tanks as part of a $7 million deal with
the kingdom. Meanwhile, King Saud announced that he had
refused Soviet offers of arms.1
Saudi -American relations suffered a minor setback,
however, in 1954, when Saudi Arabia signed an agreement
with Aristotle Onassis, giving him the right to transport
" Sai..una, Gn, A i'asA1-KhariLaA1-Saudiya_Hur,hgA
(in Arabic E3audi Foreicin Policy_1p
Beirui Arab Development Institute, 1980, p
626
Robe....Le , Chal rnens ti "The Comp]. i caled Process of
kser:h1nq a Stalemate", The Ragrter, May 31, 1966,
p.. 32; Sal ama, ocit., p. 626.
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part of its oil. The Department of State protested to the
Saudi government over what it considered to be "a virtual
monopoly" for Onassis.	 The dispute did not seriously
affect bilateral relations and was later resolved.
With the end of the Suez crisis of 1956, the area
entered a new phase. The Soviet presence was apparent.
British influence was in decline. Nasser's prestige
increased throughout the Arab world. American policy on the
Middle East shifted. As Secretary of State Dulles told the
Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on
January 7 1957
"Few, if any, of us doubt that it would be a major
disaster for the nations and peoples of the world, if
that area were to fall into the grip of International
Communism. ",4
Hence the United States' aim to promote long-term political
stability and security in the Middle East through the so-
called "Eisenhower Doctrine". This consisted in three basic
components. First, American cooperation with governments of
the area to strengthen their economies. Second, an increase
in military aid and assistance to any country requesting
these. Third, the use of "the armed forces of the United
States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and
political independence of such nations requesting such aid,
!±	 iu	 çry._\rcflIve, July 3-1, 1934, p.
134 Unitod Statos Dpartmont of St .e, United States policy
Nw York Greenwood
Pr;, i913, p. 27.
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against overt armed aggression by any nation controlled by
i n tern at ± Ofl a 1 c omrnun ± sin.
On January 10-19, 197, King Saud met Nasser of Egypt,
Hussain of Jordan, and the Syrian Prime Minister in Cairo.
All except King Saud declared their resistance to the
Eisenhower doctrine.'
From Cairo, King Saud went straight to Washington. His
visit marked the end of the Saudi association with Nasser
and the beginning of new close ties with the United States.
After the visit a joint communiqué was issued, in which
President Eisenhower explained the purposes of his
administration°s policy on the Middle East, pointing out
that his proposals to Congress were "to promote the
independence and proper aspirations of the Arab peoples."
King Saud "indicated his purpose to continue close
cooperation with the United States." They agreed that the
strengthening of the kingdom to maintain its stability was
"in the interests of world peace." The President "assured
King Saud of the willingness of the United States to
provide assistance for the strengthening of the Saudi
Arabian armed forces ... for the purposes of defense and
the maintenance of internal security in the kingdom." King
Saud confirmed that the United States could continue to use
the Dhahran airfield for a further five years. 9
 In return,
"' Cr bb, Ci 1 V.. The Doctrines of American_Foreig
E:.1......
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the United States agreed to increase its military and
economic ci ci tc the ki ngdom. ''
King Saud began to take a more pro--Western stance in
his policies, maintaining close relations with the United
States. Thus both countries would "continue to oppose
Communist activities, other forms of imperialism and other
dangers threatening peace and stability in the area."
In the light of his new policy, on May 17, 1957, King
Scud visited E(aghdad, the capital of the pro-Western camp
in the Arab world and of his old enemy. The two countries
announced "the beginning of a new era of friendship and
solidarity" between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and their
intention to resist "imperialism, Communism, and Zionism"
to uphold "Arab stability, independence and power."
In March 1958, King Saud was urged by members of the
Royal family to transfer full executive- powers to his
brother Faisal. Prince Faisal spent the autumn of 1957 in
the United States for medical treatment, met President
Eisenhower on September 23, 1957, and expressed his desire
to maintain military cooperation with the United States,
"regardless of whatever public stance he might be obliged
to take because of the demands of Arab nationalist
feeling. "i
During 1958, two events rocked the area. On July 14,
the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown. Or-i the following day the
Americans entered Lebanon at its government s request. The
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American move comforted Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western
elrnents within the area. After a few months, the Iraqi
Communist Party became the only political power in Iraq.
The new rivalry between Nasser and General Abdal Kareem
Qassim of Iraq began. The Soviet Union supported Oassim
Relations between Nasser and the United States therefore
improved, as did Saudi-Egyptian relations.
In early 1960, King Saud regained control of his
kingdom and forced the resignation of Prince Faisal from
government. A few months later, on March 16, 1961, the
Saudi government announced that the five-year agreement of
19S7 granting the United States airforce the right to use
the Dhahran airbase would not be renewed after its
expiration in April 1962. 	 This did not, however, affect
bilateral relations.
In February 1962, King Saud visited the United States
for medical treatment and met President Kennedy. On his
return, he once again transferred full powers to Prince
Faisal. The Faisal era had begun, although he was only to
become king two years later
In summary, relations between King Saud and the United
States were strained for two reasons first, King Saud had
no experience of foreign affairs, (unlike Prince Faisal who
had handled all the kingdom's foreign affairs); and second,
the structure of the Saudi government was such that it was
unable to deal with the new circumstances which existed in
the Middle East during the j95Øf	 Hence, the United
cr grrcives, April 1-22, 1961, p.
18034,
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States' urging King Saud to modernize his government
system
To this must be added that it was on a Saudi
initiative, and in particular that of Abdula al Turaky,the
Saudi oil Minister, that the Organisatlon of Petroleum
Exporting Communities (OPEC) was created in 196
Faisal and the United_States
The year in which Prince Faisal assumed power, 1962,
saw many important developments both within and outside the
kingdom. Within it, the "Free Princes" of the Saudi royal
family were calling For democratic government and social
Justice. Outside it, the Yemeni military coup of September
posed a new threat.
Prince Fai sal had suffi ci ent experience to deal with
Foreign affairs. Indeed, he had been responsible for the
kingdom's foreign relations for more than fifty years, and
he continued to deal directly with other countries, without
appointing a Foreign Minister, until his death in 1975.
It was in New York, where he was attending the session
of the United Nations General Assembly, that Prince Faisal
received the news of the overthrow of the Yemeni monarchy.
He met President Kennedy on October 6, 1962. At that time,
the United States had good relations with Egypt and was
backing Nasser to the tune of about $200 million a year,
the biggest aid grant in the Arab world. Prince Faisal
tried to convince the Kennedy administration that its
interests lay in Saudi Arabia rather than in Egypt. In
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fact, for numerous reasons, Egypt was and continues to be
more important to the United States than Saudi Arabia.
Hence, Prince Faisal 's •failure to win American support at
Nasser's expense or to receive any assurance that the
United States would not recognize the new revolutionary
regime in North Yernen.
The new republic of Yemen did create a genuine threat
to Saudi Arabia. A few days after the coup, several Saudi
pilots defected to Egypt, taking their aircraft with them,
showing the dubious loyalty to the royal family of the
Saudi armed forces. Worse still, when King Saud asked King
Hussain of Jordan to despatch some of his fighter aircraft
to Saudi Arabia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian
airforce and two of his pilots also defected to Cairo.
Prince Faisal returned to Saudi Arabia on October 17,
1962, and two weeks later formed a new cabinet, with Khalid
as Deputy Prime Minister, Fand as Interior Minister, and
Sultan as Defense Minister. These Princes were all to play
an important part in the future of the country.
Prince Faisal 's policies, in the face of the
difficulties confronting him, were to consolidate the
position of the royal family within the kingdom and to
strengthen ties with the United States. He succeeded in
restoring unity within the royal family only after coming
to the throne two years later, but his success in winning
the support of the American administration was immediate.
On October 2, 1962, President Kennedy, in a personal
Hoi c:Ien nd Johns, pp. cit., p. 226.
' For moi€ details on these events, see Holden and Johns,
p. 277; Mansfield, Peter, IheMide East,
L..ondorn Oxfor d University Press, 1980, p. 11.
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letter to Prince Falsal, stated that he wanted it "clearly
i..tnderstood, that Saudi Arabia can depend upon the
friendship and cooperation of the United States in dealing
with many tasks that lie before it in the days ahead." He
added that, "The United States has deep and abiding
interest in Saudi Arabia and in its) stability and
progress." Further, he assured Prince Faisal "of full
United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's
integrity. "
In November 1962, Egyptian aircraft bombed Saudi
villages near the Yemeni border. At Prince Faisal's
request, American fighter aircraft were sent to Saudi
Arabia to boost its defenses.'' But at the same time, the
United States, not wishing t harm its relations with
Nasser, formally recognized the republican government in
Yemen on December 19, 1962.
On 3anuary 1, 1963, Egyptian aircraft again attacked
Saudi territory. Seven days later, the State Department
released the text of the President's letter of October
1962. In April, the President attempted to mediate between
Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the Yemeni dispute, sending his
personal representative Dr. El 1 sworth Bunker to the area.
But the dispute continued until the outbreak of the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967.
Maqnu, j: ±, p. 1 12 Stookey, R. W.. America and the
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From the Saudi point of view, the American attitude to
the Yemeni dispute was not as they would have hoped, in
contrast to Britain, which adopted a strong position
against the republican government, which it did not
recognise, and supported Saudi Arabia and the Vemeni
royalists.. Saudi Arabia therefore reestablished diplomatic
relations with Britain, broken off in 1956 as a result of
the Suez crisis.
In 1964, the struggle over the leadership within the
royal family was resolved when Prince Faisal became King..
From this position, he strove to strengthen Saudi Arabia's
military capability.. To achieve this, he asked Washington
for assistance in building up the Saudi infrastructure.. As
a result, on June 5, 1965, the Saudi government and the
United States government concluded an agreement by which
the United States Army Corps of Engineers would undertake
the planning arid aclmi ni strati on of the construction of the
major military base facilities in the kingdom. There
existed "rio comparable program elsewhere abroad, either in
scope or coritext " The agreement therefore indicated the
extent of military links between the two countries..
In the same year, Prince Faisal launched his call for
"Islamic Solidarity" in an attempt to counter the Arab
nationalist call for "Arab Unity". Between December 1965
and September 1966, he visited nine conservative Islamic
''' (Jri:i ted States Congress, House of Representatives,
Coumi Lte. on Foreign Affi rs, çiyi ties of the LJni ted
i Arab ía,
I1ering h•fcre the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East, 96th Congress, 1st session, June 25,
1979.. Washington D..C: US.. Government Printing
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states to seek their support. Five of these - Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, Guinea and Mali - were non-Arab, the
remainder being Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. This
campaicjn to achieve a pan-Islamic bloc was not entirely
successful, mainly because of the strength of the radical
pan-Arab movement.
In June 1966, King Faisal paid a state visit to the
United States, his first official visit as king. It was
apparent that he looked to American support for his Islamic
call to counter "Communism and other atheistic movements."
In his talks with President Johnson, "no new political
commitment emerged. "	 In a Joint statement, however, they
"noted and approved the close and cordial relations which
have long existed" between the two countries and "the
threat posed by International Communism to the free nations
and their determination to guard against this
threat. "''
Suddenly, the situation in the Middle East changed
once more with the breakout of the third Arab-Israeli war.
Thus, during the period 1962 to 1967, relations
between the United States and Saudi Arabia continued to
expand, particularly in military areas. King Faisal 's role
in achieving this was paramount, but he failed to achieve
his overall objective of gaining a clear commitment on
Saudi security from the United States, still primarily
concerned with oil. The Arab-Israeli conflict had little
'' SLEbi'i n, Richird F. Thc 1nftlStit.es in (4orl d Affairs
9, Ne York: Harper nd Row, 1967, p. 206.
12)Z) SLobh±n, Rir:hrd P. (ed. ) Documnt on AmericanE.:ti!i_1i, New York: Harper and Row,
:L97, p. 174.
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Fct on bi1ter1 rE1tions, since th Saudi view was
that th real threat came from radical elements in the
area
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Table 2.2	 Chronology of Saudi Arabian-United States
Military Relations 1943-1967
Source: Nyrop, op. cit., p. 3.34.
1943	 United States mission arrives in July to
determine Saudi requirements for military
equipment and training.
1944	 First United States military training mission
arrives in April.
1946 .... Dhahran airfield completed.
1951 .... Dhahran Airbase Agreement and Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement signed June 18.
1953 .... Agreement to establish United States military
mission signed June 27.
1955 .... Saudi purchase in August first United States
tanks and subsequently reject Soviet arms offer.
1957 .... Dhahran Airbase Agreement renewed in February in
exchange for continued military assistance;
training starts for Royal Saudi Air Force and
first F.86 jets delivered.
1963 ... United States Air Force interceptors temporarily
stationed in Dhahran as deterent after Egypt
bombs three Saudi towns in January; Saudis
initiate discussions for acquisition of modern
air defense system.
1965 .... Agreement signed June 5 for United States Corps
of Engineers to supervise construction of
military facilities. Initial sales contract for
C-13 aircraft signed in September. Letter of
intent signed with Roytheon in December for Hawk
Air Defense System and British Lightr,ir,gs.
1966 .... Saudi Arabia mobility programme signed.
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Chapter Three
SAUDI-AMERICAN RELATIONS ON SECURITY
Historically, the Middle East has always been of
strategic importance because of its location at the
junction of three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe.
Moreover, it is situated on the Soviet Union's southern
border. Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its large area and its
location, dominates the region. It occupies a vital
position in regard to the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and
the Indian Ocean. It commands the western coasts of the
Arabian Gulf, the eastern coasts of the Red Sea and it is
not far from the Indian Ocean in the south. It is also
close to three strategic waterways, the Strait of Hormuz,
the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb.
Oil has further enhanced the significance of the area,
particularly for the United States. Before the 1970's,
American companies produced 24% of Iraqi oil, 507. of
Kuwaiti oil, 40% of Iranian oil, and 1007. of Saudi oil. By
the end of the decade, the United States was importing
almost 507. of its petroleum, of which some 34% came from
the Gulf region.
British and American interests had been in competition
in the area for a long time, but the region first came to
the attention of the Western world in general, and the
United States in particular, when, in January 1968, the
British government announced its plans to withdraw from
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East of Suez three years later. A a result, both local
powers, (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf
states,) and international Interests, (the United States
and the tJestern world,) focussed on filling the so-called
vacuum created by the British decision..
For the United States, the British plans to withdraw
were badly timed, as it was deeply involved in the Vietnam
war For the Saudi government, it meant becoming more
involved in regional affairs and adopting active policies
to maintain regional stability and Saudi security in
particular.
This chapter considers Saudi internal and external
security, Saudi and American interests, threats to the
kingdom, and American and Saudi policy. Finally, it will
examine if there was in fact any American commitment to
defend Saudi Arabia.
The coming into existence of the kingdom in 1932 was,
as we have seen, the result of tribal conflict in the Arab
peninsula. The great powers, and particularly Britain, were
snore interested in the Gulf coasts than they had been in
the desert interior of the peninsula, and played no part in
the establishment of the kingdom.. Although Britain had some
agreements with the Saudi family and with Al Sharif
Hussein, King of Hejaz, Saudi success stemmed from internal
tribal factors rather than from any British support. The
nature of the establishment of Saudi authority made Ibn
Saud mistrust the British dominant role in the area and her
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allies, the Hashemite family. He therefore awarded oil
concessiors to American rather than British companies,
believirg that the United States had no interest whatsoever
in the peninsula's internal affairs. He then urged the oil
companies to put more pressure on the American government
to play a role in counter-balancing British influence in
the area.
Ibn Saud was more concerned with establishing the
internal stability of his kingdom thdn with seeking a
regional or international role for it. In the 1930's, he
put a stop to Wahhabi attempts to disseminate their faith
beyond the peninsula. One of his priorities was to found a
stable internal security on loyal tribes and moderate
religious men (imams) in order to make them his means of
implementing internal policy decisions. He left the country
only once, to meet President Roosevelt in Egypt.
Moreover, his policy on Arab problems was a reflection
of his fears of a Hashemite threat. His concern, therefore,
over the Palestinian issue arose from his belief that
Prince Abdullah wanted to anne> part of Palestine to the
Transjordan emirate, (which indeed proved to be true.)
Above all else he did not want to see his neighbour in a
position of strength.
When King Saud succeeded his father in 1953, the
situation In the area had evolved in such a way as to force
Saudi Arabia to become more involved in Arab affairs. This
was due firstly to the prominent role of radical Arab
nationalists, (such as Nasser and the Ba'ath Party)
secondly, to the decline of British influence in the area;
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and thirdly to the increase in oil revenue to the oil-
producthg countries of the Middle East
Not only did the king lack experience and capability,
but his policies were also inconsistent, isading him to
cooperate with Nasser during the Suez crisis, only to fall
out with him in 1957 and align himself with the United
States once again.
Saud was toppled by his brother Faisal in 1962. More
experienced and capable than Saud, Faisal was the only one
to resist Arab nationalism.
In addition to this, in 1967, the British withdrew
from South Yemen, leaving it under the control of the
National Front, which established the pro-Soviet People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen.
In the aftermath of the 1967 6-day war, (in which
Saudi Arabia did not take part,) the following factors
proved to be vital to Saudi Arabia. Firstly, the Israeli
occupation of Sinai meant that the Al-Aqaba Gulf was under
Israeli control and consequently the Saudi Sinafair and
Tiran Islands were under Israeli domination. Secondly, the
Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the third holy place
of Islam, was of paramount importance, given the Saudi
policy of protecting Islam. Thirdly, the defeat of the Arab
states was followed by the build-up of Arab forces, in
which the Saudi kingdom was bound to participate, as well
as developing its own limited military capabilities.
Finally, the war had strengthened radical movements in the
Arab world, hence the rapid increase in dependence on the
Soviet Union in the field of armament in Egypt, Syria, and
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Iraq in particular. Those states imported highly
sophisticated weapons in comparison with the limited
capabilities of the Saudi army.t
In January 1968, the British government announced its
intention to withdraw from East of Suez in 1971. This
brought to an end the period during which Saudi Arabia
believed that the British presence in the Gulf was
sufficient to protect its eastern oilfields as well as its
water-ways, and the strait of Hormuz in particular.
It must be appreciated that although Saudi Arabia
occupied a distinguished international position in the
early 1970s, this did not mean that it wielded any real
power The predominant concern with security still
constituted the priority of Saudi policy. The main factors
underlying Saudi fears were the followings
- In terms of population and military might, Saudi
Arabia remains a small power by Middle East standards.
- Regional instability threatens Saudi Arabia
directly and indirectly.
' - The United States-Saudi relationship, long relied
upon by Saudi leaders to enhance the kingdom's
secur-ity, is being called into question.
- The Soviet Union is developing positions of
strength around Saudi Arabia .
	 South Yemen,
Ethiopia, as well as Libya and Syria."
LnnLii
This complicated situation drove Saudi Arabia to adopt
Nfly	 31E H fl1_Q1	 LL1YL.JIIa Gulf Security
rL.i.:itt_F'ol_icy , Cal i f nm i a: Haver
Irmti tuti. on Publications, Stanford University, 1979,
p. .7.
tJni 'LE:c:I St.ate; 1:partment of Stato, INR Conference on
Soptember 22, 1981, p. 1.
See Cnttr 1 , Alvin 3. "E'ri Ii eh WI thdraial from the
Persian (3uif', Military	 Vol. Z0, No. 6, 1970.
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a policy which depended basically on Its great wealth and
Its friendship with the United States and its exploitation
of the call for "Arab Solidarity and the Defense of Islam"
to pursue King Faisal's policies. However, Saudi Arabia did
not neglect alternative strategies, such as increasing its
military poWer. The main aim of Saudi policy remained
'assuring the defense and internal security of the
kingdom," 4
 which implied above all protecting the rule of
the Saudi royal family.
It Is important not to underestimate the difficulties
inherent in achieving this goal in the Arabian East,
despite Saudi success in doing so, difficulties which arose
from the great changes in the area since World War II,
which came close to touching the Saudi royal family.
What then were the internal threats which endangered
the kingdom's security?
During the 1970's, such threats stemmed from within
the royal family; from the nature of the structure of Saudi
authority itself; and from the tribes. In addition the
rapid modernization which the kingdom had reluctantly
witnessed had led to the emergence of a new social group of
technical and military staff, which was demanding
participation in political affairs..
In the 1960's an acute crisis within the royal family
over numerous issues, Including modernization and relations
Ki nqdom of Saudi rabi a, ten P1 an (1975-1980)
Contral Planning Orçanization, 1975, p. 1.
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with the IJnited States,' resulted in some of the Saudi
princes, amongst them Prince Talal Ibn Abdul Aziz,
emigrating to Egypt. Moreover the conflict between Saud
and Faisal Abdul Aziz's sons lasted for a considerable
period. We have already noted (see chapter one) that
although the mechanism of decision-taking within the royal
family is unknown, it is clear that some members wield more
power than others in such matters as ending disputes. Hence
the containment of the crisis to within the family, and
hence also the peaceful transition of power to I<ing Khalid
in the wake of Faisal 's assassination. During the 1970's,
however, it must be said that differences within the royal
family were few.
The tribal nature of the Saudi political system is
such that one of the tribes must emerge as more
influential, wealthy and powerful than the others. The
bedouin nature of the tribes, their non-identification with
territory and their belligerent nomadism, inclined them to
resist authority, particularly that of another tribe1
Moreover, the Saudis were pressing on with their policy of
isolating some of the tribes in Asir and the eastern area,
' Uni ted States Conqre, House f Repi'esentati yes,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia and th
n an Evolving Special
Report, August 1981. Washington D.C.:
U.S. E3rivernment Print.i ng lifE i cc, 1981, p. 2.0.(Subsequently referred to as 1JS. Congress, Saudi
Al so McNacher, Thomas
L. Arms and 01 lj)nited States Military St rat egynd
Washington: The Brookings Institute,
1985, p. 19..
Lackner, çp.jij.., pp. 91, 93..
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together with the tribes who supported Al Rashid for
religious and historical reasons..7
One of the aims of the five-year plan 1975-1980 was to
"foster social stability under circumstances of rapid
social chanye."' This rapid social change had led to a
confrontation between the traditional holders of power,
(certain members of the royal family, imams, and the
bedouin sheikhs,) and a new aspiring class, which emerged
from the development of the kingdom, particularly during
the 1970's.. These new figures, (principally technocrats and
military officers,) were ambitious to play a part in the
political process and to benefit from a redistribution of
wealth.' It must be remembered that to this day Saudi
Arabia has no constitution and no parliament, and that
political parties and trade unions are not recognized..
The royal family was not blind to the fact that the
political upheavals in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and
Yemen were led by military officers. It therefore e>ipected
that a military coup would be attempted in the 1970's,
although technically it had complete control of the
expanded army. In the face of this apparent threat, the
Saudi authorities arrested several hundred officers,
particularly from within the airforce, which they suspected
	
' Cor-dp.snan, nt.hriny H. fl	 jjjjJheearch_foL
Military
the Ar kZ
L...LJ:LLL al ance, Col orado Westvi ew Press,
1984, p.. 230..
'' Kj ncjcioin of Saudi Arab a , qp. cit.., p. 1
E:i. it, Hermann , "Security Consi derati oris in the Persi an
	
Gui 'F," 
.La:Lr:Ja.i2n L.
	
Fall 1980, Vol.. 5, No..
2, p. 99; NcNacher, g.cit., p.. 94.
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of acting against national stability, (such as in plots to
overthrow the government in 1969 and 1977.)
The other elements of the new social group,
tec;hnocrats for example, were equally significant. In the
United States alone, there were more than 13,000 Saudi
students in the years 1978-79. Every year, between 2,500
and 3,000 Saudi students return home having graduated from
well-kriciwn American universities. 11
 They play no part in
the political process, but they do share in the wealth of
the country. They are also the social group most influenced
by opposition movements echoing Nasserite and Eca'athist
political calls for an Arab homeland, which have some
influence in certain areas, such as HeJaz and the eastern
region.
Despite all these factors Saudi Arabia was successful
in striking a balance by which it ensured domestic security
and maintained the power of the royal family. The means by
which this was achieved was the National Guard, known as
the "White Army," the garrisons of which are located a
small distance from towns. The National Guard was renowned
for its complete loyalty to the royal family. This loyalty
might not be unnconnected to the fact that it consists of
individuals and tribes who were always loyal to the Saud
family its officers are sons of tribal sheikhs, and to be
nominated for the National Guard is a reward for service
and the position the individual holds in his tribe. 1
' Cordmn, pçjit, pp. 138, 227; Nyrop, op. cit, p.
346.
11	 Pc!, p. 128.
S?E? L..acnE?r,	 pp. 99-100.
Salma, pçjt.
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In 1973, members of the National Guard numbered 3,500.
They then rose to 26,000 in 1974, fell to 16,000 in 1975,
only to rise once more to 20,000 in 1976, and 35,000 in
1977. There followed the same fluctuation to 20,000 in
1978, and back to 35,000 in 1979.t4
This apparent variation could be accounted for by the
fact that it was entirely up to the sheikhs to declare the
numbers according to which they received salaries. It was
common knowledge, including amongst the government, that
thousands of so-called guard members had no connection
whatsoever with the National Guard, and the authorities
were lenient in verifying the numbers. This would explain
the reduction in declared numbers in 1975, the year in
which King Faisal was assassinated.
s far as the role of the National Guard is concerned,
a publication by official merican sources suggests that it
played a major part in the failure of the 1969 attempted
coup. It goes on to state that the National Guard
"continued in the mid-70's to be an effective defender of
the security of the state."1
But in reality, the situation was radically different
to that which e>tisted when Ibn Saud was in power, and
events were to prove the authors of the book over-
optimistic. The Guard failed to intervene in Mecca, for
example, in a plot intended basically to overthrow the
royal regime, and attempts to modernize the National Guard
'.' rh, IfltEI'11t1or1 Ir)StltLItE? for Strategic Studies, fl
and i ml 1 arl y to (1979-
1988), London 1968 to 1979.
Nyrop, op. cit., p. 339.
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under the supervision of various American administrations
failed to succeed in promoting their stabilizing role.
External threats
Saudi attitudes towards foreign powers, regional and
international, were shaped by the overriding objective of
maintaining the stability of the kingdom and protecting the
rule of the Saudi royal family. Thus the strength of Saudi
ties with other countries depended on their connection with
internal Saudi stability. During the Nasser era, for
example, Egypt was a major source of threat because of its
influence within the kingdom: there were many pro-
Nasserites in Saudi Arabia and indeed within the royal
family itself. Similarly, during the period under study,
1968 to 1978, the Saudi perception of an Iraqi threat
stemmed from the fact that the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party,
which came to power in Iraq in 1968, had a secret
organization inside Saudi Arabia. 16
 The Saudi government
believed the same to be true of the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (F'DRY). It is a fact that the
increasingly strong position of such states around the
kingdom was encouraging radical nationalist tendencies
inside Saudi Arabia.
This inter-relationship between internal stability and
external threat shaped the focus of Saudi foreign policy in
the 1970's, witness the location of Saudi military bases. A
major base was built in the south, near the Yemeni border,
'" La c k ri er , op. ci t . , p.. 1 09..
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(at Ithamis Mishet,) and an even bigger one in the north-
east, near the Iraqi border, (the King Khalid Military
City.)
In reality, the kingdom was not subjected to any
external attack, with the exception of one from South Yemen
(PDRY) In 1969, but Iraq, North and South Yemen, Iran, the
Soviet Union and Israel were all perceived as a source of
threat.
The collapse of the Iraqi Hashemite family and the
declaration of a Republic in 1958 produced tensions between
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which continued throughout the 60s
and 70's. The Saudis felt threatened by Iraq's important
position to the north of the kingdom, together with the
fact that * according to the standards of the area - Iraq
had strong military Forces, equipped with sophisticated
weapons from the Soviet Union. Saudi fears deepened when
the Sa'ath Arab Socialist Party came to power in 1968,
creating what the Saudis considered to be a socialist state
with radical ideology, threatening Saudi stability, t
 and
indeed Iraq played an important part in the politics of the
area in the 1970's, supporting revolutionary movements in
the Gulf and Arabian peninsula. 1E For its part, the Ba'ath
Party labelled the Saudi royal family, 'the tools of
imperialism" in the region. 1 Iraq was impervious to so-
17	 513.]. y E.. and Fl on ho, Joseph A. , An
Ef fec tsof
to Saudi Arbi a,
..tnpi.bl1shed thesis, U.S. Air Forc, Air University
Oh 1 o, 1977, p. 43,
U.S. Conqress, Saudi Ai-ahiaandihe United States, p.7.
' The Arab Sa 'ath Socialist Party, The 1968 Revol utjp in
The Pol_itical__Report
1974, London:
Ithaca Press, 1979, p. 131.
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called "Riyal diplomacy", thanks to its own oil wealth, its
military capability, and its political heritage. There was
some improvement, however, in relations between the two
countries in the second half of the 1970's, mainly as a
result of the r solution of border problems. Despite this,
the fear of an Iraqi threat remained and the plan to build
the King Khalid military base near the Iraqi border was
retained.
Iran, located on the other side of the Gulf, had a
larger population and was superior to Saudi Arabia in
ec:onomi c and mi ii tary resources. It played an active role
in the area, particularly after the British withdrawal from
the Gulf. It persisted in its claim to Bahrain and occupied
three small islands, (the two Tumbs and Abu Musa,) in 1971.
Despite the fact that both Iran and Saudi Arabia aligned
themselves with the United States, Saudi Arabia mistrusted
the increasing role of Iran in the region. The United
States, on the other hand, discounted any Iranian threat
towards Saudi Arabia, considering rather that in protecting
Western interests in the area, Iran was also protecting
Saudi Arabia. In 1979, Cord Meyer, a former CIA official,
expressed this view as follows
"The disintegration of the Iranian army is seen as an
accomplished fact that has already caused a seismic
shift in the power balance throughout the entire
region. For many years, Iran's army served to keep in
check Iraqi ambitions against Israel and Kuwait,
protected the Sultan of Oman against the Dhofar
guerillas armed by South Yemen and reassured Gadat in
Egypt and the Saudi princes."
Ilenry Kissinger echoed this view when he wrote
Nixon, Richard, ]eReajWar, London Sidgwick and
Jackson, 1991, p. 92.
111
"The Shah absorbed the energies of radical Arab
neighbours to prevent them from threatening the
moderate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the
Persian Gulf."
Saudi Arabia did not share this point of view and
mistrusted the Iranian role on the Arabian side of the
Gulf, especially in Oman and the small Emirates. When
Iranian troops finally put a stop to revolutionary
activities in Dhofar, Prince Fand, after a long silence,
stated
"Saudi Arabia opposes any outside interference by any
party in the Sultanate f Oman. The Sultanate must be
left to manage its own affairs without outside
interference.. "
This said, the part played by Iran in keeping a check on
Iraqi ambitions in the area was accepted, if not
encouraged, by Saudi Arabia, which is why the latter did
nothing to further the Iran-Iraq rapprochement of 1975..
The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) has the largest
population in the Arab peninsula. For a long time it was
well-known as an extreme conservative state. It was
involved in a lengthy dispute with Saudi Arabia over the
Asir area, which Saudi Arabia occupied in 1934. To this
day, there is a widespread belief in the Yemen that the
occupation was illegal.
In 1962, the Yemeni monarchy was overthrown and a
republic established. The revolution was led by nationalist
officers with Egyptian support, which turned into
widespread Egyptian penetration. The conflict between
monarchist and republican forces continued until 1967, when
Ki !inqr, Henry, White je Years, Boston: Little,
Brori and Co.	 1979, p. 1262..
	
Lar.I<ner, pp. cit., p. 127, from 	 -Rai al a 'm, Kuwait,
November 20, 1975.
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Egyptj
	 forces withdrew after their defeat in the war of
June 197. Despite the continuation of the republican
regime, a balance of power of sorts was reached between
monarchists and republicans.
North Yemen did actually violate Saudi security, with
Egyptian aircraft attacking Saudi villages on several
occasions. This threat diminished after the 196's,
however, basically because Nasser was unable to continue to
support the republican forces, and because of his
dependence on Saudi aid to rebuild his army.
North Yemen itself also became dependent on Saudi aid.
Nevertheless, it maintained its ties with the Soviet Union,
which continued to supply it with arms,	 despite its good
relations with the United States and the strength of Saudi
influence in the republic. The Saudi government, however,
continued to feel under threat form North Yemen, mainly
because any new dispute might revive the Yemenji claim to
Asir, and because the loyalty of the northern tribes could
not be entirely counted on.	 Hence the Saudi military base
near the Yemeni border.
Even so, the threat fr.cm North Yemen remained limited
in comparison to that from South Yemen, from which ?ritain
withdrew in 197 after more than a century of occupation.
The National Liberation Front (NLF) came to power and
declared the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),
espousing the cause of nationalism and adopting Mar>tist
ideology, the only state in the peninsula to do so. The new
republic had good relations with the Peoples Republic of
I'1tN:hr , pp:jj, p. 1fZ9.
' thid, p. 117.
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China until the beginning of the 1970's, when Its ties with
the Soviet Union became stronger. The latter had no
permanent bases in South Yemen, but it had use of the
facilities of the port of Aden and of Yemeni airports. More
than 5,000 Soviet, East German, and Cuban military
personnel were stationed in South Yemen, and the army and
security forces were equipped by the Soviet Union.
Political conflict between the PDRY regime and Saudi Arabia
ensued, the latter viewing the former as a political threat
because of its Marxist ideology. Saudi Arabia tried to
moderate South Yemen's policies by the well-tried means of
financial aid, but with only limited success.
In 1969, there occurred a military clash, in which the
Saudi government succeeded in countering a Yemeni attack,
thanks to the support of British and Pakistani pilots.
Before the establishment of the kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, in January 1926, the Soviet Union had established
diplomatic relations with Ibn Saud. The two countries'
bilateral relations lasted until 1937 when the Soviet
government recalled its diplomatic mission. From that time
to this, there have been no relations between the two
governments, despite the fact that many conservative
regimes in the area do have diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union, (Libya and Yemen since 1955 and 1956
respectively, Jordan and Kuwait since 1963, and the United
Arab Emirates since 1971.)
The Soviet Union's influence in the area began with
the sale of arms to Egypt in 1955, at a time when Saudi
l...acey, cp
	 t., p. 445;	
_Y?yi.Iini, April 19, 1981.
Salama, op cite, pp. 286287, 290
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Arabia had good relations with Nasser. Saudi Arabia's
attitude to the Soviet Union was not made public until
April 1957, when King Saud visited the United States,
supported the Eisenhower doctrine, and stated that the
security of the Middle East was threatened by Communism.
This position has been held up to the present day. Saudi
Arabia took this stand against communists because they "do
not believe in God."	 In the words of King Faisal -
"Our enemies are first Communism, then Zionism, and
finally Imperialism. Communism is Zionism's first son.
The Jews invented Communism. Communism fights the
Arabs, for they created Israel •
This link of Communism with Zionism does not reflect a
failure to understand either, but rather an attempt to
e>icite nationalist and religious feeling against the Soviet
Union. Communism did not after all prevent the Saudis from
establishing relations with the Soviet Union in the 20's
when Ibn Saud and his followers had equally strong
religious convictions.
The nature of the perceived Soviet threat remained
veiled in the statement quoted above for several reasons.
Firstly, such is the nature of Saudi foreign policy;
secondly, it was clear to Saudi leaders that Saudi Arabia
had no ability to counter any Soviet aggression; and
thirdly, if aggression were to occur, it would lead to
full-scale war between the two superpowers.
James D. Nyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, was more
explicit
'	 LE.Q!L.acLi!J, 1-15 t)ecember, 1972, p. 584.
Des Jard:ins, Thi erry, "Saudi Arab:i a Next in Line t
Revoluti.on",	 September 1970, p. 31.
1 1EJ
rhe Sovie?t Union does not represent a threat in terms
of potential immediate overt military action. In terms
of desire to increase influence, to possibly assist
subversion in the area,
	 to take other actions
detrimental to the stability of the area, I would not
want to exclude those threats. "
In fact, during the 1970's, a Soviet presence became
increasingly apparent around the Saudi kingdom. The Soviet
Union maintained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and
used military facilities in South Yemen and Somalia. It
assisted Iraq, North and South Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia,
after communist coups and all In all gained significantly
in political, economic, and military influence in the
region. '
This spread of influence presented a genuine threat to
Western and Saudi interests. The Soviet Union's support of
the radical states in the area bolstered radical
nationalist movements which in turn Jeopardized the
stability of the conservative states, especially Saudi
Arabia, the most conservative regime in the Middle East.
The Communist movement, actively exploited by the
Soviet Union in the area, was not represented in Saudi
Arabia. A Marxist organisation known as the Popular
Democratic Party existed, but was not active in the Arabian
peninsula, nor did it receive support from the Soviet
	 -
Union.
U.S. Conqre's, 1E:L_1iL5 P . 100.
For more details on the Soviet. Union's presence and
irifluenco in the area see Halliday, Fred, Threat_from
....	 EQI	 fri.2BL±.ab.nitn an dlranto
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The Saudi government considered that Israeli activity
threatened the stability of the area, and that any
instability would create opportunities for the Soviet Union
to increase its influence in the Middle East still
further.
The Israeli threat to Saudi territory was, however,
considered a relatively minor one, despite the Israeli
occupation of two Saudi islands during the 1967 war. This
point of view is implied in the following:
"The Saudis insist that they intend to use the planes
to defend their own airspace with bases at Dhahran to
coves- the Persian Gulf Oilfields, at Taif to protect
Mecca and Jeddah, and at Khamis Mushayt near the
hostile regime of South Yemen. "
One commentator has interpreted this as meaning that
neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States "could say that
defense mainly meant defense against Israel, so both the
Saudis and the administration spoke airily of possible
threats from Iraq, South Yemen and Ethiopia." 	 The Saudi
government, however, told the United States that "the
threat from Israel (was) not their primary security
concern. "'
United States Department. of State, Saudi Perceptions of
Paper prepared by
Wi 1.11 am EL Cuandt to the INR Conference on Saudi
rahia, October 26, 1991, p. 2.
Conq essior 11 £!uart	 Wekort, Vol. XXXVI, No.
14, 9 (ipril 1979, p. 939..
I1oe, Russe].i Warren, Weapons: the International Game of
Pirm	 Money and Di2jrnj, London: Abacus, 1981, p.
565
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I)ecisions, Washi nqton D.C.. : U. S. Government Pri nti rig
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In effect, the real threat to Saudi Arabia was the
possibility of a fifth round in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
which would strengthen the influence of the radical
nationalist Arabs and of the Soviet Union.
American and Saudi Interests
We have already shown how American interests in Saudi
Arabia went back to the 1930's, when Ibn Saud granted oil
concessions to American companies. Their activities were
private and remained so for more than four decades.
American administrations considered the area to be a
British political influence zone and that British
arrangements were sufficient to protect Western interests
in it.
For its part, Saudi Arabia tried to develop its ties
with the United States and to extend them to other fields,
including political and military. It failed, however, in
its main objective, which was to obtain an American
commitment to its security.
During the period under consideration, 1968 to 1978,
core American Interests in the area were oil and the need
to counter the influence of the Soviet Union. For the Saudi
Arabi an government on the other hand, foremost interests
were the kingdom's security, and reducing the influence of
the Soviet Union and of radical states in the area. All the
two countries' mutual interests derived from these.
Such mutual interests were as Follow the guaranteed
flow of oil to the United States, West Europe and Japan;
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contairment of the influence of the Soviet Union;
containment of nationalist ideology and influence;
enhancement of Saudi defense capabilities; promotion of the
Internal security and stability of the kingdom and of other
nations in the area friendly to the United States;
encour agement of cooperat I on between the conservative
states to maintain the region's stability; achievement of a
peaceful solution to the Arab--Israeli conflict; and
continuing improvement of American-Saudi economic and
commercial ties.
The other major American commitment was to the
survival of the state of Israel. While Saudi Arabia had no
objection to the existence of Israel, it differed from the
United States in how best to achieve a peaceful resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See Chapter Five.)
Oil and its continuing flow to the United States and
the industrialized world was the primary mutual interest.
In his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Rpresentatives, in 1972, Joseph Sisco, Assistant
Secretary of State, stated "Obviously, oil is a very, very
vital part of this entire area, and certainly vital in
terms of the economies of our NATO allies and our friend
East of Suez. "
	
In the same year the Department of State
defined the region's oil as being of indirect American
Linited F3tates Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Th9Pnited States
..... .fQl	 c	 :..cLatLLE	 LSLGU 1 F.
Ilearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East and
South As:i. , 93rd Conqrss, 1st session , 1973.
Washi nqton D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,
1972, p. 2. (Subsequently referred to as U.S.
Congress, fl:L..fln :L	 i	 Lrir_sts in and Pol icy_
toaids the p ri an Gui f •
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strategic Interest, because it was vital tc the American
allies 7
 In 1973, the Department of State f urther stated
that oil must be available "at reasonable prjce arid in
sufficient quantities. "	 Alfred Atherton, Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, echoed this in 1974, when he spoce oF "maintaining
access to the area's oil at reasonable prices."
Similarly, Henry II. Jackson, Chairman of the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, In 1977: "These
supplies must be continuous and they must be available at
prices which do as little damage to the United States
economy as possib1e."' In February 1978, Secretary of
Defense Harold E4rown said: "because the area is the world's
greatest source of oil, the security of the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf cannot be separated from our security and
that of NATO and our allies in Asia."4'
Uni ted States Department of State, "F3ackground Study of
the Per-sian Gulf Area 1972." In U.S. Congress, fl
L[it.iLt _in and Policy towards th
Pers . an Gulf, p. 139.
' tini ted State Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, NewP	 ectives on the
PerianGu].f. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Near East and South Asi a, 93rd Congress, 1st session,
1973, Nashinqton Ii). C. U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1974, p. 2. (Subsequently referred to as U.S.
Conqress,	 Etic:LiL.tt1PersiAa_Gulf.
t.lni ted States L'oncjress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, IhJrsian,_Guif 1974:
Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, 93rd
Congiess, 2nd sessi on, 1974. Lashi ngton DC.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 63. (Subsequently
referred to as Li. S. Conqress , fl_L i an Gui + 1974.
U. S. Comiqress,	 cjt1 P'	 '
41. Uni ted States Department of Defense , Office of Assi stant
Se:reiary of Def ense, E: h...1 ..
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Following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, despite
numerous plans to redi.ce American consumption, the United
States became increasingly dependent on the region's oil.
In 1973, United States oil imports were 5.5 million barrels
per day, of which about 0.6 millIon were from Saudi Arabia.
Five years later, imports had risen to 8.4 million barrels
per day, of which 1.3 million from Saudi Arabia. In fact,
with the largest proven reserves of oil in the world, and
as the largest oil exporter, whose production made up
nearly 207. of the oil available on the free market, the
importance of Saudi Arabia to the industrialized world, and
to the United States in particular, cannot be overstated.
Clearly, Saudi Arabia also had an interest in
maintaining the flow of its oil to the United States. In
1972, Ahrnad Zaki Yamani, Saudi oil minister, called for an
agreement with the United States to "guarantee the United
States a continuous flow of oil."
	
After the 1973 oil
crisis, Yamani called for cooperation between producers and
consumers, because - "no one group of countries, let alone
one country, can hope to solve its problems In isolation
from the rest of the world."
Next to oil, and closely related to it, were
commercial and economic interests. Saudi Arabia gradually
became an important market for American goods and
services.' 4
 According to Joseph Sisco, "Beyond oil, there
is the question of markets for American industry. There is
The Middle Eat Institute, World Enegy Demands and the
Washington D.C.
	 1972, Part I, p. 99.
'	 , Ahmd Zi::i , "Oil To.'ard a new F'roducer-Consumer
Rel ahi nn'hip," The World Today, November 1974, p. 483.
Gordon , Murriy,	 an Gil f , New York:
Facts on File, 1981, p. 23.
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a gr-eat need and desire for American technology and
expertise.'" As Saudi Income increased, (Jumping from t87
billion in 1973, to .39.2 billion in 1974,) so
opportunities for American imports also grew. By 1978,
Saudi Arabia had become the seventh largest market in the
world for United States exports. In fact, the Saudi Arabian
economy was of great Importance because "the value of its
accumulated financial surpluses have been tied to the
fortunes of the world economy in general and the United
States economy in particular. "
The other main American interest was maintaining the
region's security and stability by strengthening the
internal security and stability of the friendly states in
the area In 1975, Joseph Sico told the Special
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Internat:Lonal Relations, House of Representatives, that one
of the United States main policy objectives was "support
for collective security and stability in the region"
	 He
also stated that the United States would help Saudi Arabia
"to achieve several objectives which they see as critical
to their own defense and stability."'
Manifestly, Saudi Arabia shared this interest. In
1976, the kingdom normalized its relations with South Yemen
to "guarantee the security and stability of the Arab
peninsula.'' Indeed, it was "greatly concerned about its
'' U.S. Corqr, Ba	 aLtcLiLatLS ts in and Policy
:c	 ..ca J..b! ErLaJ3'iLf., p. Em).
" U.S. Cotiqre, a
	 abaLJra ted States, p.
27.
' U.S. Cnqress, The Persian Gulf 175, p. 9.
'"' 
.flat.L, p. ii.
May 7, 1976, p. 27712.
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securlty,	 arid its stated primary objective remained
"assuring the defense and internal security of the
kingdom. "'•
Containment or indeed reduction of the Soviet Unions
influence was for the United States a global objective, but
as far as the Middle East was concerned it was shared by
Saudi Arabia. In addition, when the flow of Saudi oil came
to be regarded by the United States as "a national
interest",	 the reduction of Soviet presence and
influence became yet more important to America. In a
statement before the Subcommittee on the Near East and
South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, James
Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated that
one of the American interests in the area was "to contain
Soviet military power within its borders.." 	 For Saudi
Arabia, religious convictions lay behind this interest. The
Saudi Arabian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said in
1972, "We cannot have relations with nations that do not
believe in God.
In summary, the mutual objectives of the United States
and Saudi Arabia were protecting oil and ensuring its
supply for the industrial Western world, reversing or
reducing the Soviet influence in the area, finding a
peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and finally
U.S.. Conqrees,	 p. 11.
1' K:i. nqdom of E3udi Arabi ,
	 P- 1
I\Iibi oc.I: , Ti in, "Can the Gui f Stat.e Remove the
Superpower?" (Arabic) , in Farid, Abdel Majid and
other	 c L. iacJ.	 Gui f, London
Arab Rearch Centre, 19G2, p. 24.
iJ..S. Coriqress,	 the Persian Gulf, p.
39.
1-1 December, 1972, p. 554..
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supporting conservative regimes in the area, In order to
safeguard its security and stability..
Prior to the beginning of the 1970's, the United
States had no specific policy towards the Gulf and Arabian
peninsula. WI 111am Quandt, •former staff member and later
Head of the Middle East Office in the United States
National Security Council, stated
"In the late 1960's, American policy-makers began to
think about one area of the Middle East where there
had been little previous involvement, namely, the
Persian-Arab Gulf. "
This occurred as a result of the British decision to
withdraw its military presence from East of Suez at the end
of 1971. There is no doubt that this decision, announced in
January 1968, came at a difficult time for the United
States, deeply involved as it was in the Vietnam war 1 which
was developing in such a way that the American Congress and
public would oppose any direct United States involvement in
the area. The day after the announcement, Mike Mansfield,
Senate majority leader, said
"I am sorry the British felt they were forced to take
thi s step because I am certain we will be asked to
fill the vacuum east of Suez. I don't know how we can
do it, because I don't think we have the men or the
resources for it."
'' Qundt.., (.'Ji 111 am,
The Fand Corporat i on,
FE?I::ruE:lry 1970, p. 74. Herman Ei 1 ts, Amen can
Ambassador	 Saudi Arab I a from 1965 to 1970 ± s of the
same opinion. E,'e his article, "Security
Consi dErati ons in the Persi an Gui f ," Internati onal
Security, Fall 1980, Vol. 5, Na.. 2, p. 103.
'	 haa2a..±Q, January 17, 1968.
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The British riecision to disengage was therefore "most
unwelcome", creating as it did an opportunity for the
Soviet Union to fill the ensuing so-called "power
vacuum."	 Some officials and congressmen in fact believed
that the regional powers, Iran and other Gulf States, would
'fill the gap," but the Department of State's view, as
stated at a hearing before the Special HOUSE Subcommittee
on Investigation by Joseph Sisco, was that
"the British are getting out, and we have a huge void
hPr'e, and we have two alternatives One would be for
the United States to try to fill the void directly
the second alternative was to try to help the people
of the region to help themselves so we can stay out I
happen to believe that this is one policy which is
working..
In fact, the situation which had arisen after the 6-
day war in any case made an "imperial presence" in the
region inappropriate. This was the main reason for the
British withdrawal, despite the British government's
statement that their decision was taken on economic
grounds. Direct American involvement in the region would
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Commit lee on Armed Services, Review of the Vietnam
_Mi 1 ity
ColtmnentAhr-nad. Report of the Special Subcommittee
on National Defense Posture, 90th Congress, 2nd
session. Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing
Office, i99, p 64.
'' Uni ted States Conqr ess, Senate, Conimi ttee on Foreign
Rel at 1 OflS
Hearing , 92nd Congress, 2nd session 1972.
Washing Ion D.C. U. S. Government Printing Office,
1972, p. 1O United States Congress, House of
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Iti.
	t.	 Report to the
Si..ibco gnmitt pp on the Near East and South Asia, 92nd
Conc'es, 2nd sessi on , 1972. Nashi ngton D. C. U.. S.
Government Printing Office, .1.972, pp. 10, 13 US.
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not therefore have been acceptable to local powers, not
even to America 's all i es, Iran and Saudi Arabi a.
In addition, the United States involvement in Vietnam
had significantly affected American public opinion, and was
to shape its foreign policy for years to come. President
Richard Nixon, who caine to office in January 1969,
appreciated the need to formulate a new foreign policy,
especially towards Asia, stating that "once the Vietnam war
was settled (the United States) would need a new Asian
policy to ensure that there were no more Vietnam in the
future."
	 The basis of this policy was the so-called
"Nixon Doctrine" which was adopted during his visit to Guam
in July 1969. According to Nixon himself:
"The Nixon Doctrine provided that the United States
woulri supply arms and assistance to nations threatened
by açjqr-ession, if they were willing to assume the
primary responsibility for providing the manpower
necessary for their defense. "'
The Nixon Doctrine became the conceptual framework for
United States foreign policy during the 197s.
From it emerged the concept of the "Two Pillars"
policy. The Nixon administration attempted to negotiate an
informal security pact between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the
United States, to maintain the status quo in the region.
The basic principles of this policy were outlined in August
1972 by Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and Asian Affairs, as follows:
"1) Non-interference in the Internal affairs of other
nations;
Nix or , Fi chird 	 London
Arrot Jooks , 1975, pp. 394-395.
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2) encouragement of regional cooperation for peace
and progress;
3) supportIng friendly countries in their efforts to
provide for their own security and development;
4) the principles enunciated at the Moscow summit of
avoiding confrontations in such areas of the world
and
) encouraging the international e>tchange of goods,
services and technology."
In addition, the United States recognized "the role which
the British will continue to play as an advisor on security
and economic development."
The first principle was central to American foreign
policy during the 197's, as a result of the American
e>tperience in Vietnam. Thus the American presence in the
Middle East was minimal. It had had a small naval facility
on Bahraln since 1949, and based its Middle East Force
(MIDEASTFOR) - a flagship and two destroyers - there. The
base was originally rented from the British government,
which governed Bahrain until 1971, at which time the United
States and Bahrain signed an agreement permitting continued
United States Navy use of these facilities. 6
 Saudi Arabia
welcomed an American presence in Bahrain, about twenty
miles from the Saucji coast, since any American military
presence on Saudi territory would have laid them open to
political attack from nationalist and revolutionary regimes
in the area. The American base had in effect more political
than military importance.
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The second principle suggests that - as far as the
Middle East Is concerned -. American policy relied on
cooperation between the two friendly conservative states in
the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In his testimony before
the House Special Subcommittee on Investigations in 1975,
Joseph Siscci, Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs, confirmed that United States policy was -
"To continue to promote regional cooperation by
encouraging the two strongest riparian states, Iran
and Sai.di Arabia, to assume increasing
responsibilities for the collective security of the
region.. "''
The third principle underlay its support for "a
reasonable expansion and modernization of regional defense
forces, particularly those of Iran and Saudi Arabia." 6
 The
United States provided Saudi Arabia and Iran with huge
quantities of arms during the 1970's, a policy which
strengthened Iran's military capabilities, but failed to
give Saudi Arabia any real regional power. (See chapter
five.)
The fourth principle "appeared to be more of an
expression of hope than a principle of policy (because It)
was based on mutual U S. -Soviet relations in a global
context that did not necessarily include the Gulf."87
Un i t. ed St. at es D€par L ment of St ate , Eur eau of F'uLi 1 i c
Affal rs, (Jff ice of Mcdi a Services, Sd ected Documents
No.. 4,	 Lt:..c!....	 .1iii.....
Washington D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 104.
Uni ted Stat.e Department of
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Depa' tment of State PLthi i cat.i or's 8699, April 1973.
Wahinqton D.C. U.S Government Printing Office,
1973, :. 387.
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1')
a. -c..
The fifth principle addressed American economic
interests in the area, related to the basic interest, oil
In effect, this became more important after the October war
of 1973, which created the so-called "oil crisis" and had
far-"reaching economic effects on Western powers.
The "Two Pillars" policy therefore hoped that the
development of Iran's military capability, Saudi Arabian
political leverage, (mainly derived from its financial
might,) and American military and political support would
create a regional deterrent.
According to William Quandt, since Saudi Arabia had no
military power, the United States relied on Iran to
maintain stability and security within the region.
Kissinger said that the United States "attached a great
importance to its relations with Iran as well as to the
crucial role Iran plays in the security and balance of the
whole area."' He wrote -
"The Shah absorbed the energies of radical Arab
neighbours to prevent them 'From threatening the
moderate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the
Persian Gulf .	 Iran under the Shah, in short, was
one of America's best, most important, and most loyal
friends in the world."
Saudi Arabia on the other hand had gained the capacity
to influence other states in the area, and was basically
considered a source of oil and a moderating factor within
OPEC. According to James Akins, former American Ambassador
to Sai.c1i Arabia, Kissinger's great plan for the Middle East
depended on Israel and Iran. He added that Kissinger did
Si r'r" i. yh, kluei. ri	 tc!...JL...	 f
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not like the Arabs and did not understand them. 71. In
effect, the United States considered that Iran was
protecting the Saudi Arabian regime in safeguarding western
interests in general and American interests in
particular. 7 ' America regarded the entire area as being
under "the Iranian military umbrella".	 indeed according
to Joseph Sisco, the United States appreciated that "Saudi
Arabia has much to protect, but relatively little to
protect it with."
The "Two Pillars" policy continued until the collapse
of one of them, the Shah's regime, towards the end of 1978.
Meanwhile, the United States sought to strengthen its
relations with Saudi Arabia in other areas. Thus on June 8,
1974, the two governments signed an agreement to expand
"cooperation in the fields of Economics, Technology,
Industry, and Defense." Furthermore, "it was agreed that
Saudi Arabia and the United States <would) continue to
consult closely on all matters of mutual interest."
Despite the fact that the agreement "heralded an era
of increasingly close cooperation", it had little impact in
the field of security. The agreement reflected how each
Akins, James, "The Internal ancJ External American
Policies and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", (Arabic) In
Farid, Abdel Majid and others, Oil and security in the
London Arab Research Centre, 1982, p. 172.
See Nixon, g	 cit., p. 92 and Kissinger, op. cit., p.
12.62.
Uni. ted States Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, "United States Policy towards the Persian
Gui. f , " Current Polici, No. 160, April 11, 1980, p. 2.
U.S. Congress, The Persian Oul+ 1975, p. 11.
LJnI ted States Department of State, "1974 Cooperation in
El ci ds of Economics, Technology, Industry and Defense
Agreement between Linited States and Saudi Arabia
signed June 8, 1974.." Unitettes Treaties and jb
.gternaUona Aqpements, UST2S TIAAS 7974, pp. 3115,
3120..
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party considered their bilateral relations.. The United
States recognized the new role of Saudi Arabia in the
region and hoped "that this cooperation would be the
benchmark for its evolving relations with the Arab world,"
whilst Saudi Arabia hoped that it would briny in an era of
"peace and security (for) its citizens and for all the
people of the area.."
Despite this, the American administration and some
influential journalists began to voice the possibility of
the need to seize the oilfields in the peninsula.
	 In
January 1975, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, stated
that the United States "would consider using military force
in the Middle East under circumstances of grave emergency -
if say, the industrialized world became threatened with
economic strangulation."	 A few days later, he added that
he had been "speaking hypothetically about an extreme
situation. "
The aim of any American intervention would be to force
OPEC members to change their policies, by occupying a
sufficiently important target area. Saudi Arabian
oilfields, with their vast reserves and exports, provided a
suitable target..' The scenario of possible American
military action against the Saudi oilfields was as follows:
"Flown out of the United States without fanfare,
briefly staged and refuelled in Israel, the 82nd's
1iai.ci, p.. 3115.
Ahmad, Eçjbal and Caploe, David,"The Logic of Military
IntervEntion," [<aeaj Class, Vol.. XVII, No.. 3, 1976,
pp. 319, 324.
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heavy C-S end 5-141 Je transports would fly straight
across Saudi Arabia to Dhehran, escorted all the way
by air refuelled Phantom fighters, also based on
Israel fields or aboard carriers in the Arabian sea.
One or two paratroop batallions would jump to seize
the Dhahran airfield, and to take up positions around
the United States residents' housing a few miles away.
Once the airfield was secured the paratroopers would
signal other aircraft waiting overhead to fly in the
rest of the troops."t
The troops would then seize "the Ras Tanura jetties as well
as storage tanks;" they could secure "some of the
installations of the Shawar oilfields" and they "could also
seize the entire nearby Abqaiq field"
Any damage to oil facilities could be repaired. The
United States "would be deprived of oil from the occupied
area not for eight or nine months, but for three or four
months and possibly less. "
In reality, the American contingency plan to seize
Saudi oilfields was part of Kissinger's overall strategy,
which linked diplomacy with the threat of force to achieve
American objectives in the area. e4
 This explains why the
Saudis did not react very strongly to this threat, stating
'	 Iqnotus, Miles, "Seizing Arab Oil ," Har per's, March
1975, p. 52. According to Harper's, Miles Ignotus was
a "Wshington-based profe or and a defense consultant
with intimate links to high-level United States
pol icy-makers." Latin for "unknown soldier", Nil es
Iqnotus is rumoured to be a pseudonym for Edward
Luttwik, a well-known conservative "defense"
intellectual, close to Washington's defense and
intelligence community; Ahmad and Caploe, op.. cit. , p.
31.9..
Ignotus, p. cit.. , p.. 52..
Tucker, Robert E. "Oil: The Issue of American
Intervention", Coininentar, January 1975, p.. 26.
"Tucker, a professor of international relations at
Johns Hopkins, is a left-of-center liberal who
commanded some respect for his early opposition to
Vietnam and far his advocacy of reduced American
presence abroad." Ahmad and Caploc, op. cit. , p. 319.
U.S.. Congress, Th .f'ersian Gulf 1974, p. 263; Ahmad and
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simply that they would destroy their wells if any military
action occurred.	 Nevertheless, the threat showed that the
United States government would intervene to protect not the
Saudi Arabian regime, but the oilfields.
In spite of the fact that the region went through a
period of relative stability, and Saudi Arabia was not
exposed to any genuine threat during the years 1968 to 1978
under study, the aftermath of the "Two Pillars" policy was
essentially negative as far as the political situation in
the area was concerned.. The policy had fuelled the imperial
ambitions of the Shah, encouraging him to try to rebuild
the Persian empire, and ironically leading to the collapse
of his regime. It caused an arms race within the area, with
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other states spending a significant
part of their oil income in building up their military
capabilities. It created tension between the two major
regional powers, Iran and Iraq, which lasted until their
rapprochement in March 1975 and sowed the seeds of the
Iran-Iraq war in 198g . It gave the Soviet Union an
opportunity to increase its influence in and around the
regions the Soviet Union signed a 15-year friendship
agreement with Iraq in 1972; had a Marxist client-state in
South Yemen, (the first Arab Communist state;) and gained
the use of important facilities in Somalia and subsequently
in Ethiopia after the Marxist coup there. For Saudi Arabia,
the "Two Pillars" policy raised doubts about Xrans
intentions, especially towards the small Sulf states and
Oman.. Despite huge American military sales to them, Saudi
Sal ama, çjp ..çj_, p. 253..
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Arabia did not achieve true military strength in comparison
with other regional powers, particularly Iraq, Iran and
Israel. (See Chapter Four.)
The failure of the policy can be attributed to a
number of causes. Firstly, the regional powers in the Gulf
realized the limitations of American capabilities in the
1970's, after the global decline in United States power,
particularly after its defeats in Vietnam and Angola.
Secondly, American policy-makers failed to understand the
Arab mentality, and were even unsympathetic to it. Thirdly,
United States policy depended almost entirely on Iran and
Israel, powers considered by the Arabs to be alien for
historic reasons. Finally, American policy-makers had no
overall experience in the region's affairs.
We have already noted the strong congruence of
political interests between the Saudi and American
governments, whose major mutual objectives were the
stability and security of the region, the containment of
Soviet influence and radical elements in the area, and
finding a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In Saudi Arabia's view, the United States was "the
leading anti-Soviet and status quo global power," 87
 being
the only one able to stand against the Soviet Union, which
Saudi Arabia believed to present a major threat to Islam,
" Cordcnin, op. cit., p.
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to the security oF the region, and particularly to the
Saudi regime. Moreover, since 195, when the Eastern bloc
supplied arms to Egypt, the Soviet Union supported radical
elements in the Arab world, which also threatened the Saudi
regime. Saudi Arabia therefore turned to the United States
as a counterbalancing force.
This had been the cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy
since 1964 when Faisal became king. With his long
experience in foreign affairs, he recognised the decline in
British power, France's abandonment under De Gaulle of its
former imperialistic policy, and the strength of Soviet
influence and of radical movements in the area. During his
first three years in power, he had three main objectivesi
unifying the House of Saud, which had been split during
Saud's reign; defeating the republican forces in Yemen
which threatened the southern border; and containing the
spread of radical Arab nationalism.
These immediate goals reflected his understanding of
the intimate link between internal security and external
affairs which has dominated Saudi foreign policy to this
day. His goals were not, however, achieved until the
outbreak of the Arab-Israeli 6-day war in June 1967.
The Arab defeat in that war entirely changed the
political complexion of the area. Saudi Arabia gained more
than it could have expected. The war In Yemen ended;
revolutionary propaganda against the monarchy ceased; and
the divided House oF Saud was once again unified, when
dissident members of the family, who had been supported by
Nasser, returned and announced their regret. But the Saudi
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government was now forced to play an active part in Arab
affairs and to take up clear positions on issues, such as
the Palestinian problem and Gulf security. The situation
was further complicated by the British withdrawal from
South Yemen in 1967, and the announcement within a few
months of its withdrawal from East of Suez; by the coming
to power of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party in Iraq; and by
the growth of radical Palestinian movements.
Saudi Arabia's "shift from a defensive to an offensive
position as leader of conservative forces in the area"
began with the Arab states' summit in Khartoum in September
1967. Saudi Arabia succeeded in persuading the Arab states
to lift their oil embargo; President Nasser agreed to
withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen and end his support of
the republican movement there in return for financial aid
from Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states of $250 million
to Egypt and $100 million to Jordan. But the main
diplomatic victory for Saudi Arabia during this period was
its success in holding an Islamic conference in Rabat in
September 1969, where it emerged as the leader of the
Islamic world. In fact, the Saudi call for an Islamic
all lance had begun five years previously, as a stand
against pan-Arabism, but had failed hitherto, basically
because of Nasser's strength,
1970 marked another shift in Saudi Arabia's role in
the region, the main factors underlying this being the
coming to power in Syria of the moderate Hafiz Al-Assad;
'' I)wish, Athed, Saudi Arabia'sSjh for Scurity,
Londoru The International Institute for Strategic
Stuthes, 1979, p 56.
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the Palestinian defeat in Jordan and the subsequent
departure of the Palestinians to Lebanon; and the death of
Nasser in September 1970. Nasser's successor, Sadat, was
pro-West and conservative, and moreover ready to accept
Saudi Arabia's role in the reyion..W
During the years 1970 to 1973 then, the Saudi
government had pursued an active diplomacy in the Arab
world.. Saudi financial leverage forced Egypt and Syria to
adopt Saudi Arabia's conservative political positions..
Similarly, under Saudi pressure, Sadat expelled Soviet
advisors from Egypt in July 1972. Saudi Arabia became the
dominant power in the peninsula. North Yemen was no longer
a source of threat. Its cooperation with Iran enabled it to
resist the Iraqi influence in the small Gulf states. The
Saudi view of how best to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict
was gradually accepted by other Arab governments.
This active role led to the kingdom shouldering the
burden of regional problems, which in turn led to
differences between it and the United States, especially
over the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
United States, however, did not take seriously the Saudi
warning that it would use oil as a political weapon,
despite the fact that they "soon realized that the desert
kingdom was no longer the weak, and somewhat subservient,
client it had been in the previous decade." 1
 In any event,
Saudi Arabia's deep involvement in the Palestinian issue
' Ibid , p. 4
Salama,	 pp.. 652-633.
I Daw I h a, op. cit., p - S.
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during this period gave the Saudi government no alternative
but to Join other Arab states in the oil embargo.
With the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 came 'the
beginning of the so-called "Saudi era,""' which was to last
until 1979. The Saudi capital, Riyadh, took over the role
played by Cairo in the 60's. "The October war in 1973,
Saudi financial support of the Egyptian-Syrian war efforts,
and the four-fold increase in crude oil prices provided
more leverage for Riyadh."	 Saudi participation in the oil
embargo gave it political leverage, whilst its huge oil
reserves placed it in an important position in the
international economy, but the most important aspect of the
period was the massive Saudi financial aid to Arab and
other Third World states. Aid, in the form of grants and
loans, was the major instrument of Saudi foreign policy at
this time. $2.37 billion were disbursed. in 1974, 3.87
billion in 1975, 3.6 billion in 1976, and 1.55 billion in
1977.' Saudi aid in 1977 was second only to that of the
United States and was the largest in the world as a
percentage of its gross national product." Aid was given
strictly according to foreign policy objectives. In 1975,
70"!. went to Egypt, Syria and Jordan, (see Table 3.1.) The
political intentions behind this were obviously to support
the moderate stance of these immediate neighbouring states.
'' Sec the articles of Moharnmad Haikal in Al-Nattari
(Kuwait,) May 10, 22, 23, 1977.
"" Si nder, L.ewi s and McLauri n, Saudi Arabia's Air Defense
Requirements in 1980i A Threat Analysis, Virginia:
AL:bot Associates Inc. , 1979, p. 40 Anthony, John
Duke, "Foreign Pol icy: The View from Ri yadh," flj^n...9jii, Winter 1979, p. 75.
"	 fl.i ... .I.!i LJ.iL_Iin1S, April 23, 1979.
"' t)awisha, cp.__cit, p. 17.
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Table 3.1	 Saudi Aid in 1975 and 1976 (7.)
Source:	 La__arid the Gui-f, 14 July 1978
Red p1 ents
tahrai n
Egypt
Jordan
Mauri tani a
Morocco
Oman
Somalia
Sudan
Syr I a
Tuni si a
Yemen (North)
Yemen (PDRY)
Afyhani stan
Ca mer oun
Chad
Comoro Islands
Congo
Ethiopia
Gabon
Guinea
Indonesi a
Mali
Niger
Paki stan
Riaanda
Senegal
Thai land
logo
Turkey
1975
0.2
53.4
2.9
2.0
4.7
1.0
5.4
13.7
1.2
5.4
1.0
1.1
0. 1
0.1
0.6
0.9
0.7
4.3
0.3
0. 1
0.3
1976
4.8
24.0
8.0
4.5
1.2
9.0
9. 1
6.0
4.9
0.4
0.005
0. 1
0.2
0.01
0.3
0. 1
25.0
0.2
-r
0.05
0.005
100.0	 100.0
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If one adds aid given to North Yemen, Oman, Sudan and
Somalia, the total becomes 95X, the objective clearly being
to reduce Soviet influence in these countries. Similarly,
assistance to Pakistan, (25Y. of the total in 1976,) was
intended to achieve the sam objective and to balance Saudi
relations with Iran, as was the aid given to other Third
World states. Certain Western countries were also given
aid, and assistance was given to the IMF (International
Monetary Fund) to stabilize world economic relations and
safeguard the Western economies.	 Saudi Arabia did not,
however, assist any Eastern bloc state, nor any espousing
Marxist ideology, its aid to South Yemen in 1976 being an
abortive attempt to encourage moderate factions in the
Aden government.
For the United States, the "Saudi era" was the time of
a "special relationship" between the two governments,
thanks to which Saudi Arabia virtually became the active
American client state within the area, the Third World and
OPEC. The main indication of this special relationship was
the 1974 agreement to expand cooperation in the fields of
economics, technology, industry and defense referred to
earlier in this chapter. In 1977, President Carter said:
"I do not believe there is any other nation with whom
we have had better friendship and a deeper sense of
cooperation than we have found in Saudi Arabla."
Relations with Egypt also strengthened, particularly
after Nassers death in 1970. The pro-Western Sadat shared
''	 1 9.
U..S. Conqres, Saudi Arabia and ......,United State, p. 2.
Hoacji arid, Jim and Smith, J • P. , "Saudi Arabi a and the
lJnited States: Security and Interdependence,"
Survival, March/April 1970, pp. 81-82.
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Saudi Arabia's conservative political leanings. During his
presidency, Egypt was an active regional power, mainly
because of Saudi financial aid. According to Sadat himself,
in 1977
"Saudi Arabia paid the commitments for the development
oF the armed forces. It undertook For the next five
years commitments to develop the armed forces without
us paying a penny.
In return, Egypt supported Saudi activities In the Arabian
peninsula, Asia and Africa, Including In Sudan,
traditionally an area of Egyptian influences.
One event not greeted with any enthusiasm by Saudi
Arabia was the Iran-Iraq rapprochement which resulted from
their agreement during the OPEC summit in Algiers on March
5, 1975. This agreement was perhaps unique in the region in
the 73's, in that Saudi Arabia did not act as a mediator
between the two parties. Saudi anxiety over it stemmed from
three facts: Iraq, which was seen by the Saudi government
as a threat to the kingdom, put down the Kurdish rebellion
and achieved stability within its boundaries; as a result
of their agreement, Iran recognised the role of Iraq in the
area, which Saudi Arabia had long resisted; and finally,
Iraq had no need of Saudi aid, being itself an oil-rich
state.
King Faisal was assassinated on March 25, 1975, to be
succeeded by King Khalld, with his brother Fand as heir
apparent and first deputy prime minister. Fand conducted
most oF the day-to-day affairs of the kingdom. More pro-
American than his brother the king, he was behind the
Speech to the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union on July 17,
1977..
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strength of Saudi-American relations which were described
as the "special relationship".
The "Saudi era" came to an end at the close of 1978,
due to several factors. Firstly, the Camp David accord of
September 1978 brought to an end the Saudi-Egyptian
alliance. Wide and strong Arab opposition to the agreement
gave the Saudi government little choice but to align itself
with other Arab states. James Akins, former American
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, stated that if the Saudi
government had supported the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, it
would have been overthrown, either from within the royal
family, or by some other internal element.' 	 The Saudi
government was in effect forced to attend the Baghdad
Conference in November 1978 and break off diplomatic
relations with Cairo. Secondly, the collapse of the Shahs
regime in January 1979 not only made the area vulnerable to
Instability, but also ended the American "Two Pillars"
policy. For Saudi Arabia, it also raised doubts about
American credibility.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia had no relations with
the Soviet Union or other Eastern bloc states. Most Saudi
initiatives were designed to contain or reduce Soviet
influence in the area and elsewhere. For example, Prince
Fand stated:
"I I ntend to get the Russians out of Somalia. My
policy will be to help the moderate forces in Southern
Yemen. I will help the Sudan resist Communist
subversion. "
"Seu.Adi Arabia, A Special Supplement," The Financial
::Lt., April 23, 1979.
I1oaciaiic:I and Smith, op. cU., p. 02.
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This policy was variously successful, such as in Somalia,
or not, such as in South Yemen
Relations with Iran improved despite Saudi Arabia's
suspicions about the Shah's intentions in the Arab Gulf
countries, thanks to the role played by Iran in keeping in
check the Iraqi revolutionary tendencies in the area.
Saudi Arabia encouraged the moderate factions in the
Palestine Liberation Front (PLO), particularly the Fatah
movement and its leader, Yasser Arafat. Most of Saudi aid
to the PLO went to the latter. Saudi Arabia also encouraged
Nasser to accept the peace initiatives, and it endorsed
President Sadat's initiative to end military action.
"... it does not want to risk another war in the
Middle East because it does not know what would happen
to it.. Therefore it is going to use what influence it
has in the cause of peace, and that is what really
makes it a moderate state.."
Clearly, Saudi aid policy and activities within the
region and throughout the world served Western interests
and in particular those of the United States.. In his report
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate
Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, said
"Saudi Arabia is important to the United States for
more than its oil. It is a critical factor in the
search for peace in the Middle East and for
maintaining regional stability. "'
But in return, was there any American commitment to defend
Saudi Arabia?
Unitec:I States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Lebanon. Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asi an Affairs, 95th Congress,
2nd session, 1979. Washington D.C. U.S. Government
Pi'intinçj OFfic::e, 1979, p. 35.
United States Senate, A Reportoudi Arabia.. Report
presented to the Commi Ltee on Foreign Relations,
October 1975, Washington DC.. United States
Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 3.
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In June 1977, Njs.Si! published a report on a secret
agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
According to this report, the Saudi government was
permitted to invest 507. of Its balance of payments surplus
in non-redeemable United States bonds at 7.57. for 25 years,
during which time it could not withdraw either capital or
interest, but interest would be usable for the purchase of
American goods or military equipment. These Investments
reportedly totalled 17.2 billion by the end of 1976. The
Saudi government also agreed not to increase the posted
price of its oil to the United States by more than 57. until
1904, regardless of OPEC prices. For its part, the United
States promised the Saudi government to use "its full
political, military and economic resources to assist the
Saudi Arabian government In any way that may prove
necessary. I'
The American administration denied the existence of
such an agreement. According to the magazine, it had been
endorsed by the Saudis outside the United States. The
question remains was there any American commitment to
protect Saudi Arabia?
In Mai-ch 1979, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
William R. Crawford told the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East that the
administration regarded "the maintenance of the integrity
of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia as vital to American
interests in the Middle East, and (stated) that (the United
'' Newsweek, June 27, 1976.
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States) should be prepared to act in implementation of that
consideration." He added,
H WE
 have no formal treaty commitment to the kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, but a succession of American presidents
- every American president since Harry Truman - has in
word and deed made clear that that is of vital concern
to the United States, and that the integrity of the
kingdom was of importance to, and would be protected
by the United States"1
This statement was intended to convince the Congress that
there was a commitment to the Saudi regime after the
collapse of American security arrangements in the areas and
reflected American concern about Saudi survival. However,
President Truman did not in fact give any such commitment,
although it is true that President Roosevelt stated that
Saudi Ai-abia was vital to the United States interests, thus
making the kingdom eligible for American loans in 1943.
(See chapter two.) The statement was clear, however, on the
lack of any "formal treaty commitment.".
In 1977, a Senate study indicated that the United
States was "e>ttremely important to Saudi Arabia's
security." The study went on
"The Saudis take for granted the United States
commitment to defend them against direct Soviet
incursions given the importance of Saudi oil such a
Soviet move could only be a step in the movement to
general war. "'''
Here too, there is no commitment as such to the kingdom's
security, but rather to the defense of America's vital oil
"' United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Ej_drms Transfers to
Hearing before the
SuI::c:ominttee on Europe and the MidcJl East, 96th
Congress, let session. Washington DEC. U.S.
Government Frinting JFfice 1979, p. 13.
U.S Congress, Access to 4U... p. 60.
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interests in the event of the outbreak of a third world
war. The Saudi government appreciated that distinction.
In 1975, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs stated that the
Saudi state was "primarily concerned about neighbours."1m7
The same study also addressed this question, stating -
"The Saudi require the further United States
commitment to defend them against Arab radicals and
they probably have it.
It went on to say that "Saudi Arabia requires United States
involvement as a counterweight to (Iraq and Iran)."1
The study was not specific on this issue, but hinted
at a secret commitment in statements such as, "There is no
United States-Iranian Joint Security Commission, there is
one fr Saudi Arabia," 11
 and "... the Saudis probably
assume that United States military personnel in Saudi
Arabia would participate in Saudi Arabia's defense." 1	Is
it possible to deduce from this that an American commitment
did exist?
In 1979, the Comptroller General of the United States
sent a significant report entitled "Critical Factors
Affecting Saudi Arabia's Oil Decisions" to the Congress.
Its importance stemmed from the fact that it had been
compiled on the basis of interviews with many high-ranking
Saudi and American officials. It included the statements
"Although rio formal defense agreements exist between
the United States and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia's
government Is highly dependent on the United States
for security. It expects United States support against
U.S.. Congress,	 p.. 111.
1ZE!P U.. S. Congress, Acces to Oil , p. 60..
1.	 1J?i_ci ,	 61.1)	 b . .J, p..
1 1 1 itLUiJ., p.. 60.
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external aggression which seriously threatens the
security of oil supplies. "'•'
This makes it clear that there was no American commitment,
secret or otherwise, witness the use of the words "support"
if the oil supplies are "seriously" threatened. In other
words, the Saudis expected support in the event of total
war, in which case the United States would defend its vital
interests and quite clearly not the Saudi territory or
regime.
What then was the purpose of the United States-Saudi
Arabia Joint Commission on Security Cooperation?
In the first place it was the United States who asked
the Saudi government to create the Joint Commission. The
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia, Lee H.. Hamilton, told the House of Representatives in
January 29, 197
"Last year, we urgently instructed the Saudi Arabian
Ambassador to tell his government that we wanted to
create a new special relationship and to establish
special joint commissions with Saudi Arabia to help
effect closer ties."1j
This initiative was part of general American policy towards
many countries in the region. It established similar joint
commissions with Jordan, Israel, India, Egypt and Iran in
the same year. 114
 But in fact, Hamilton was referring to
Joint commissions in economic fields, rather than in
security areas. The only united States joint commission on
security was with Saudi Arabia.. There is therefore no doubt
U.S. GEneral Accounting Office,
i	 30.
t1.3 U.S. Conqres, TI PorsiarL (3!f
	 7, p. 266.
114 Ibid, p. 257.
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that it was established on the initiative of the Saudi
government. lit,
The aim of the joint commission on security was -
"To establish a Joint Commission to review programs
already underway for modernizing Saudi Arabia's armed
•forces in light of the kingdom's defense requirements,
especially as they relate to training."116
To avoid any misunderstanding about this objective, Alfred
Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, told the Congress in August 174
"the decision to establish the Joint Commission does
not Involve any commitment by the United States to
assume new defense responsibilities in this area."1'
A year later,the Department of State told the same
Subcommi ttee
"The Commi esi on is consultative and does not - as such
- make decisions or formulate policy. 	 Its
principle purpose in that regard was to give the
United States side a clearer perception of Saudi needs
and priorities. "''a
These statements show that the existence o.f the joint
commi esi on did not change the nature of the countries'
bilateral relationships, nor constitute an American
commitment to defend Saudi Arabia.
Finally, what was the role of the American military
personnel in the kingdom? Would they participate in its
defense?
The pri mary agreement of cooperation was in April 1974.
Meanwhile the two parties agreed to establish the
Joint Commi ssi on on Security ± n June of that year,
during Prince Fand's visit to Washington. See the
statemcnt of Al fred Atherton, Assi stant Secretary of
State For Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs before
the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on August 7, 1974,
in ihid, p. 65.
1Z4, Ib •ici	 p. 3120.
1 17 Jbid	 p. 65..
lit, u S.. Congress, The Persi an Gui + 197, p.. 7.
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The American Congress in fact became increasingly
concerned about the American military personnel and their
role within the kingdom. In 1975, Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
of the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives, asked
the Department of State
"does not this presence Involve us directly In these
countries despite the philosophy of the Nixon
Doctrine, etc'?"11
In its reply the Department of State said that American
personnel were "a major factor in keeping various arms of
the Saudi military establishment operational." It went on
to say:
"This does not constitute the kind of foreign military
involvement by United States forces which the Nixon
Doctrine sought to avoid. 	 We have no security
treaty with Saudi Arabia. "'u'
In short, there was no American commitment to defend
Saudi Arabia and subsequently the question of Saudi
security remained the major area of difference between the
two governments. Despite the failure of its attempts to
obtain the commitment it sought, the Saudi government gave
the impression that it was under the American military
umbrella, to deter regional threats. The difference between
the two became apparent, however, in late 1978 and early
1979, when the area entered a new phase1 The Saudis, on
record as considering Communism their first enemy,
moderated their tone in a statement by Prince Saud,
Minister of Foreign Affairs:
"Relations used to exist between us and the Soviets in
the past, they were the ones who suspended them. We
t t ' 
.Lisi, r.
Ibid, p. 71.
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would like to emphasize that the absence of diplomatic
relations between us does not mean we do not recognize
the Soviet Union or the importance of the role played
by the Soviet international policy."1
In conclusion, the following are the key points
summarizing Saudi -Amen can relations on security.
The security of the region was the major concern of
both governments during the 1970's, mainly because of the
Eritish decision to terminate its security commitments in
the area in 1971.
The two governments had strong mutual interests, but
while the main concern of the Saudi government was its
security, that of successive American administrations was
the region's oil.
The Saudi regime faced many internal and external
challenges during the 1970's, despite the fact that its
security and stability was never genuinely at risk.
The Saudi government played an important role in the
region, and in th.e world, in maintaining the interests of
the West in general and the United States in particular,
especially after 1973.
Saudi Arabia failed In the basic objective of its
relations with the United States, which was to obtain an
American commitment to protect it, this failure being due
mainly to pressure from Congress.
The Saudi government tried to project the impression
to the regional powers that it had such a commitment.
Security thus remained the major area of difference
between the two governments.
1'1 ILJU L!L!	 LJ19aLtcr.., Morch 13, 1979, p.. 2..
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Chapter Four
THE AMERICAN ARMS TRADE TO SAUDI ARABIA
The transfer of arms became a significant feature of
the post-war worldj the arms trade was far from new, but it
now formed part of the international trade and industry
picture of the second half of the twentieth century. The
two superpowers became deeply involved in the manufacture
and sale of arms and related services. The great powers
joined in these activities, and some third world countries
also became producers and suppliers of weapons.
According to the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, world-wide spending on arms reached
$467 billion in 1971. Ten years later this figure had risen
to $595 billion. In 1980, the Soviet Union had the highest
military expenditure, $188 billion, compared with the
united States' expenditure of $1305 billion in the same
year. Together, the military expenditure of the two
superpowers represented 54Y. of the entire world's
expenditure on weaponry. During the 70's, European military
expenditure increased from $254 to $328 billion by the end
of the decade, while in the same period the military
expenditure of Middle East countries rose from $12 to $41m
billion.
The Soviet Union held the lion's share of the world
market in arms exports; 33.7% by the end of the 70's,
compared with the united States' 25.2%. In the same year,
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the Warsaw Pact countries were responsible for 38.8% of
remaining arms transfers, and NATO countries 53.2%,
together accounting for 927. in total. The majority of
these arms were destined for the Middle East, which
imported 33.7% f the world's total. During the seventies
the region imported $47.7 billion's worth of arms from the
United States alone.3
During the period under study, (1960-1978), the
defense expenditures of the Gulf states increased
dramatically - from $4.1 billion in 1969, to $27.5 billion
In 1978. In the same period, Saudi Arabia's expenditure
rose from $1.2 billion in 1969 to $10.3 billion in 1978 and
totalled $40 billion. American arms exports to Saudi Arabia
were worth $36.9 million in 1968, and had risen to $2.4
billion in 1970.. American sales of arms and related
services to the kingdom during the same period totalled
$5.99 billion.
This huge transfer of arms during the 70's to the
region in general and to Saudi Arabia in particular
occurred as a result of various factors. Firstly, the
region was involved in numerous conflicts the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the conflict in the Horn of Africa, the Yemeni
1 lbid, p. 27.
2 Ray, Grady Dale, United States Arms Policies in the
MiddleEt:ACase_Stud. Unpublished dissertation,
Stephen F Austin State University, December 1983, p. 5.
3 American Society of Friends, A Compassionate Peace, New
York Hill and Wang, 1982, p. 117.
4 u.S. Arms Control arid Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenthtur and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, Washington D.C.,
1980, Table 1.11; United States Department of Defense,
Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign MilitaySales
and Military AssLance, Washington D.C., 1980.
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conflict, and Arab-Iranian hostility in the Gulf. Secondly,
the huge income of the oil-producing states after the oil
embargo of 197:3-1974 enabled their governments to make
massive purchases of military equi pinent and services. And
thirdly, in addition to th economic benefits to be gained,
the two superpowers realized the political significance of
arms sales and e>ploited them as foreign policy tools.
This chapter ecplores early relations in the military
field between the Saudi and American governments, Saudi
armament policy during the 1970's, United States' arms
sales to the kingdom during the same decade, and the major
themes underlying American arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Erlyre1tions in the mjj-y fi
The United States played an important role in
modernizing Saudi Arabian armed forces, beginning during
the second world war, when the United States sent its first
military training mission to the kingdom in December 1943.
Whilst the mission itself achieved little insofar as
modernizing the Saudi armed forces was concerned, it marked
the start of the two countries' mutual relations in this
field, relations which have endured until the present day.
The king had announced the creation of the Ministry of
Defense in 1940 and had appointed his son, Prince Mansour,
minister four years later. On the death of the latter, he
was succeeded by his brother, Prince Mishaal. No real
progress was made in this field, however, during the life-
time of King Abd al-Aziz. The king remained dependent on
1 s
his tribal forces and he and his advisers had no real
conception of what was meant by military modernization.
Nevertheless, before his death the king concluded - in June
1951 - the country's first formal defense agreement with
the United States. This agreement gave the United States
the right to continue to use the Dhahran military base in
return for military assistance. A further agreement to
establish a permanent American military mission in Saudi
Arabia was reached in June 1953.
Despite the strain in political relations between the
United States and Saudi Arabia during the reign of King
Saud (1953-1964), the kingdom continued to rely on the
United States for military assistance. Between 1956 and
1958, the United States gave Saudi Arabia 55 M-47 Patton
tanks, 58 M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, and 12 F-86
Sabre aircraft. In 1957, the Dhahran air. base agreement was
renewed and the training of the Royal Saudi Air Force
began.. 8
 But the most significant event of King Saud's reign
in this respect was the agreement to end American use of
the Dhahran base in 1962, an agreement which did not,
however, seriously damage bilateral relations.
It was undoubtedly Prince Faisal, who regained full
power in 1962, who was behind the strengthening of Saudi-
American bilateral relations in every field, and
particularly in the military. Faisal came to power in the
wake of a crisis within the royal family and after the
kingdom had faced a genuine threat in the south s a result
Cordesman, op .__cit, pp. 95 and 97; Nyrop, op. cit, p.
334..
8 Ibid, p.. 334.
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of the civil war in North Yemen and Egypt's involvement
therein. 'This complex situation led the king to seek the
assistance of the United States in the modernization of the
Saudi armed forces. He also renewed the country's military
ties with the United Kingdom and France. Most important of
all, he appointed Prince Fand minister of the interior,
Prince Sultan minister of defense, and Prince Abdullah
commander of the National Guard. The significance of these
appointments lies in the fact that this team has continued
to lead the kingdom until the present day.
In 1963 the Saudi government requested that the
American administration send an air defense survey team to
study its requirements for a modern air defense system. By
the end of 1963 the survey was complete and the team's
recommendations were submitted to the Saudi government on
2 January 1964. These were that the kingdom needed 36
supersonic aircraft (either the Northop F-S or the Lockheed
F-104) , surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, and an air defense
radar net. In 1965, to offset British purchases of
American F-ill aircraft, the United States and Britain
reached agreement to cooperate on supplying an air defense
package to Saudi Arabia of which the United Kingdom would
supply 49 SAC LiQhtnir,q fighters and radar and
communication equipment, and would provide a five-year
training and maintenance programme. These British sales
totalled nearly 2G4 million. For its part, the United
States would supply 150 Hawk tlIM-23A surface-to-air
missiles at a cost of :l26 million. The Saudi Ministry of
Lonq, DrVi U, 1j	 Jr	 •.jjçj._91udi Arabi a
imtivaljAl1ie, LondonWstview Press, 1985, p. 45.
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Defense signed agreements to this effect with the Americans
on 4 May 1966 and with the Dritish on the following day.
The Any1oAmerican air defense system proved unsuccessful,
but it did lay the •foundations for the modernization during
the 70's of the Saudi air defense system which was entirely
dependent on the United States.
In early 1964, Saudi Arabia requested the assistance
of an American Army Corps of Engineers' team for military
construction and to study the needs of Saudi armed forces.
Dy mid-1964, the team had established a permanent office in
Saudi Arabia. The Corps of Engineers WoE) were to play a
major part in the modernization of the Saudi armed forces,
its role becoming increasingly important during the 70's.
The CoE became involved to a greater or lesser extent in
every military programme and moreover in a number of civil
projects, such as the setting up of television and radio
systems -
An agreement was signed by the Saudi government and
the CoE on 5 June 1965 according to which the CoE would
plan and supervise the construction of the military
cantonment at Khamis Mushayt near the Yemeni border and of
another at Tabuk near the Jordanian border. (The former was
completed in 1971 at a cost of $81.4 million, and the
latter In 1972 at a cost of $81 million.) On 7 September
1966, the Saudi government signed a further agreement with
the CoE which accounted for $147 million's worth of
services the following year This provided for the CoE to
Smp;on, Anthony Ili j:j! E L The Companies,__the
Deilers, the Bribes, From Vickers t LE3Theed, London
Corcnet:. Books, 1983, p 334
1 6
supervise a five-year programme for the supply of lorries
and spare parts and the Introduction of a maintenance
system to Improve the army's mobility." (For ma j or Saudi
arms purchases prior to 1967, see Table 4.1.)
In general terms, until the 6-day war of 1967, Saudi
progress in military fields was limited. The country's
major source of equipment and services was the United
States, with equipment and services to the Saudi air force
being provided by the United Kingdom under American
arrangements. (See Table 4.1.) During this period the
principal task confronting Saudi armed forces was to deal
with the threat from Egyptian and republican forces in
North Yemen. King Faisal, however, mistrusted the regular
army, because many army officers, as well as some members
of the royal family itself, were already in sympathy with
the call for Arab nationalism. He therefore took relatively
few steps to develop the regular army.
Saudi armamentpolicy
	
jn the 1970's
The 6-day war marked the beginning of a new phase in
the region's history and in the Saudi role in the area. The
war had affected not only political priorities in the
Middle East as a whole, but also the position of Saudi
Arabia. The war lay behind the termination of the Yemen
" CorrJesman,	 p. 128; Nyrop, op. cit. , pp. 49-50.
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Table 4.1
	 Saudi Arabia's major arms purchases prior to
the 6-day Nar of 1967
Year	 Ai rforce
I 956-s S
	
55 tl-47 Pattor, tanks	 12 F-86 Sabre aircraft
(United States)	 (United States)
58 M-41 t1alker Bulldog
light tanks
(United States)
1964	 300 EAC Vigilant anti-
tank guided weapons
(United Kingdom)
1965	 Construction of
military facilities
(United States)
150 Raytheen NIM-23A
Haik mi ssi ls
(United States)
37 Thunderbird I SAM
missiles
(United Kingdom)
14 C-130 Hercules
transports
(United States)
40 Lightnirg inter-
ceptors
(United Kingdom)
9 Lightning F-52
interceptors and
T-54 trainers
(United Kingdom)
1966	 Army mobility, parts
and maintenance
p roy r a mine
(United States)
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civil war which had plagued the Saudi regime far more than
seven years, since NassEr's defeat left him no choice but
to withdraw his troops frbm North Yemen; with them
evaporated the Yemeni-Egyptian threat to the kingdom.
In 1969, the Saudi armed forces totalled some 36,000
men and defense e>penditure was $321 million. The army
consisted of approximately 30,000 troops, organised into
some five infantry brigades, and was equipped with a
limited number of M-47 Pattør, medium tanks, M-24, M-41 and
MX-13 light tanks, and BAC Vigilant anti-tank missiles. It
also had some AML-90 arinoured cars and 6 batteries of Ham'4k
surface-to-air missiles. The total navy strength was 1,000,
equipped with coastal patrol craft only. The air force
commanded 5,000 men and some 40 combat aircraft, (4 Hunter
intercepters, 24 F-52 and F-53 Lightning Jet fighters and
11 obsolescent F-86 Sabre Jet fighters.). It also had B C-
130E, 10 C-47, and 2 C-hG medium transport planes; 2
Alouette-3 and 20 AB-20 and AEI-206 helicopters; 40
aircraft trainers; and some Thunderbird surface-to-air
missiles. Finally the National Guard consisted of some
20,000 lightly armed tribesmen.'
Until 1970, the Saudi government did relatively little
to enhance the combat capability of its armed forces. It
did, however, import 220 ML-90 Par,hard armoured fighting
rh IntCrnaLional Institute -For Strategic Studies, fli
London, 1969, p. 45;
Cottrell, ñlvin, The
	 ri_Oulf States, Baltimore:
Johns Hnpki ns University Press, 1990, p 142; Burrel 1
P - N. fl:L.Er.!
	
of British
1, tiashinqton Paper No 1, Vol. 1, Center for
Strat.eçj:i c: and Internati onal St.udi es, (Jashington D.C.
1969, p 92; The International Institute for Strategic
Studi , :[.h MtLitJa1nce (169-1970) , London,
1969, p. 36.
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vehicles from France and 25 SAC Strikemaster counter
insurgency and training aircraft. These gave the Saudis a
measure of capability to withstand any threat from South
Yemen or any Internal Instability within a relatively short
time. Having said this, the aircraft were not used against
South Yemen in 1969.1
Various factors Influenced Saudi defense policy prior
to 1970.. First, as we have already noted, King Faisal did
not trust the regular army. The Middle East had after all
witnessed several military coups during the 1950's and
1960's. Hence the king's reluctance to modernize the Saudi
regular forces. The 1969 attempted goj in Saudi Arabia
served to confirm his suspicions. Second, the Egyptian
threat had evaporated as a result of Nasser's defeat in the
1967 war, following which Nasser adopted a moderate policy
towards the Arab monarchies until his death in 1970. Third,
the kingdom's commitment at the Khartoum summit meeting to
provide financial aid to the Arab confrontation states left
it with insufficient financial resources to develop its own
forces Fourth, the kingdom had a dearth of manpower able
to absorb the skills required by modern technology. (This
continued to be a major problem in modernizing the Saudi
forces throughout the 1970's.) Finally, the Arab defeat in
the 1967 war strengthened the case of the radical Arab camp
which sought to put pressure on Saudi Arabia to prevent it
from seeking military aid from the United States.
' Safran, Nadar,
	 d	 rab	 The Ceaejess Cuest for
Secj, LoncJon Harvard Liniversity Press, 1985, p.
2)3.
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By the end of this period, Saudi armed forces were the
third largest in the Gulf region, but their combat
capability still bore no comparison with that of the two
other major armed forces, those of Iraq and of Iran. (See
Table 4.2..)
The first significant attempt to modernize the Saudi
forces was initiated in 1970 when the Saudi government
requested that the United States provide a special military
mission to evaluate the needs of the Saudi armed forces..
The Defense Department duly sent a mission under Major-
General Oswald Leahy.. Although the Saudi government did not
formally adopt the findings of the mission, they did form
the agenda for future planning of Saudi military
modernization plans throughout the 1970's.
What lay behind the shift in Saudi defense policy in
1970? In the first place, there was Britain's announcement
of her intention to withdraw from the region by the end of
1971. From the Saudi point of view, this move would leave
Saudi Arabia's western borders vulnerable to threat from
Saudi Arabia's two largest neighbours, Iraq and Iran. In
the second place, the American role in the area had now
clarified. The Saudis from now on did not hesitate to
declare their cooperation with the United States. (1970
also witnessed the emergence of conservative elements in
the region for a variety of reasons. Nasser moderated his
stance in the wake of his defeat in the 6-day war and after
his death in September was succeeded by the moderate Sadat.
King Hussain of Jordan delivered a crushing blow to the
Lony, 2it, P 54.
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Table 4.2
	 Major Saudi Defense Acquisition Programmes
(1960-1978)
Sources: The lriterriat.zorial ZT,st:tute for Strategic Studies,
to .1979-1980, London: 1974
to 1979; Stockholm International Peace Research ITiStitute,
Norid Armaments arid Disarmament, Jf. I Yearbook, Taylor arid
Francis,, London,: 1976-1978.
YIrL. r:tPi
1960 220 AML-90 Panihard
armoured + i qhti ny
vehicles (France)
1971
Airforce	 Nayy
25 BAC-167 Strike-
master counter-
insurgency trainers
(U.K.)
55 F-SB/E fighters
U.S.)
1972 Programme for
1 ogi sti cal
support system
(U..S)
1973 200 AMX-30 medium
tanks (France)
250 armoured
personnel carriers
(France)
1974 250 M-60 medium
tanks (U. S. )
250 armoured
personnel carriers
(U.S..)
350 105mm
Hovitzers (U.S.)
1200 Hawk SAMs
(US.)
250 Scorpion light
tanks
550 armoured cars
(U.K. and France)
8 hovercraft
(coast guard)
(U.K.)
22 patrol
boats (coast
guard) (U.K.)
Agreement
on naval
program (U.S.)
11 C-130 Hercules
transports (U. S.)
38 Nirage III
fighters (France)
34 Alouette II
helicopters
(France)
contd.
4 MSC-322
coastal mine-
sweepers
1 large
missile patrol
boat
14 patrol
boats
100 Harpoon
surf ace-tD-
surface
mi sd 1 es
6 large
missile patrol
boats (U.S.)
12 coastal
patrol boats
(U.S.)
B patrol boats
(France)
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Table 4.2 contd.
Ycr.
1975 00 AMX-30 medium
tanki (France)
250 AMX-10
armoured personnel
carriers (France)
1976 250 M-60 medium
tanks (France)
100 M-113 armoured
personnel carriers
(U.S..)
1650 TOW anti-tank
gui ded weapons
(LI.. S.
4000 Vra qors anti-
tank missiles
(U.S..)
S0-60 Vulcari anti-
aircraft guns
(U. S..
6 Ha,k surface-to-
air missiles
(SAWs) (U.S..)
Al rforce
60 F-SE/B/F
fighter/bombers
10 KC-130 Hercules
transports
0 C-10 Hercules
transports
4 F-SF fighter/
bombers (U.S..)
17 C-130 Hercules
transports (U.S.)
11 BAC Strike-
master /counter-
insurgency
trainers (U.S.)
2000 Side'ir,cIer
air-to-air missiles
(U.. S..)
1650 Ha.'erick air-
to-surface missiles
(U.S..)
200 Bell 209 AHIS
attack helicopters
(U.. S..)
1977 /?edeye surface-to- 10 mIscellaneous
air missiles	 helicopters (Italy
(SAM's) (U.S.)	 and Japan)
4 Badr class
corvettes
(U.S.)
9 As-Sadiq
class fast-
attack craft
(U.S.)
1978 250 AML wheeled	 60 F-iS Eagle	 9 Tacoma fast
armour ed	 fighters (U.S.)	 patrol boats
reconnaissance	 (U.S.)
vehicles (France)
94 V-iSO wheeled
a r mou red
reconnal ssance
vehicles and
armoured personnel
vehicles with anti-
tank guided weapons
(U.S..
86 35mm anti-
aircraft guns (U.S.)
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Palestinians in his country, also in September. The
moderate politician Hafiz Al-Assad became president of
Syria.) In the third place, the Saudi government found
itself free of financial constraints. Saudi revenue
increased by 69X in the fiscal year 1971 and by an annual
average of 3"/.. over the years 1971 to 1973. And last but
not least, the Saudi government was prompted into action by
the build-up of the armed forces of Iraq and Iran. The Shah
was preparing to assume the role o-F major power in the
area, whi1t Iraq, sensible of the complicated situation
which prevailed in the region, was also building up its
armed forces..
Thus between 197 and 1973 the Saudi government
embarked on a serious attempt to modernize its armed
forces. Or 29 May 1971 it formally requested the United
States to sell it 2 F-SE Tiger fighters (to follow its
original purchase of F-5As), as well as 35 F-SB training
aircraft. This request included the necessary equipment,
spare parts and training personnel. The cost of the
fighters was 171 ,nillion, and in 1972 the Saudi Minister
of Defense and Aviation signed a .t277 million contract for
the training, equipment and construction components of the
programme.. The F-S purchase
"gave the Royal Saudi Air Force much better access to
training facilities in the United States and led to
the stationing of a much larger cadre of U.S.A.F. and
U.S. contractor personnel in Saudi Arabia."
As a result of this agreement, the U.S. Military
Training Mission was expanded to	 and the Technical
Advisory Field Team was expanded still further.'3
' Cordsmn, op.. cit., p.. 163..
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In May 1973, the Saudi and British governments reached
agreement on extending the existing British Aircraft
Corporation (SAC) contract for a further five-year period,
enabling it to continue to operate the major part of the
Royal Saudi Air Force's projects and services. In the same
month the United States gave Saudi Arabia its approval in
principle for the purchase of F-4 or Jaguar fighters. This
approval met fierce opposition from pro-Israeli groups in
the United States and despite initial Department of State
assurances that any military sales to Saudi Arabia would
take "fully into account (America's) long-standing policy
of support for Israeli security", '- was eventually
withdrawn
During the same period (1968-1973), the Saudi army was
given a lower priority.. Its main source of arms was France.
In 1973, the Saudi government purchased 200 AMX-30 medium
tanks and 250 armoured personnel carriers The American
role in modernizing the Saudi army was limited to
maintenance and repair. These activities were carried out
in accordance with the October 1967 agreement which had
been concluded between American Secretary of Defense
McNamara and the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation,
Prince Sultan. tJhen the agreement expired in 1972, the
Saudi government requested the U.S.. Army Corps of Engineers
to carry out their programme for a logistical support
system for the army. According to an earlier (June 1965)
agreement between the American and Saudi governments, the
CoE constructed two major military cities, the first at
' Long,	 p. 48.
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RhamiS Mishat:, near the Yemeni border, the second at
Tabuk, near the Jordani an border. '
During these same years (1968-1973), Saudi Arabia
could not be said to have been a naval power. In the mid-
60's consideration was given to the construction of two
naval bases, one on the western Saudi coast and the other
on the eastern. In April 1968, the Saudi government
formally requested the United States Navy to modernize its
navy and to create a credible Saudi naval force. This
request was met in the first instance by the arrival (in
August 1968) oF a three-man U.S. Navy team which completed
its study by February 1969. The study recommended the
creation of two operational bases at Jeddah and Jubayl, as
well as a headquarters in the capital, Riyadh. The study
also found that the Saudi navy required six vessels for
each base and a ten-year training programme. After a
further study, a Joint Saudi-American team recommended in
1971 a nineteen-ship navy. This latter recommendation led
in February 1972 to a Saudi-American agreement on the
establishment of the navy. The agreement, which was known
as the Saudi Arabian Naval Expansion Plan (SNEP), allowed
for four 700-ton and nine 300-ton guided missile patrol
boats, four MSC-322 coastal minecraft and eight other small
craft, as well as MK-92 fire-control systems, MK-46
torpedoes, AN/BPS surface search radars, 76mm rapid-fire
For details of the activities of the U.S. Corps of
Engineers in Saudi Arabia, see United States Congress,
House of Representatives, Committee on Internatlohal
Rel ati onS,	 in the Persian
faSeaf'resent and Future, 95th
nnqress , 1st sessi on Washi nyton D.C.. : U. S.
Government Printincj Office, 1977, p. 28.
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guns, and Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles.	 Both
governments recognising that this plan was over-ambitious,
it was trimmed in 1974 The original estimated cost was
$150 million, but by 1977 actual costs had topped $2
billion.
The Saudi government also recognised the need to
modernize the National Guard. In September 1971, Prince
Abdullah, commander of the National Guard, asked for
American help in developing a modernization plan. The two
parties reached an agreement for the equipment and training
of the National Guard in March 1973,'• although it was not
implemented until 1975. The plan called for the
reorganisation of the National Guard into 20 light infantry
battalions, Including two mechanized infantry battalions
and two artillery batteries.. This programme was expanded to
include four infantry battalions and one supporting
artillery battalion. The original estimated cost was $200
million and the programme was to take four years to
implement.. The infantry battalions would receive 150
Cadillac Gage V-iSO commando armoured cars, 20mm cannon,
recoilless rifles, guns, tube-launched optically-tracked
wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles and Vulcan 20mm anti-
aircraft cannon, while the artillery would receive 105mm M-
102 howitzers. 1
Cottrei]., op. cit.., p. 144.
• Ho! dn and Johns, c.cit., p . 361
Tahtins, Dale R.. , Ntiona1 9curity Challenges to
v-aLji, Washington D.. C.. Amen can Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p. 17,
EmuUet.in, 27 May 1973, p.
866.
" c:crcIm.n,	 p. 178.
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Thanks to such measures, by the end of this period the
Saudi armed forces had risen to 42,000. The army strength
was now 36,000, organised into 4 infantry brigades, 1
armoured battalion, 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 parachute
battalion, 1 Royal Guard battalion, 3 artillery battalions,
3 antl-air'c:raft battalions, and 10 surface-to-air missile
batteries, equipped with Hawk missiles. The army also had
25 M-47 medii.in tanks; 60 M-41 light tanks; 200 AML-60 and
AML-90, some Staghourid and Greyhound armoured cars; Ferret
scout cars; as well as field and anti-aircraft guns. The
naval strength retnai ned one thousand, but it was now
equipped with 2 torpedo boats, I motor gunboat, 2 utility
craft, 9 coastguard patrol boats and 8 SRN-6 coastguard
hovercraft. The Saudi airforce comprised 5,500 men and now
boasted 70 combat aircraft 2 fighter-bomber squadrons
equipped with 15 F-86F's; 2 fighter-ground attack squadrons
with 35 F-52 and F-53 Lightriings; 2 transport squadrons
with 10 C-130 and 2 C-140D's; 2 helicopter squadrons with I
,l1ouete III, 1 AB-204, 8 AB-205 and 20 AB-206, 1 1-33
trainer, 1 Cessna 3101< and 6 172G light aircraft, as well
as 37 Thunderbird Mark I surface-to-air missiles. Finally,
the National Guard had been completely reorganised into
regLil ar and semi-regular battalions.
It is clear, however, from these details that on the
eve of the October 1973 war, Saudi Arabia still had only a
very limited combat capability. Hence the United States'
failure to take King Faisal 's threat of war seriously. The
main objective of the bul id-up of Saudi armed forces had
The Internti onal In;t tute for Strategic Studies, The
!t:.irsis_(19731 2Zft, London, 1973, pp. 35-36.
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been to maintain the kingdom's internal stability and to
deal with limited threats, such as that from South Yemen
(PDRY).
The October 1973 war had a dramatic effect on Saudi
deFense policy. As a result of the oil embargo, oil prices
rose sharply, causing Saudi income to soar from $6.4
billion to p27.7 billion in the fiscal year 1974-1975. This
removed all financial constraints on Saudi defense
expenditure. Conversely, oil prices adversely affected
potential arms suppliers the United States and European
countries needed funds to all evi ate the bal ance-of -payment
problems which had followed the increase in oil prices and
they were prepared to provide arms and services to help
solve their financial difficulties. At the same time, Saudi
Arabia emerged as a major global oil and financial power.
It also became effective leader of the wide conservative
camp in the region, thanks to the "Royal Policy" of I<ing
Faisal, who succeeded in embracing Egypt and Syria under
the Saudi umbrella.
In December 1973, the Saudi government once again
sought American assistance in modernizing its air force.
The Defense department agreed and proposed to undertake a
comprehensive study of Saudi defense requirements. t
 It
must be borne in mind that the Saudi request fell during
the days oF the oil embargo. Two explanations for this
apparent paradox can be advanced. The first is that the
United States was aware that Saudi participation in the oil
embargo was a reluctant response to Arab pressure rather
Sfrn,	 pp.. 2i7-2ø8.
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than a free cholc:e.. The second is that no connection was
sought between the overall situation in the Middle cast and
the sale of American arms and services to Saudi Arabia. In
other words American arms sales were not linked to the
general American policy on the area.
After 1973, relations between the two governments
entered a new phase, that of the so-called "special
relationship". In the military field, American involvement
deepened, principally thanks to the new-found Saudi wealth:
the Saudi government was now in a position to commission
virtually every armament and service it desired. Thus in
response to the request made by the Saudi government, an
American team began its field study in April 1974,
completed it in June, and submitted its report in October
of the same year. (The study excluded the National Guard
which was covered by another American study prepared in
1973, reflecting the Saudi desire to keep the National
Guard at one remove from the other Saudi armed forces.)
The defense plans of 1974 extended over a ten-year
period.. During this time, the army was to be expanded from
4,øø to 72,OO men. Four mechanized brigades were to be
created with twelve mechanized infantry and three armoured
battalions; similarly two armed brigades with six armoured
and two mechanized infantry battalions; one airborne
brigade with three infantry battalions; and three
l.Jni ted Stat.E.c Congress, House of Representatives,
Cornm Itee on internati onai Pci ati ens, Ibe__Uc
.f.iJ!!	 A Report, 94th
Conqress , 1st Sessi on. 'iashi nqLen D.. C. : U. S.
Government Pri nil ny Office, 1 973, p - IS. (Subsequently
referred to as U.. S. Congress, The united States Arms
Sal cs i the Persi an Gui +
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helicopter battalions. The plan also recommended that the
Sai.di air force be expanded from 14,000 to 22,000 men and
called for the 5 F-B/E aircraft which had been purchased
in 1971 to be integrated within	 years. The air force was
moreover to acquire 60 F-5E/F aircraft at a cost of 769
million, with a further 1,74 million allocated to
construction and training. The plan also recommended that
the Lockheed Company continue to provide the support
programme for the C-13@ Hercules transport aircraft.
In 19Th, representatives of the Saudi air force
visited the United States to evaluate the F14, F-15, F16,
and F-iS aircraft. In March 1976, they informed the U.S.
Department of Defense that they favoured the F-15 for
defense purposes and specified that they required 40 of
them. This represented a major change in the Saudi plans
for the modernization of the air force. 	 There were many
reservations about or opposition to the sale from within
the Ford and Carter adrninistrations, 	 ostensibly because
it was felt that the Royal Saudi Air Force was not yet
ready to operate the advanced F-15 system. Nevertheless,
Presidents Ford and Carter met the Saudi request, agreement
being finally reached in May 1978, by which time the number
f aircraft had risen to 60. This delay in reaching final
agreement was caused by the lobbying of pro-Israeli groups
who had campaigned to block the sale,	 in order no doubt
to secure more weapons for Israel • In point of fact by the
Safran, pp. cit., pp. 207-208.
8 July 1976; WhirrnLon Post, 3
Septembei' 1977.
^!:i1.!:.9	 y Repor -t, S Apri 1
1978, p. 938.
171
time delivery of the aircraft wa taken in late 1981, the
entire security needs of the kingdom had changed.
We have noted above how the modernization programme
for the Saudi navy was adopted by the 1971 American
mission, modified in 1972 according to a joint agreement
and •finalized in 1974. The estimated cost rose to more than
$2.6 billion. Despite this the 70's naval programme was
relatively unsuccessful, mainly because the existing navy
provided such a poor starting point.
The National Guard was the subject of a separate
American study and Final agreement on its modernization
programme was reached in 197S. The original estimated cost
was approximately $200 million. By 1974 this had risen to a
total of $33 rnillionj $123 million for equipment; $63
million for construction and $149 million for management
and training. In 1976, the cost of the construction element
rose still further to $1366 million, bringing the total
cost of the programme to $19 billion.8
During this period (1973-1978) , the major objective
underlying these plans was to deter the so-called "Iraqi
threat". A priority was therefore the construction of the
large military city (which became known as the King Khalid
military city) near the Iraqi border. According to one
researcher
"the survey relied on Iran to deter an outright Iraqi
invasion; and if such an invasion nevertheless took
place, it envisaged a Saudi capacity to fight a
delaying action until Iranian, and ultimately
American, Forces came to the rescue."
"s E3aFran,	 cit. , p. 208.
Ibid, p.. 207.
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tJrirJoubtedly, It was the Iraqi capability to move its
army to 'the Syrian front in some 45 hours, demonstrated
during the October 1973 war, which lay behind Saudi fears.
The Saudi oil fields are located about 4ø miles from the
IraqI border-. Hence the Saudi government's unease at the
Ir'aqi-Irarian raprçc men of March 1975. It is not
unreasonable to surmise that they believed that the Shah
had left them exposed to an Iraqi threat.
The other major Saudi objective for expanding its
defense programmes was to deepen United States involvement
in matters relating to Saudi defense, hoping that this
would lead to America assuming dfacto responsibility for
Saudi security. In his report to the House Committee on
International Relations, Congressman Pierre S. du Pont IV,
who conducted a special study mission to examine United
States arms sales to Iran, Kuwait and Suadi Arabia during
May 1975, stated
11 Although there is no formal military alliance binding
the United States to (Saudi Arabia), the American role
in its military development creates ties that could
lead to increasingly deeper involvement.'
American involvement was indeed considerable. The
Saudi air force for instance could not operate without
American personnel. In December 1975, Colonel William A.
Fifer, (U.S. Army, Near East and South Asia Region, Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs,) told the House Sub-Committee on
International Political and Military Affairs that if
U. s. cc:.ricjrs, The United__SLteE Arms Sales to the
p. 32.
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Congress did not accept an extension of the 1971 American-
Saudi contract for the support of the Saudi air force,
"we will have to withdraw American people that are
there. The Saudi Arabian air force, unquestionably,
will not he able to continue to operate in a very
short time period thereafter... I think the Saudi
Arabian air Force would be grounded within a matter of
a couple of weeks after the current contract runs
out.
Similarly the Department of State told Congress that
American personnel were a major factor in keeping various
arms of the Saudi military establishment operational. But
it rejected the notion that this placed responsibility for
Saudi defense with the United States. (See Chapter Three.)
It should be borne in mind, however, that Saudi plans
to modernize its armed forces would take ten years to
complete, from 1974 to 1984. In reality the strategic
environment in which the plans were to be implemented would
change within a few years, especially in the volatile
Middle East. This is in effect what occurred when the
region entered a new phase after the Camp David accord and
the fall of the Shah's regime. (For major Saudi defense
acquisition programmes 1968-1978, see Table 4.2.)
By the end of the period with which we are concerned,
i.e. 1978, the total strength of Saudi armed forces had
risen to 61,500. The army now had 45,000 troops, organised
much as in 1973 (see above), but with in addition 1
mechanized division, 2 infantry battalions, and a further 3
United SLates Congress, House of Representatives,
Ltee on Internet i onel Rel at.i ons, Military__Cies
Heari ncjs before the Subcommittee on
IrilerneLi onel Poll ii cal and Military Affairs, 94th
Co;qv.:.:;., 1't Session. t4ashington D.C.: U.S.
Government F'ri nti ny Of -f ice, 1976, p. 3. (Subsequently
referred to as U. S. Congress, Military Sales to Saudi
Arabia.)
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anti-aircraft battalions It was equipped with 400 MX-30
and 75 M-47/-60 med:Lurn tanks; 1O Scorpion, AMX-13 light
tanks; 200 ML-60/--90, some Staghoursd and Greyhound
armoured cars Ferret scout cars; M-113; Parihard and M-3
commando armoured personnel carriers; 105mm guns; 75mm
rec:oilless rifles; 55-11, Dragon, Vigilant, Harpoon anti-
tank guided weapons; anti-aircraft guns; and Rapier, Hawk
surface-to-air missiles. The Navy strength was still a
modest 1,500 men, equipped with I fast patrol boat with
guided missiles, 3 Jaguar class fast patrol boats, and 1
large patrol craft in addition to the vessels they had in
1973. The Sai.tdi air force strength had risen from 5,500 (in
1973) to 15,000 men, and its combat aircraft from 70 to
137 2 fighter bomber squadrons were equipped with 70 F-
SE's; 2 counter-insurgency/training squadrons with 30 BC-
167's; 2 interceptor squadrons with 37 Lightririg F52/F53's;
2 transport squadrons with 39 C-130 E/H's; and 2 helicopter
squadrons with 16 AB-206 and 24 AB-205's. Its other
aircraft consisted of 4 KC-130 tankers; I Boeing 707; 2
Fekin 20's; 2 .7etstar transports; 12 Alouette Ill's; 1 B-
204 helicopter; and trainers including 20 F-SB, 7 Lightning
T54/55; 6 Cer,a T-414. The National Guard comprised 35,000
men in regular and semi-regular battalions
Saudi armed forces were now the third most powerful in
the region, but were still far behind the other two - Iraq
and Iran (see Table 4.3) insofar as their defense
capabilities were concerneth Despite a vast investment,
(from 1969 to 1975 Saudi military expenditure reached
'' The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
London, 1977, p. 40.
Year
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
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Table 4..3 i The Military Build-tip in the Major Gulf States
(1968/69-1977/78)
Sourcei The Ir,terr,at.ror,al 
.Tristitute for Strategic Studies,
The Hilitary Balance (19) to (1977-1978),
Lor,dor,s 1968 to 1977.
Total armed
forces (OOOs)
S.A.. jq Iran
36 82 221
34	 78 221
36	 95 161
41	 95 181
41 102 191
43 102 212
43 113 238
47 135 250
52 158 300
62 lee 342
Medium tanks ! Combat aircraft
	
SA jj
	
Iran !	 S.A Iraq Iran
	
a few 535 n/a I
	 40 215 200
	
a few 535 n/a I	 43 213 180
	
55 645 n/a !	 75 229 175
	
25 860 860 I	 75 220 140
	
25 960 860 I
	 71 189 160
	
25 990 920 1	 70 224 159
	
55 1390 1160 !	 90 218 212
	
175 1290 1160 I
	 95 247 238
	
325 1290 1360 1
	 97 299 317
475 1400 1620 1 137 369 341
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.l36,241 million, see Table 4.4,) and the purchase of the
most advanced weapons systems and services available, the
kingdom's defense capability was still problematical, for a
number oF reasons. Firstly, the kingdom's territories
represent a very large geographical area to defend, with
over 2,000 miles of coastline along the Arabian Gulf and
the Red Sea. Secondly, trained manpower was limited,
basically because of the small population. 1
 Thirdly, the
combat capability of the Saudi armed Forces had not been
tested outside Saudi borders. The Saudi army, for instance,
took no real active part in any Arab-Israeli conflict. And
finally, as far as the modernization programmes themselves
were concerned, it is important to bear in mind the
following points.
In the first place, Saudi spending on infrastructure,
construction projects and services absorbed BOX of its
military expenditure. The remaining 20X spent on arms was
small by comparison with just under a third of the military
expenditure of Iran, (the total defense spending of the two
countries being roughly equal.)
In the second place, given the nature of the Saudi
/ political system, decisions relating to defense were highly
personal. The purchase of a given weapon depended on the
king, the defense minister, and in some cases on a few
other individuals. The request made by Prince Sultan,
Minister of Defense, to purchase F-S aircraft from the
American administration rested on the mere fact that he
admired it. (This was to prove an unsuitable choices in the
' Tht:i.res,	 ciL, p. 15.
826
822
857
977
1,304
1,686
1,738
1,837
2,007
2,136
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1,102
1,481
1,572
2,115
2,796
p	
,-,4-
7,105
9,280
8,952
10,284
1,828
2,045
2,505
3,093
3,729
6,303
8,646
9,521
0,747
10,598
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Table 44	 Defene Expenditure in the Gulf 1969-1970
(current $ millions)
Source: Ur,ied States Arms Control arid Disarmament Agency,
No...IC//li. litary E.penditures arid Transfers 1 969-jj7 arid
1971-1990, kashir,gton, D.C.: 1960 arid 1963 respectively.
Year	 Saudi Arabia	 Iran	 Iraq
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early 1970's, this advanced aircraft became outdated and
the Saudis were unable to operate it without the support of
American personnel.)
In the third place, Saudi spending on defense related
to the country's huge income, rather than changes in the
strategic environment of the region Expenditure increased
when revenues increased.
All these served to diminish the effectiveness of the
modernization programmes.
arms sales to Sauçii
Arabi a
American policy on arms sales to the Middle East was
influenced by various factors during the 70's. Dominating
these were the British withdrawal from East of Suez, which
left the so-called security vacuum in the area, and the
American involvement in Vietnam, which lay behind the
adoption of the "Nixon doctrine", calling for a shift of
some of the American regional security burden to regional
pOwers. The Nixon doctrine resulted in the "twin pillar"
policy, that is to say the United States' reliance on Iran
and Saudi Arabia to maintain regional security. In effect,
as was shown in Chapter Thi-€c, the United States regarded
Iran and Israel as the two regional powers capable of
securing Western interests in the area, rather than the
Saudi regime, simply because the latter had no capability
to build a strong military force. Nevertheless, the United
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States injected a massive amount of military equipment and
services Into Saudi Arabia. To what end?
According t Congressman Pierre S. du Pont, in his
report to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Af+airs
"Arms sales bring several advantages to (the United
State$). They aid the U.S. balance of payments. They
also expand U.S. influence within a nation and promote
friendly ties with (the tJrited States). In addition to
this, they promote the security of nations whose
sec:urity is important to the United States.. By selling
ar-ms to certain nations the United States can build
the defenses of these nations to levels where they are
able to insure their own security.. In this way, they
do not have to rely on the direct intervention by the
United States for their protection. "
There is no doubt that the October 1973 war, in
dramatically pushing up oil prices, affected the United
States balance of payments. Between 1973 and the end of the
decade, the Suif states imported more than 21 billion's
worth oF military equipment and services from the United
States • The American arms sales policy.was clearly an
important part of its petrodollar policy. The arms sales
also led to another economic benefit for the United States.
The American firms involved in military projects were also
involved in civil projects, such as the installation of
telephone systems or the construction of hospitals. Thus
arms sales opened the markets of the area to non-military
sales and activities. In 1974, American exports to Saudi
Arabia totalled $G33 million, an increase of 9Y. over the
previous year. Huge arms sales also not only reduced unit
production costs, but also created jobs in America in both
military and non-military industries..
U.S. Conqress, The United States Arms Gales to theEWaJ uif , p. 2.
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' 1 For each .t1 billion In military sales, approximately
47,000 jobs are created. "
In short, economic benefits were an Important factor
in the American willingness to sell arms to the region,
particularly after the October 1973 war.
At the same time the United States exploited its
military sales as a major source of political leverage in
meeting its diplomatic aims. Lieutenant-General Howard M.
Fish, (United States Air Force, Director of the Defense
Security Assistance Agency,) told the House of
Representatives Sub-committee on International Political
and MIlitary Affairs on 17 December 1975
"The basic reason (1cr selling arms), of course, is
that it is a very powerful foreign policy tool. It
presumes a relationship of mutuality of interest
between the two countries. "3'
Similar-ly, the earlier statement of Congressman Lee H.
Hamilton, Chairmen of the Subcommittee on the Near East and
South Asia, made to the House of Representatives on 31 May
1973
"These sales will create an important inter-
relationship between the United States and these oil-
rich states and will, partially because of their need
for spare parts in the future, give the United States
some useful leverage in our dealings with these
states. "'
Arms sales unquestionably reinforced American
influence in the region and clarified the role of the
United States there. Iran, which had built up considerable
military strength thanks to American assistance became the
regions policeman, safeguarding Western interests and was
Ltat1,	 26.
ii.S. Cunqress,	 Arabia, p 31.
U, S. Conqross, NwPorpectives on the Persi an Gulf, p
103.
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now an important tool of American policy in the area.
During the 70's, Saudi Arabia, which had hesitated to
declare its special relationship with the United States in
the past, now openly concluded many agreements to promote
this special relationship, especially after King Faisal's
death in
Behind the American arms sales policy also lay the
desire to pass some of America's regional security burden
back to regional powers.6
This is what lay at the heart of the Nixon doctrine
which emerged in the wake of the American experience in
Vietnam.. According to this policy, the United States would
supply arms rather than troops and would provide its
regional allies with substantial military equipment and
services in key areas. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs stated on 6
June 1973
u•	 this whole policy is based on the assumption of
the Nixon doctrine that we would like to help these
people help themselves wherever they want our help
and, frankly, it is a way of avoiding direct
involvement. 'I
This policy proved successful, especially where Iran
was concerned, making of it the guardian of Western
interests and a major tool of American policy in the area.
In addition to this, American arms sales and
assistance would give to purchasing nations the security of
which was important to the United States the capability of
Fu::t.tyam&., Fr anci s, MilijApççoF U. S. -Svi et
CompLitic.n in the Third__World, :i ii Shul man, Marshal 1
D. (od..) , East .... W tTnBionsinthe Third World,
Lorido	 W.W. Norton and Co. , 1986, pp. 194-195.
?	 Congross,	 the Persian Gulf,
p. 33.
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building up armed forces for their own defense1 President
Richard Nixon wrote In his memoirs
"I said, we would furnish only the material and the
military and economic assistance to those nations
willing to accept the responsibility of supplying the
manpower to defend themselves "
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard expressed
the same notion when he stated in 197ø
"The best hope of reducing our overseas Involvements
and expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly
nations to do even more in their own defense. To
realise that hope, however, requires that we must
continue, if requested, to give or sell them the tools
they need for the bigger load we are urging them to
assume. '
To implement this policy, American foreign military
sales reached $3.9 billion In 1973 In 1974, after the oil
crisis, total foreign military sales rose to $8.3 billion,
nearly half of which sum was accounted for by sales to
Iran."' In fact the American administration agreed to sell
Iran "virtually any conventional weapons it wanted. "n' Here
again, one must bear in mind that the United States was
intending Iran and not Saudi Arabia to become the strong
regional power in the Gulf on whieh it could rely to
protect its interests there.
The final justification for American sales to the Gulf
states was a simple ones there was nothing to stop oil-rich
states from meeting their defense needs from other sources.
Amos A. Jordan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Nixon, Ri chard, The Memoirs of Ri chard Nixon, Arrow
Dooks, London, 1978, p. 395.
Sampson, p. cij., p. 239.
'	 p. 241.
Uni ted States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Relations, jjlitary Sales to
La. A Report, 94th Congress, 2nd session. Washington
D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 41.
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Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs,
bluntly told the House Committee on International Relations
on 10 June 1975,
u If we do not sell our equipment to them, they will
purchase them elsewhere.. "
This was not only undeniable, it also underlined the
absence of any selective policy for arms sales to the area,
and especially to Saudi Arabia. We have already noted that
Amei-icari arms sales formed part of its petrodollar
strategy.. This did not, however, prevent Congress from
continually questioning this throughout the 1970's.. The
administration could give no convincing answer.. From the
time of the announcement of the British intention to
withdraw in 19G until the Iraqi-Iranian agreement of 1975,
the American administration argued that its arms shipments
to the region were a response to Soviet threats.. This was
an argument which convinced no-one, simply because neither
Iran nor Saudi Arabia had the ability to stand against any
Russian attack.. After 1975 -
".... the threat, they say, is Iraq with a history of
ideological hostility to the conservative Saudi
monarchy.. The Saudis need a first-class fighter, they
say, to fend off the much larger Iraqi army and air
force which is equipped with the latest Soviet
fighters.."
This reasoning also lay behind the Saudi decision to
build a large military city (King Khalid) near the Iraqi
border.. But events were to prove the Justification to be
untrue.. It is Important to recognise that the American
administration was anxious to Justify its military sales to
'' U.S.. Conqri, Th Fr.ian Gulf 1975, p.. 107..
Conc(r. icr	 4kly_Report, 8 April 1978, p..
E333..
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Saudi irabia in order to answer criticism from Congressmen
representing the Israeli lobby in Washington, with the
cmerican Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) at its
head.. The major aim of AIPAC was to obtain more support and
aid for Israel, and in this they succeeded. This remained
true even in the case of the Saudi purchase of 60 F-IS
fighters which was approved in 1978 and which some
observers interpreted as "the Israeli lobby (having)
finally lost on a major issue."
	 The Saudi F-iS's were
impotent against mass threats because they had no digital
data links between their computers and a sensor and control
system such as the AWACS.. The F-iS computer programme was
not designed for combat with Israeli F-iS, A-4, or F-16
fighters.. It had no mapping or moving indicator capability,
which made it	 capable of detecting city-sized targets ony.tt
was not equipped with anti-tank missiles and had no
accurate means of distinguishing between potential targets
as "fri end or foe".. 	 The Saudis agreed not to use their
fighters against Israel, not to transfer them to other
countries, and undertook not to acquire any other fighters
from any other country whilst preparing for and taking
delivery of them.' The Saudis were moreover willing to pay
nearly $42 million per unit, compared with a cost of $17
million.. At the same time the American administration
agreed to sell Israel 15 F-IS fighters, in addition to the
25 which had already been agreed upon together with 75 F-
16's at a price of $17 million per F-IS and $7 million per
Howe, op.. cit.., p.. 566.
'	 Cord m..n, op_c.i, p.. 246..
"" Howo, op.. c:it., p.. 566..
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F-16..	 Thus the total cost of the Saudi-American deal was
2..5 billion, compared with 1.9 billion for the Israeli-
American sale.	 In the same year (1977) total American
military aid and security assistance to Israel came to
nearly $2.5 bil1jn.	 Does this not suggest that the Saudi
government had subsidized a large part of the cost of the
fighters supplied to Israel? It had after all paid more
than 1.3 billion for a less advanced version of the F-iS
than that which Israel received as part of American aid. It
could hardly be argued that the Israeli lobby had "finally
lost on a major issue."
LiJ:1iarag ircan arms sales to Saudi
Arab I a
We have shown how, during the period 1968-1978, the
United States provided Saudi Arabia with huge military
sales and services. These rose from 436.9 million in 1968
to .2..4 billion in 1978, and totalled 5.99 billion over
the whole period. The United States became involved in
every aspect of these, from simple English language courses
to the complex training of fighter pilots, as well as
supplying all manner of armaments, from Infantry light
weapons to highly sophisticated fighters like the F-15.
This deep involvement became crucial to bilateral relations
during the 70's. It failed, however, to make Saudi Arabia a
'	 nqre	 onal Quarterly W kl .yReort, 28 May. 1977, p.
1070
.ly	 S April 1978, p.
8 :;.
'
	
	
28 May and 25
Juno .1970, p. 1078 and p. 1305 respectively.
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significant power by Middle East standards. What then were
the main themes underlying these sales?
First of all, Saudi Arabia did not face any serious
military threat during the period under study (1968-1978).
In 1969 there was a minor clash between Saudi Arabia and
South Yemen (PDRY) This did not, however, represent a
significant threat, simply because South Yemen had only
limited military capabilities and its economy was too weak
•for it to si..tstain a prolonged confrontation. The American
administration attempted to Justify its arms sales to the
kingdom on the grounds that there existed a real threat
from the Soviet Union (particularly in the light of the
British withdrawal from the area in 1971) and an Iraqi
threat (particularly after the Iran-Iraq rapprochement of
197). In reality, no threats existed at all.
Another noteworthy factor is the lack of connection
between arms sale and the overall situation in the region.
Hence the surprising American decision to sell arms to
Saudi Arabia during late December 1973, when the Saudi
government was deeply involved in the oil embargo and the
area had just come to the end of another round of war. This
underlines that the sale of American arms and services to
the kingdom was quite divorced from its overall policy on
the area.
On the other hand the arms and services sales were
closely connected to the American petrodol lar policy. Table
4.3 shows that arms sale steadily increased at the same
time as oil prices rose, forcing the United States to pay
more for its imported oil. This was the single most
Oil imports	 Military salesYear
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1 97
1976w
1977
1978
32
64
160
211
1P -
324
927
1,502
2,760
3,320
4,330
7,550
26,120
26,530
34, 110
44,210
41,600
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Table 4.3	 merican Oil Imports and Military Sales to
3audirabia 1970-1978 (in
	 millions)
Sources: United States Department of Deferise,Defer,se
Secur ity Assistance Agency, Foreign Nilitary_Sales and
Washington D.C., December
1980; International Nonietary Fund, International
Fir,ar,ci1 Statistics, Vol. XXX, November 1977; Vol..
XXXIIq November 1979.
includes transitional quarter (fiscal year 1977)
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important factor behind the huge United States arms sales
to the kingdom. It also explains why the sales remained
unlinked to overall policy on the situation in the region,
which had - needless to say - resulted in the high oil
prices in the first place. The United States was well aware
that its arms sales to Saudi Arabia would not affect the
military balance in the area, that is to say that they
would not create a sufficiently powerful military force in
(
Saudi Arabia.
It is also worth pointing out that during the 70s all
Saudi plans to modernize its military forces were based on
the findings of American studies. From 1970 until the end
of the decade all the sales agreed between the two
governments had been recommended by advisors of the•
American defense department. These encouraged the Saudis
either to purchase more than their requirements, or to buy
weapons of such sophistication that they were unable to
operate them.' (We have also noted the assertion of
Colonel William Fifer that in his opinion "the Saudi
Arabian Royal Air Force would be grounded within a matter
of a couple of weeks" if American personnel were
withdrawn.)
In addition, the true value of Saudi purchases of
American arms and services was exaggerated. ?etween the
years 1968 and 1978 agreements between the two governments
accounted for a total of *21,167 million, but the value of
actual deliveries was only $5,988 million. (See Table 4.6.)
Furthermore, this amount was not paid for hardware alone.
'' CordeE.mir,	 ci1., p. 167.
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Table 4L	 Growth in Military Sales to Saudi Arabia
1950-1978 ($ 000s)
Sources United States Department of Defense, Defer,se
Security Assistance Agency, ForeigpNi1itarySaiesar,
Hilitary Assistance Facts, kashirigtors DC: December
19Sø,
Year
	 Value of agreements	 Value of deliveries
1950-67
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
574,080
13,696
4,214
80,910
15,863
371,004
709,259
2,031,250
3,614,819
7,742,087
1,888, 155
4,121,519
121,037
36,856
32,086
31,937
64,059
159,646
211,159
329,971
-',,	 .,-4-9
926,882
1,502,104
2,368,921
TOTAL	 21,166,856
	
6,108,887
* Includes transitional quarter (fiscal year 1977)
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According to White House background papers, 60% went on
construction, 20"!. on training and only 20% on hardware.51
Thus the actual cost of Saudi arms purchased from the
United States was around $1,200 million. Bearing in mind
also, as has been noted above, that the price tag Dfl these
weapons was two or three times higher than their original
cost, it could be argued that the true value of Saudi
military purchases lay between $400 and $600 million.
In addition, the Saudi purchase of arms was subject to
so-cal led "commissions". As Anthony Sampson recorded in his
book, "The Arms Bazaar",
"By August 1973 Lockheed found that the original two
per cent it had agreed to pay for the sale of Hercules
transports .	 had escal ated to eight per cent, an
increase, Khashaggi explained, 'due to more players
getting involved and the necessity to satisfy their
requirements in order to get the contracts siyned'."
In 1971, Adnan Khashaggi told the Northrop Company
that it must give General Hashim, the head of the Saudi air
force, $250,000 to ensure that the sale of Tiger aircraft
would go through as agreed. He subsequently told the
company that General Hashim having been replaced by General
Zuhair, a further $200,000 should be paid to the latter.
According to Lockheed these payments were "under-the-table
compensation to Saudi officials".
By the mid-70', Adrian Kashaggi's "commissions" came
to more than $154 million from Lockheed and Northrop
1. ib_ict, p	 1 88.
Sam:uson, op. c:tt.., p. 19E.
lb Id, p.. 194.
IJn:i. tcd Slates Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Rel all ons, MulUna ion1 CpDrions and U. S.. Foreign
Pc:ilic.:v, Part 12. 94th Concjress, 2nd Session.
Whinglon D.C. U.S.. Govei"nrnent Printing Office,
1976, p.. 1088..
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alor."' These payments - bribes - were the subject of
Cor,gressional investigations by the mid-70's, and as a
result of the pi.iblicity these generated, arms sales became
the subject of government-to government contracts in the
late 1970's.
Fl nail y, Amen can arms sales were behind the arms race
in the Gulf region. Huge arms sales to Iran and Saudi
Arabia left other nations no choice but to spend more to
build up strong armed forces and the entire area saw
massive military e>penditure throughout the 7's.
To summarize, American arms and services sales to
Saudi Arabia formed part of its petrodollar policy. The
United States had no formal policy on arms sales to the
kingdom simply because they were relying on Iran and Israel
to safeguard their Interests in the area. For its part the
Saudi government was not blind to this fact, but aimed to
deepen American involvement In the military field in order
to obtain from the United States some tie facto commitment
to their security..
Lac€y,	 ..ciL., p. 46G.
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Chapter Five
SAUDI-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Of all the conflicts in the Middle East, it is the
Arab-Israeli dispute which dominates all others, hence its
being commonly referred to as "the Middle East dispute".
The conflict is a long-standing, lasting, and bitter
onsi long-standing because it dates back to earlier this
century, according to some to when Balfour, then British
foreign secretary, declared in 1917 that Palestine would be
the Jewish homelandp (Ibn Saud believed that the conflict
dated back to the time of the Prophet Mohammad'); lasting
because it remains unresolved and dominates the region's
affairs; and bitter because it has resulted in four full-
scale wars erupting in the area in the years 1948, 1956,
1967, and 1973.
Superficially, it is a conflict between Arab and Jew,
but in reality the Arab countries adopt a variety of
stances. Egypt and Syria were directly involved in the
conflict with Israel in all four wars. Jordan was less so
given that it did not take active part in the fourth war.
Other Arab countries were involved in different ways, Iraq
directly so, while others were less effective and lent
their support in ways similar to those of non-Arab
countries such as Pakistan, (motivated by religious
Rubin, Barry, Th Arab States and the Palestinian
Conflict, 1st edition, Syracuse Syracuse University
Press, 1980, p. 13..
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convictions), and China, (which acted in the light of its
ideological conflict with the United States and the Soviet
Union)
Before the creation of the state of Israel, the
parties concerned in the conflict were the Palestinians,
the Jews and Britain - the mandate state. From 1948 until
1967, the conflict involved Israel, Egypt and Jordan
(because of the control it had over the West Bank), and
from 1967 until the late 1970's - Israel, Egypt and Syria.
Other Arab countries which did not share a border with
Israel played a supporting role.
Saudi Arabia, located not far from Israel, falls into
the latter category. Thus, although it could have
intervened in military terms, it failed to do so, because
the particular nature of Saudi policy and the implications
of policy decisions were dependent on considerations
outside the Arab-Israeli conflict, in spite of the effect
the conflict had on the policies of the Middle East as a
whol e.
Saudi concern with the Palestinian issue, then the
Arab-Israeli conflict, began in the thirties as a result of
various pressures, (religious conviction, Arabism ...) At
the same time, the United States' interest was a response
to Zionist pressures, although it was Britain who was the
major power in the area at the time.
Prior to World War II, United States involvement was
limited, because of the nature of American foreign policy
at the tune. Saudi Arabia sought to obtain greater American
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involvement, and to this day believes that a solution rests
with the United States.
The United States and Saudi Arabia were most deeply
involved at the time of the outbreak of the third war in
1967. Before then, the United States' relations with Israel
consisted of a kind of moral commitment. In 1967, American
aid to Israel exceeded all prior aid since the
establishment of the state. The arms Israel had used in the
1956 war had been made in the Soviet Union, France, and
Britain. In the 1967 war, they were made principally in
West Germany and France, and to a lesser extent in the
United States and Britain. After 1967, Israel was equipped
with massive and sophisticated American-made weapons.
In general, American policy in the Middle East rested
on Israel, the Iran of the Shah, and Saudi Arabia.
There may have been no major differences between the
policies of the United States and Saudi Arabia as far as
oil, security and arms sales were concerned, but at first
sight there appear to be differences in their policies on
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
This chapter will discuss Saudi policy in relation to
the dispute similarly United States policy; Saudi-American
relations in this regard during the years 1967-1973 and
1973-1978; and the role played by Saudi oil.
Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli conflict
As with any policy, various factors affected Saudi
policy on the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli
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conflict, the main ones being the nature of the
establishment of the kingdom as a sovereign-state with
religious roots the extension of Saudi power to embrace
HeJaz, formerly controlled by Sharif Hussain who was
calling for Arab unity under his leadershipp and the
concern of the Saudi family for their security, linked to
the security'of the kingdom.
As far as the nature of the establishment of the
kingdom is concerned, although - as has been shown - Saudi
authority was founded on tribal traditions, its basic
ideology was Wahhabism. The Wahabbi sect is fanatical in
its condemnation of other sects as atheistic. How then do
they view Judaism? Both Christians and Jews are in fact
considered to be "people of the book", as stated in the
Ouran, but there was much controversy about the status of
Jews in the Islamic religion.
The Saudis, given their self-appointed role as leaders
of the Islamic world because of the location of the holy
cities within their territory, came under pressure to adopt
a hostile attitude towards the Jews, especially in the
light of the occupation of Jerusalem, the third holy city
of Islam. Ibn Saud stated that the Palestinian issue was an
Islamic one. The same belief was expressed by King Saud
when he came to power in 1953, likewise by King Faisal in
1964, and by King Khalid in 1975.
2Salama, op.. cjj, p . 544; Sai 'd, Ameen, Tarikh A1-Va1a
Ai-Saujya <in Arabic: The History of the Saudi
State), Vol. 3, Beirut: 1965, p. 19.
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Thus Jews were forbidden entry to the kingdom of Saudi
Arabia until 1976, when this restriction was lifted, but
only under pressure from the United States.5
As far as the second factor - political developments
within the peninsula - is concerned, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn
Saud had extended his kingdom by occupying the then kingdom
of Hejaz. He shouldered all the burdens of the occupation.
Heiaz had witnessed some political progress, including a
constitution, (unlike Saudi Arabia, which to this day has
none) and had called for Arab unity under the leadership
of King Hussain. For a short time, Ibn Saud proposed that
he should be made king of all Arabs, 4
 but realizing this
was beyond his ability, he abandoned this idea. The trend
towards Arabism in Saudi policy has been a weak one, except
during Saud's reign, under the influence of Nasserism in
the 1950's	 enerally speaking, the Saudis are
uncomfortable with the notion of Arabism, because of its
unpleasant associations with Nasser, the Ba'ath Party, and
the war in Yemen'
But it is the third factor - Saudi concern for the
security of the kingdom, and therefore of the Saudi family
- that still dominates their policies. This explains why
they sought an early American role in the area, believing
3 U.S. Congress, The Persian Gulf 1975, p. 198.
4 Salama, op. cit., p 132w
S Dawisha, ded, Saudi Arabias Search for Security,
Adeiphi Paper No. 158, London International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1979, pp. 2-3.
6 Hoagland and Smith, p. 81.
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that Britain was supporting their traditional enemies, the
Hashemite family, who ruled Iraq and Trans-Jordan.7
Ibn Saud believed that the Hashemite family sought to
exploit the Palestinian problem by annexing the West Bank
to Tranejordan in order to form the kingdom of Jordan.
Hence Ibn Saud's desire for an early resolution of the
problem.. He wrote to Britain, the mandate state, seeking a
solution; he sent his son Faisal to the London conference
of 1939; and finally turned to America, the first Arab
leader to seek to involve America in the area. After World
War II, realizing that American policy on this issue was
not as he would have wished, he sent a secret letter to the
United States President. In this letter
"the King ... expressed his great hope and faith in
the United States and declared that he would always
remain eAmericas friend, although on occasion his
pronouncements in regard to the Palestinian question
might Indicate otherwise. "
In the 19ø's, the newly enthroned King Saud Joined
the Cairo-Damascus axis because he believed that the
Baghdad Pact had been created to support the Hashemite
family in Iraq; hence his hard line against Israel. In the
1960's, the situation changed dramatically with the
involvement of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Yemen war. It
was then that Saudi Arabia realized that Arabism was more
of a threat than they had expected.
7 711..9GW/1-1946 Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State
to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck), Washington,. January
19, 1946..
8 E367N..01/1364 No. 1473, The Chargé in Egypt (Merriam) to
the Secretary of State, Cairo, December 15, 1938..
9 B9øF..77/1.0-146 Telegram.. The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck)
to the Secretary of State, Cairo, October 1, 1946..
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As a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Yemen
war came to an end and the "leadership" of the Arabs
transferred from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.'
After 1967, Saudi Arabia believed that any new war in
the area could affect them in two ways. Firstly, the Soviet
Union's involvement in the area would increase thanks to
their supporting the Arab side by supplying them with
weapons. Secondly, any new conflict would strengthen the
radical wings of the Arab world in general and of the
Palestinians in particular. For these reasons, Saudi Arabia
took part in the fourth war (1973) in an attempt to limit
it both in terms of action and scope. This also explains
their good relations with the moderate wing of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Fateh
organi sati on.
The ambiguity and inscrutability of Saudi attitudes
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict can be attributed to
their overriding concern with security.
The Saudi role in the Arab-Israeli conflict in fact
remained obscure for a long period, it could be argued
until 1973, when the world was questioning the role of
Saudi oil in the conflict. In actual fact, Saudi Arabia did
not play an active part until 1967, when the third war
ended in an Israeli victory. Saudi Arabia benefited from
this insofar as it resulted in the ending of the Yemen war,
and Saudi Arabia achieving a dominant position in the area.
løDawisha, Aded, "Internal Values and External Threats:
The Making of Saudi Foreign Policy," ORBIS, Spring
1979 p. 129.
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The part played by Saudi Arabia in the military
confrontation, in giving financial aid to the front-line
states and to the PLO, in the Arab boycott of Israel, and
finally in diplomatic efforts must therefore be reviewed.
Saudi Arabia neither joined directly in military
activities nor took active part in the wars with Israel.
Saudi statements about their supposed participation were a
part of their political propaganda. (The Zionist lobby made
a vigourous attempt to establish Saudi participation before
the Foreign Relations Committee in the United States
Congress, but failed to do 5.hl) In 1948, the Arab League
resolved to fight the Jews in Palestine. News reports
indicated that 60 - 200 Saudi soldiers were with the
Egyptian army in the Nakab desert, but they were
inadequately equipped and there was no evidence that they
engaged in any military activity, despite Ibn Saud's
promises to other Arab states on 10 May 1948 that Saudi
Arabia would play her part.	 At the time of the second war
(1956), Saudi Arabia enjoyed good relations with Egypt.'
The two countries had a Joint defense agreement and a five-
year military treaty. Nevertheless, Saudi forces entered
Jordan in March 1957, when the war was already over.
In 1967, at the outbreak of the third war, Saudi
Arabia's relations with Egypt had deteriorated as a result
of the Yemen war. The Saudi army was positioned on the
southern Saudi border in order to repulse Yemeni republican
11 U.S. Congre, Militar y Sales to Saudi Arabia 1975, p.
19.
12 Al-Zarakly,	 ._cit., p. 1288.
13 Sai'd, gp. cit., pp. 160-174.
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forces. Thus, despite its declaration of war on Israel,
Saudi Arabia again failed to play any active part.14
In October 1973, Saudi Arabia's relations with Egypt
were once again friendly, and Saudi Arabia was the third
state to be informed of Egypt's intention to wage war
against Israel. Contrary to Saudi media reports, however,
Saudi Arabia did not take part in any military activity.
The Saudi presence on the fronts with Israel was limited to
a small number of soldiers in Egypt, about a thousand in
Jordan, and some Jet-fighters which were subsequently
transferred to Syria.
Given the inefficiency of its army, Saudi military
participation could scarcely be other than weak. Financial
aid to the front-line states and to the PLO was therefore
the Saudi substitute for direct engagement and was
considered to be equivalent to participating in the
conflict. Aid was given first to Nasser, the most
influential figure in the area at the time, to obtain his
agreement to the lifting of the oil embargo in 1967. At the
Khartoum summit of August 1967, Saudi Arabia undertook to
donate $140 million a year to Egypt. 18
 The Arab summit
conference in Rabat in October 1974 agreed that Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would donate
2.35 billion dollars to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO.
The bulk of this financial aid came from Saudi Arabia,
which made its payments regularly and sometimes exceeded
14 rbpjtand Record, 1-1E June 1967, p.. 177.
15 U.S.. Congress, Military Sales to Saudi Arabia 19Th, p.
19..
16 Haikal, Mohammad, The Road to Ramadan, New York: The New
York Times Co.., 1975, p.. 269.
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its allocated share. Egypt was the main recipient of aid,
particularly under Sadat.	 In some cases, Saudi Arabia
funded arms supplies to these countries. 1
Saudi financial aid influenced the conflict in two
ays firstly, it improved the front-line states
capacities, particularly in the case of Egypt, to bear the
costs of the warp and secondly, it served to moderate the
policies of the PLO, especially the Fateh wing, which
enjoyed a special relationship with Saudi Arabia,
The Arab boycott of Israel was another weapon intended
to paralyze the Israeli economy. The Arab League
establ I shed a "boycott bureau", whose task was to puni sh
companies found to be dealing with Israel. In theory, Saudi
Arabia, as a member of the Arab League, was committed to
abiding by its decisions, but in practice it failed to
comply to the letter with the regulations. In 1975, James
E. Akins, former United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
said,
"I would say they are not overly zealous in
application of the boycott regulations, on the other
hand they are certainly not in the lead of those who
are disposed to relax the regulations."'
Underlying all Saudi diplomatic activity was the fact
that war was not their preferred option. Even their
participation in the October 1973 war was interpreted as a
reaction to the United States' ignoring Faisal 's call on
them to put pressure on Israel to withdraw from Arab
occupied territories. King Faisal threatened the United
17 U.G. L)epartment of Coinmerce Critical Factors affecting
audi Araja's Oil Dcisions, p. 29.
18 U.S. Congress, The Persian Gulf 1975, p. 29.
19 Ibid., p. 198.
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States with his intention to go to war against Israel, but
this was not taken seriously., 	 Saudi policy had a long
history of seeking a diplomatic solution. The period
following the October war saw an intensification of
diplomatic efforts to find a solution.
Saudi Arabia was the leading moderate state in the
area. This was amply demonstrated by the Khartoum summit
conference in 1967, at which Faisal succeeded in convincing
the other Arab states to give up the oil embargo. The
financial aid given to Nasser compelled him to accept
United Nations resolution 242, which confirmed the right to
exist of the state of Israel. This in turn implied his
belief that Israel could maintain its external security.'
The key elements of the political compromise soLight by
Saudi Arabia were the recognition of Israel, in return for
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories) the creation
of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza) and the
return of Jerusalem - as a Muslim holy place - to Arab
sovereignty.	 This formed the general framework for Saudi
policy during the 1970's.
Saudi diplomatic efforts concentrated on attempting to
reduce Soviet influence in the area, to obtain Palestinian
participation in the search for a settlement, and to
involve the United States, whom they believed could find a
soluti on.
20 Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalj, 2nd edition,
Harmondsor-th: Penguin Books, 1980, p. 359.
21 Ouandt, William B. t)ecade of Decisions: American Policy
toardLhe Arb-Israeii Conflict, 1967-19Th, Berkely:
university of California Press, 1977, p 65.
22 Dawisha, Adeed, Saudi Arabia's Search for Security,
Adeiphi Paper No. 158, London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1979, p. 23.
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Hence King Faisal 's trying to convince the EgYptian
president of the need to reduce the Soviet presenCE in
Egypt.	 In the event, Egypt expelled all 8oviet On 18
July 1972.	 From 1967, the United States, the Soviet
Union, Britain and France were the great powers concerned
with the dispute. After the 1973 war, it was principally
the United States and the Soviet Union who were involved,
until the United States became master of the situation and
became the third party in the Camp David accords.
The second main focus of diplomatic activity was
seekin9 Palestinian involvement in a solution. Saudi Arabia
had only limited success in ersuading the United States to
recognize the PLO, but did succeed in convincing the PLO
that they should participate in the search for a solution.
Finally, there was Saudi Arabia's belief - clearly
apparent in the 1970's- that only the United States was
able to find a compromise which would provide a
comprehensive solution to the problem.
In summary, the Saudis had no alternative but to be
involved in the conflict, but the security of the kingdom
continued to be uppermost in their minds, and this remained
the -case throughout the reigns of King Abd Al-Azi and of
his son's Saud, Faisal, and Khalid. The search for a
diplomatic solution dominated their policy, and even their
23 Haikal, op. cit., p. 120.
24 Kissinger, gçjj, p. 1295; Sheehan, Edward R. The
rabs Israelis and Kissinqer: 	 Secret History of
meri canj l omacy in the Middle East, New York p
Reader's Digest Press, 1976, p. 65.
25 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Iti.
Search for Peace in the Middle East, Foreign Affairs
and National Defense Division, Washington D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 157.
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participation in the October 1973 war had this ultimate
aim. The mainstay of their diplomatic efforts was massive
financial aid, and their policy objectives were two-fold:
to moderate the policies of other Arab states and to
convince the United States of the need to put pressure on
Israel to moderate her stand. Were they successful in
meeting these objectives? This will be the subject of a
later discussion.
The United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict
Since World War 11, United States' Middle East policy
has been determined by three main objectives: the
containment of Soviet presence and influence in the area;
securing a steady supply of Arab oil for the western world
and Japan; and maintaining their commitment to the security
and survival of the state of Israel.
As far as the latter objective is concerned, after
1967 the United States did more than any other country to
maintain Israel 's security, their commitment being
sustained not only in the light of their strategic
interests, but also in response to considerable public
support for the special relationship with Israel demanded
by the influential Jewish community in the United States.8
As part of its global defense strategy against the
Soviet Union, the United States sought to secure both bases
and allies in the region. During the post-war period, it
26 CongressIonal Quarterly, The tiiddle East: United States
plicy,jsraelOil and the Arabs, 5th edition,
Washington D..C.: 1981, p. 11.
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succeeded in doing so until 1955, when the Soviet Union
gained a foothold by supplying Egypt with weapons. The
American response was to attempt to outbid the Soviet Union
for Egypt's favours and to support conservative forces in
the region including Israel. 2 After the significant
changes which took place in the area during the 50's and
60's, the United States recognized that Israel was a real
ally in the region. In 1962, President Kennedy became the
first American president publicly to acknowledge this.
After the Israeli victory in the 1967 war, which made
Israel the dominant power in the region, the United States
regarded Israel as the guardian of Western interests, and
enormously increased their support for Israel,
notwithstanding the importance of American interests in
Arab countries..
United States policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict has
also been shaped and influenced by the Jewish American
community. Although Jews make up less than 3% of the
population, they have been able to influence United States
policy-makers and public opinion, thanks to a highly
organized, well-financed and very active pro-Israeli lobby.
The Jewish vote and their financial muscle can affect the
outcome of United States elections, particularly at
national level, putting considerable pressure on candidates
and decision-makers.' This said, does this 3/. minority
genuinely influence American policy?
27 Quandt, op.. cit. , p. 5.
28 Eveland, Wilbur C. Ropes of Sand: The American's Failure
in the Middle East, London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1980,
p.. 321.
29 Isaac, Stephen,	 s and Amen can Poll U cs, New York:
Doubleday, 1974, p. 12.
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In effect, the policy f the United States, given its
superpower status, is shaped by national interests. But
"more often, interest groups provide a useful excuse
for a policy-maker to do what he intended to do for
other reasons. "'
United States support for Israel prior to 1967 took
the form mainly of financial aid, with little direct
military aid.. Under the latter heading, in 1962, Israel was
supplied with surface-to-air Hawk anti -aircraft missiles;
in 1965, with U.S. Pat*or, tanks; and in 1966, an agreement
was reached for the sale of 48 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-
bambers.. t
 After the 1967 war, United States support was
virtually unlimited
"to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force
capable of preventing future Arab aggression by
offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab
states and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the
1967 conflict.."
During two and a half years of the Nixon-Ford
administration, the United States provided Israel with more
than $3 billion worth of weapons. 3 The United States
became Israel's major source of support, forcing the Arabs
to turn to the Soviet Union.
Thus the United States played a leading role in
attempting to bring peace to the Middle East and prevent
any further outbreak of war between the Arabs and the
Israelis. In a meeting with some of the leading members of
the Jewish community, President Nixon told them that
Quandt, pçit, p. 20.
Concji'essic:.nal Quarterly, The Middie East U.S. Policy
ra Lc1ii_and the Arabs, 3rd edition, Washington
D.C.	 1977, p. 93.
U.Sjpartment of State Sulletin, 28 October 1968, p..
452.
Ambrose, op. cit. , p. 367.
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"each new war would be more and more costly because
their neighbours would learn to fight, and there were
more of them -" the only long-term hope lies in
reaching some kind of sett1ement..."
In Kissinger's view,
"Israelis must understand the importance of Middle
East peace to the global concerns of the United States
and the Western world.,"
The United States was well aware that
"peace in the Middle East area is not only important
for the stability of the world.. It is also important
in order to continue to assure sufficient stability in
the Gulf area to permit our overall relationships to
continue.. Political wisdom must continue to accompany
economic success.. "8
In March 1977, President Carter outlined his three-
point plan calling for Israeli withdrawal, the creation of
a "Palestinian homeland" and the establishment of permanent
peace between Israel and the Arab states.. The Camp David
peace agreement of September 1978 emerged from this three-
point plan, but President Carter was able to secure Israeli
withdrawal only from Sinai..
To summarize, United States policy on the conflict was
affected by its interests in the area, with Israel being
seen as a strategic ally maintaining these interests..
Policy was also influenced by a powerful and well-organized
Jewish lobby in America. The United States commitment to
Israeli security was unchanging.. It became deeply involved
34 Nixon, Richard, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, London:
Arrow BooI<s, 1979, pp.. 1007-1008..
3 Kissiriqer, Henry, For the Record, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1981, p.. 98..
36 United States Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, "U.S.. Policy toward the Persian Gulf",
tPolic, No. 160, April 11 1980, p... 4..
37 Kurdi, MaFa Abdul Mohsen, Saudi Arabia: Perspective on
Oi1 Foreign Po1icy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
1970-1980, unpublished PhD Lhesi s, Claremont
University, 1902, pp.. 149-10
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after the Israeli victory in the 6-day war of 1967,
believing - at least until 1973 - that Israeli superiority
disarmed Arab threats and gave stability to the area. After
the October 1973 war, however, the administration pursued a
diplomatic solution, seeking a negotiated peace given that
any new outbreak of war would draw the Soviet Union further
into the area and risk Israeli security.
The question of whether the Saudi government had any
effect on American policy on the conflict will be addressed
1 ater.
Saudi-American relations with regard to the conflicts 1967-
1973
The third war broke out on i June 1967 when Israel
launched a surprise attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
Israel was victorious and its forces occupied the Gaza
strip, most of the Sinai peninsula, the City of Jerusalem,
the West Bank and the strategically important Golan
heights.
Israel 's victory changed the entire political map of
the area. Thus, for instance, the United States became the
main supplier of weapons to Israel, 	 and the two countries
enjoyed a "special relationship". The Soviet Union's
influence in the area grew still further as the Arab states
were now more dependent than ever on Soviet help to rebuild
their armed forces. A number of Arab states broke off
35 Jabber, Paul, "Linited States Interests and Regional
Security in the Middle East", Daedalu, Vol. 109, No.
4, Fall 1990, p. 71.
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diplomatic relations with the United States and stopped oil
shipments to the United States and Britain. France, in a
shift in policy by de Gaulle, announced an embargo on all
arms sales to the Middle East.
Nor were such changes confined to outside the Arab
world. Within it, Nasser's influence declined dramatically.
His defeat forced him to adopt a more moderate policy
towards other Arab states. Saudi Arabia became more
influential than ever before, even on Nasser's policies.
The June war brought to an end the Yemen war which had
plagued Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it strengthened
radical Arab nationalist feeling. This latter development
redoubled the difficulties Israel had to confront and
alarmed Saudi Arabia.
Between 1967 and 1973, the United States adopted a
three-fold policy. First, it attempted to restore stability
and peace to the area; second, it sought détente with the
Soviet Union; and third, it tried to find a solution to the
problem of its growing demand for energy and consequent
high dependence on oil imports.'
Saudi policy objectives were similar to United States
policy during the same period. Saudi Arabia attempted to
limit the Soviet Union's involvement and influence in the
area, sought stability and a political compromise to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and attempted to
moderate radical Arab nationalism.
When the 1967 was broke out, King Faisal aligned
himself with Nasser, despite the poor relations that
39 l3çyson, op. cit., p. 253.
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existed between Saudi Arabia and Egypt because of the
conflict in Yemen.. He took up this position in response to
various pressures, from the religious leaders, from other
Arab states and from some of the members of the royal
family.
LJhen Nasser claimed that the United States and Britain
had aided Israel directly in the war, Saudi Arabia Joined
Iraq and I<uwait in cutting off oil exports to the United
States and Britain. In making this claim, Nasser intended
to draw the Soviet Union into the conflict, but they took
no'action, being fully aware that it was without
foundation. 4 ' But the allegation did dffect Arab-American
diplomatic relations. More than half of the Arab states
broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.
Saudi Arabia was not amongst these, but it did join some of
them in cutting off oil shipments. Until 1967, oil had not
been an effective political weapon 1
 the embargo marked
the first time that Saudi Arabia used oil in this way
against the United States.
This action did not affect the operations of ARAMCO,
which was told on 10 June that it could continue its
operations but it could not supply oil to Britain or the
United States.
On 19 June, President Johnson made a nationally
televised speech in which he put forward five principles
for a solution to the dispute. These principles were
40 3oe, T..C. Th Suprpowcrs and the Middle East, New
York: Asia Publishing House, 1973, p. 109.
41 Mosley,	 . cit. , p. 346.
42 \rab Report and Record, 16-30 June 1967, p. 214.
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"(1) Every nation in the area has a fundamental right
to live in peace and to have this right respected by
its neighbours (2) justice for the refugees (3) the
right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved
for all nations; (4) limits on the wasteful and
destructive arms race; and (5) respect for the
political independence and territorial integrity of
all states in the area."
The Arab states held a summit in August 1967. They
resolved that their future policy on the Palestinian issue
would be based on three conditions, known as the three
"no's - no direct negotiation; no formal peacej and no
recognition.
In fact, Saudi policy was far removed from these
radical "nos" and reflected an altogether different
approach. King Faisal convinced Abdul Nasser that the oil
embargo was ineffective as a political weapon, since the
Arabs were dependent on oil revenue. The summit resolved
that the wealthier states should give financial aid to the
front-line states, and it was agreed that oil-producing
states should be allowed a free choice as far as continuing
with their oil embargo was concerned. Hence, Saudi Arabia's
announcement on 2 September of their resumption of oil
shipments to the United States.
The end of 1967 marked the opening of a new period in
relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Saudi
Arabia was no longer dominated by fear of radical Arab
nationalism and was more confident in seeking ties with the
United States. It was also under less pressure to justify
its e>panding relations with the United States. The three
43 Johrion, Lyndon, Ih	 Eo.iriL!Perspective of the
Eresia!263-1969. , New York: Holt, Rinehart and
('Jinston, 1971, p. 304; U.S. Department of State
BUetfli, July 10 1967, pp 31-34.
44	 b Rep9rt and Record, 1-15 September 1967, p. 294.
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factors underlying this were the influence of the far-
sighted and pragmatic King Faisal; Saudi financial muscle;
and the weakness and division of the radical Arab
nationalist movement1
Bilateral relations between Riyadh and Washington
strengthened in 1968 as a result of the significant changes
in the area1 In the first place, in January 1967 the
British government announced its intention to withdraw from
the Gulf by the end of 1971, hoping that the United States
would take up the British role in the area. The Department
of State declared that the United States looked to Iran and
Saudi Arabia to play a key role in maintaining the
stability of the area. In July 1960, King Faisal sent his
brother, Crown Prince Khalid, to the United States to meet
President Johnson and request American support, mistrusting
the role of Iran or any other state which could threaten
its eastern border.
In the second place, during the period following the
war, the United States became increasingly identified with
Israel in a "special relationahip", 	 which compelled the
Arab states to turn to the Soviet Union for support. Saudi
Arabia had always opposed Soviet involvement in the area
and sought to resolve the conflict because it believed that
stability in the area would reduce Soviet involvement and
influence.
In the third place, as a result of the Arab failure to
win the war, the scope and activities of the Palestine
organisations increased. All except the Fateh wing belonged
4E, Bryson, op. cit, p. 248.
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to left-wing movements in the Arab homeland. The Saudi
monarchy was mindful of the threat posed by radical Arab
nationalism and realized that the Palestinian organisations
encouraged radical tendencies and fostered opposition in
Saudi Arabia itself.
	 It therefore used it financial
power to bolster the moderate wing of the PLO47
Finally, 1968 was an election year in the United
States. President Johnson was under intense domestic
political pressure to support Israel, and the United States
became its major supplier of weapons. The Saudis knew that
the rival presidential candidates needed the Jewish vote if
they were to succeed in ousting President Johnson. It was
therefore clear to them that the United States could not
actively pursue a solution to the Middle East problem.4
These factors shaped Saudi policy on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Saudi Arabia felt that finding a solution was in
the hands of the United States, as King Faisal believed
that the Arab states needed Washington to press 	 Israel
into withdrawing from the occupied territories.
Consequently he asked the United States to take action to
force Israel to accept a peaceful solution. He remained
optimistic about the United States' ability to find an
acceptable compromise, believing that any peaceful
46 In June 1969, the Saudi government uncovered an attempt
to overthrow the king and establish a republic. Some
two hundred people were arrested, many of them
airforce officers. See Lackner, op. cit., p. 12.
47 Halliday, Fred, "A Curious and Close Liaison: Saudi
Arabia's relations with the United States', in
Niblock, Tim, StatesSoclety and Economy in Saudi
Araj, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p 132.
48 During that time, the United States was also preoccupied
w i t h Vi et n am.
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settlement depended on Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories and recognition of Palestinian rights..'
President Johnson and subsequently President Nixon
assured King Faisal that the United States would press
Israel to withdraw from Arab territory.. 	 But the Israeli
victory in the 6-day war enabled both Israel and the United
States to disregard Saudi demands.
Since the Khartoum summit, the Saudi monarchy had
involved itself actively in the area's affairs, arid King
Faisal had succeeded fri convincing Nasser that he should
shift his position in favour of an American involvement in
finding a solution to the conflict.1
As for the Americans, there was no significant change
on their part.. In December 1968, Nixon sent his chief
foreign affairs advisor, William Scranton, to the Middle
East. He discussed their bilateral relations and the Middle
East dispute with King Faisal in Riyadh.	 On entering the
White House, in a press conference given on 27 January
1969, President Nixon announced,
"I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership
on the part of the United States in order to cool off
the situation in the Middle East. I consider it a
powder-keg, very explosive.. It needs to be defused."
The Saudi monarch hoped that the new administration
would adopt a fresh approach and a neutral position toward
the problem. In the words of a foreign service officer of
the Department of State, however,
49 Deij, op. cit.., p. 82.
50 Sheehan, p. cit., p. 65.
51 Kurdi , op.. cit., p. 116.
52 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 17 February 1969, pp.
142-143..
53 Arab Report and Record, 1-15 December 1968, p.. 405.
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"in Fact, for domestic political considerations within
the United States if for no other reason, the Nixon
administration had little leeway in reducing American
support for Israel. Washington's call for a new, even-
handed approach to the Middle East could best be
translated as a desire to sell additional arms to
Saudi Arabia or other friendly Arab nations at the
same time as a military assistance was being provided
to Israel. This, indeed, is what occurred."°
On 9 December 1969, Secretary of State William P.
Rogers announced a new Middle East peace plan. (The Saudi
deputy prime minister, Prince Fand, had in fact been in
Washington in October when the Roger's plan was being
prepared.) The secretary of state called for direct
negotiations between the Arab states and Israel. He also
called on Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories
occupied during the 6-day war, in return for Arab
recognition of the state of Israel, to which he also
reaffirmed America's commitment.
	 Saudi Arabia persuaded
Nasser to consider the Roger's initiative, 8 but Nasser
died on 28 September 1970, and it was to be his successor,
Sadat, who bowed to Saudi pressure. In November, King
Faisal sent his brother-in-law, Kamel Adham, to ask Sadat
to reduce the number of Soviet military advisors in Egypt.
Sadat undertook to expel them all if the first phase of an
Israeli withdrawal took place.
The United States recognized the influence of Saudi
Arabia in the area, which Rogers visited in May 1971, the
first secretary of state to do so since 1953. He met King
Faisal in Riyadh on I May and assured him of America's wish
54 (3rayon,	 p. 102..
55 cnps.ionalQuarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXVIII, No.
5, 30 June 1970, p.. 290.
56 Kurdi , pp..	 p.. 114..
57 Haikal , op. cit.. , p.. 52.
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for an Israeli withdrawal to "substantially the same
borders as before the war." 	 Rogers delivered a letter
from President Nixon, asking Faisal to play a positive and
moderating role in achieving a peaceful settlement to the
problem..	 At the end of May, King Faisal visited the
United States and told President Nixon,
"The aggression to which Arab countries are subjected
at this time needs your attention, Mr. President, and
that of your nation."
In the words of the White House press secretary, King
Faisal expressed his "special interest in the status of the
holy city of Jerusalem", while for his part President Nixon
"reaffirmed the dedication of the United States to the
search for a Just and lasting peace in the Middle
East.. "
On B July 1971, Vice-President Spiro Agnew met King
Faisal in Jeddah. Three days later he stated in Addi Ababa
that the Nixon administration would not.put pressure on
Israel to withdraw. Agnew added that he had made this
attitude clear to Saudi leaders saying to them,
"There is no way we can play that kind of role."81
King Faisal warned the American administration that
its policy would ultimately drive all Arab states to turn
to the Soviet Union, and would bring disaster to America's
allies in the area..	 Despite this, there was no
significant shift in American policy on the Middle East.
iB Arab Roport and Record, 1-15 May 1971, p. 251..
59 Orayson, op. cit., p. 164.
60	 ab Repj2rh and Record, 16-31 May 1971, p. 267.
61 Arab Report and Record, 1-15 July 1971, p. 363.
62 Akins, James E. "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is
Here", Epreign AFFai1, Vc1. 51, No. 3, April 1973, p.
467.
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In Spring 1972, however, the United States told King
Faisal that if President Sadat reduced the Soviet presence
in Egypt, the United States would press Israel to withdraw
from occupied Arab territory.	 King Faisal, who not only
took America at its word, but who was also motivated by
anti-Communism, persuaded Gadat to comply, with the result
that in July 1972, all Russians were expelled from Egypt.
King Faisal and President Sadat confidently expected that
the United States would now put pressure on Israel to
withdraw from occupied territory.. But Washington - then in
the throes of a presidential election - was unable to take
any action in return for the expulsion of the Soviets. The
Nixon administration, under pressure from "constraints of
domestic politics" behaved as if it had never taken
place.
Early in 1973, the moderate Arab states realized that
the time for a bilateral understanding between them and the
United States had now passed. On 10 January 1973, King
Faisal called for a holy war against Israel. 88
 Neither
Israel nor the United States took King Faisal seriously.
Indeed, for various reasons, no-one in the entire Middle
East took him at his word.
63 Ifl ow York Tjs Magazine, 24 March 1974, p. 52.
64 Arab	 pprt and Record, 16-31 July 1972, p. 336.
65 Quandt, William E. "Domestic Influences on U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Middle East: The View from Washington,"
in E'eling, Willard A. (ed.) The Middle East: Quest for
an American Policy, Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1973, p. 277; Mansfield, Peter, "Prelude
to Geneva: Elements of Middle East Conflict", The
gundTabj, No. 259, July 1975, p. 244.
66 Grayson, o. cit., p. 109.
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In March 1973, President Sadat sent his security
advisor, Hafez Ismail, to Washington. He asked Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger
"whether the United States did not understand that if
there were not some agreement then there would be
war?"
Kissinger later told the Israeli prime minister, Golda
Meir,
"there was not a slight smile on my face, but in my
heart I laughed and laughed. A war? Egypt? I regarded
it as empty talk."
At that time, the American administration was hardly
pursuing any diplomatic solution at all, believing that the
area was stable as a result of Israeli military
superiority.
This convinced King Faisal and President Sadat that
the only option available to them was the military one.
According to Sadat himselfi
".... every door I have opened has been slammed in my
face by Israel with American blessings ... The time
has come for a shock.."8'
Ten days later, on 19 April, Saudi Arabia warned that
their plans to increase oil production to some 20 million
barrels a day were influenced by the United States policy
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 7 ' This in itself did not
imply that Saudi Arabia would use oil as a political
weapon.
During May 1973, Saudi Arabia tried to buy equipment
for its airforce from the United States, but under pressure
7 Ambras, op.. cit., p. 359.
60 Rubenhet'g, Chary]. A. Israel and Amjcan National
111	 tL	 ^iJical Examination, Chicago University
of Illinois Press, 1996, p. iSS..
69 Newsweek, 9 April 1973..
70	 afport and Record, 16-30 April 1973, p. 186.
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from Zionist groups in Congress, the administration
refused, despite Saudi assurances that it would not be used
against Israel.7t
Sy mid-1973, the situation was becoming increasingly
serious Saudi Arabia was unable to justify its moderate
policy to other members of OPEC. In June, OPEC raised the
price of oil. A month later, King Faisal warned that his
country's friendly relations with the United States would
not survive if the United States insisted on continuing to
support Israel .
This warning was ignored. Moreover, on 25 July, the
United States vetoed a Security Council resolution which
called for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories. In response, King Faisal stated on 30 August
that despite his friendship with the United States, the
latter's unflinching support for Zionism against the Arab
states had placed him in an extremely difficult
situation.
King Faisal outlined Saudi Arabia's position at this
stage, stating on 31 August that while Saudi Arabia did not
wish to limit its oil exports to the United States, the
latter's support for Israel made it difficult for Saudi
Arabia to maintain good relations with Washington, and it
could not supply the American demand for oil.
71 Seefl Cor ressionl Quarterly, 	 manac, 93rd Congress,
1st session, 1973, Vol. XXIX, Washington D.C.: 1974,
p
72 (ab_Repo_d_Record, 1-15 July 1973, p. 302..
73 Wilcox, Wayne, "American Foreign Policy: A Year of Mixed
Fortunes", in Jones, Peter (ed) The International
Yerbookof Foreign Policy Anal ysis, Vol. 1, London:
Croom Helm, 1974, p. 21.
74 Arab Report and Record, 16-31 August 1973, p. 382.
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The United States did not react, still confident that
the Israeli victory in the 6-day war allowed them to Ignore
the Saudi and Egyptian warnings.
Sadat had already visited Saudi Arabia in April 1973,
to discuss the situation with King Faisal. They were now
convinced that there was nothing to be gained by a
political approach, since the United States was manifestly
not pursuing peace or even moving in that direction. In
August, Sadat again visited Saudi Arabia to appraise King
Faisal of the military option. Faisal, having failed to
convince the United States of the need for a political
settlement, had no choice. He promised Sadat that Saudi
Arabia would provide Egypt with financial support and
agreed that oil should be used as a weapon.
In a press conference on 5 September 1973, President
Ni>cn underlined the link between Arab oil and the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and declared that his administration
would give high priority to finding a settlement. 76
 But no-
one in the Arab world would trust even the states friendly
to America in the area.
On the eve of October 1973 the situation was dominated
by the following factors.. Firstly, in 1972, for the first
time, the United States had shown a trade deficit. In 1973,
it imported 486,000 barrels of oil per day from Saudi
Arabia, 915,000 from the Arab countries, and about
3,000,000 barrels from OPEC as a whole. It desperately
needed Arab oil at that time for its forces in Vietnam and
for its allies, particularly Japan. Secondly, the main
73 Dij, opçi, p. 35
76	 nd Record, 1-1 September 1973, p. 398.
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focus of the Ni>ton administration was the war in Vietnam.
Thirdly, the Palestinian organisations were stronger than
ever, which in turn strengthened radical tendencies in the
Arab world and the influence of the Soviet Union in the
area. Moreover American failure to respond had caused
problems for moderate states, and for Saudi Arabia in
particular.
These circumstances compelled moderate Arab states to
take action, given that any further delay might result in
their losing control of the situation. Thus Sadat, Assad
and Faisal planned to administer the "shock" which Sadat.
had referred to by preparing for a "limited" war.
On October 6 1973, the entire region found itself
thrown into a new war which came to be known as the
"Ramadan" or "Yom Kippur" war.
Saudi-American relations with regard to the
Palestinian problem can thus be summarized as follows.
The Saudi government actively pursued peace, in order
to avoid any increased involvement of the Soviet Union or a
strengthening of radical Arab nationalist movements which
would result from a further outbreak of war. The Saudis
believed that the United States could put pressure on
Israel to withdraw from Arab occupied territories.
Saudi Arabia succeeded in convincing the Arab states -
and particularly Egypt, (the major power on the Arab side
of the conflict) - to adopt a moderate stance. This success
was reinforced when Sadat came to power after Nasser's
death, since he shared Saudi Arabia's conservative
leanings. The main testimony to Saudi Arabia's success was
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the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt; its main tool was
financial leverage.
Meanwhile, after the Israeli victory in the 6-day war,
-	 America became tbemain prop of Israeli security. The
American administration, like the Saudi government,
realized the need For stability in the area, but pursued
this objective by attempting to ensure Israeli military
superiority, and did not undertake intense diplomatic
activity to reach a peaceful settlement.
King Faisal, who had made great efforts to moderate
Arab attitudes, expected the United States to repay this by
putting pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied
territories, but this they failed to do. He and President
Sadat were therefore compelled to seek an alternative way
of convincing the American administration of the need for a
diplomatic solution. Hence the limited war.
In short, the evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia - a
small state - was unable to affect the position of the
United States - one of the superpowers.
Saudi-American relations with recard to the conflicts 1973-
1978
The October war took many by surprise. Sadat and
Faisal had talked of war, but no-one believed that the
Arabs would attack after their crushing defeat in 1967. The
moderate Arab states intended the war to be a limited one,
their principle objective being to compel the international
powers, and the United States in particular, to acknowledge
4-4-
the need for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.	 For the Arab people on the other hand, the
October war was a great psychological boost.
On the first clay of war, the Nixon administration sent
a message to King Faisal, asking him to intervene to end
the fighting. King Faisal replied that the United States
should compel Israel to withdraw from occupied territories.
On 7 October, Iraq decided to nationalize the interests of
American oil companies.	 The following day, King Faisal
ordered ARAN1CO to reduce the flow of oil through the
pipeline to Lebanon. He also placed the Saudi army on a war
footing. 7'
On 9 October, Kuwait called for an immediate meeting
of Arab oil ministers to discuss the possibility of using
oil as a diplomatic weapon. Despite Arab threats that they
might cut off their oil shipments, on 12 October the United
States began to replace the weapons lost by Israel in the
first days of the war. 	 King Faisal sent an urgent warning
to the effect that such American aid for Israel would bring
about an oil embargo.	 The following day his minister of
state for foreign affairs, Omer al-Sa99af, arrived in
Washington with the same warning.' American arms shipments
to Israel caused Kuwait to call for a meeting of the
Organisation of the Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries
77 El-Sadat, Anwar, In Search of Identity: An
rPJLy , London: Fontana/Collins, 1978, p. 238.
78	 _Reportand Reco, 1-15 October 1973, p. 449.
79	 p 445.
80 lb Id, p. 473.
81 ahingtonPot, 13 October 1973; New York Times, 13
October 1973.
82 New York Times, 14 October 1973; Arab Report and Record,
1-15 October 1973, p. 441
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(OAPEC) to consider using oil as a political weapon.
Meanwhile, President Nixon met with the foreign ministers
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco to hear the
Arab point of view Dfl arms shipments to Israel.. Omer al-
Sa99af, the Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs,
said of Henry Kissinger
"The man who could solve the Vietnam war, the man who
has taken the lead all over the world, can easily play
a good role in settling	 our area."
The OAPEC representatives met in Kuwait on 16-17
October and agreed to raise the price of oil by 177.. They
also decided to reduce their production by 5/. a month,
until the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab occupied
territories and the recognition of the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people.	 Saudi Arabia was behind this
relatively moderate stance, in order to give the United
States time to adopt a more neutral position on the
conflict.' On 19 October, however, President Nixon asked
Congress to approve a .2.2 billion programme of aid to
Israel.	 This forced King Faisals hand. On 20 October, he
announced
"In view of the increase of American military aid to
Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to
halt all oil exports to the United States of America
for taking such a position"'
83 Arab P q_ and Ford, 1-15 October 1973, p. 445.
84 Ibid, p. 470
85 Demarce, Alan T. "AF<AMCO is a Lesson in the Management
of Chaos", FortL, February 1974, p. 58.
86 Sheehan, o. cit., p. 64.
87 For the t p• 't of President Nixon 's letter, see
Conqi'essi onal 8uarter 1 y, L'ieekl y Report, Vol XXX I , No.
43, 27 October 1973, p. 2857.
89 Lencowski, George, Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary
Age, Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1976, p. 14.
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With this announcement Saudi Arabia joined the other Arab
states in an oil boycott..
On 31 October, Sadat bowed to American pressure for a
cease-fire with Israel, given that the objective of
administering a "shock" had been successfully achieved.. A
week later, Egypt's diplomatic links with the United States
had been restored..
As on various occasions in the past, Saudi Arabia's
public stance on foreign policy followed a "hard line" in
the month following the war. King Faisal sent the Soviet
leadership his congratulations on the anniversary of the
Communist revolution, the first time he had observed this
formality..	 On 23 November, the oil minister, Sheikh
Yamani, announced that if the United States used military
force to break the oil embargo, the oil fields would be
destroyed.. "p'
Secretary of State Kissinger visited Saudi Arabia on 8
November 1973 in an attempt to persuade King Faisal to lift
the oil boycott. He renewed his attempts with Sheikh Yamani
on 5 December in Washington.. But the mood in the Arab world
was not conducive to any move to end the embargo.
Eventually the oil embargo was lifted on 18 March
1974, beFore Arab objectives had been achieved, but in the
expectation of an early settlement.. On 25 March, Saudi
Arabia declared that it would increase its oil production
by a million barrels a day.
09 rb Report nd Record, 1-15 November 1973, p. 575.
9(	 b_Report .ind Record, 16-3G November 1973, p.. 543..
91 Congressional Quarterly, Week3.jport, Vol. XXXIII, No..
36, 6 September 1975, p. 1960; Arab Report and Record,
16-31 March 1974, p. 110.
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Some months later, in June 1974, Saudi Arabia received
President Nixon., King Faisal told him,
"There will never be a real and lasting peace unless
Jerusalem is liberated and returned to the Arab
sovereignty	 the injustice and aggression which
were wrought upon the Arabs of Palestine are
unprecedented in history, for not in the darkest ages
tiad the whole population of a country been driven out
of their homes to be replaced by aliens."
Nixon was later to write that
"Faisal saw Zionist and Communist conspiracies all
around him."
Sut at the time, Nixon was unable to take any action, being
then under pressure from the Watergate investigation, which
forced him out of office on 8 August 1974.
The new administration of President Gerald Ford
announced that United States foreign policy and commitments
remained unchanged, and more specifically, on 9 August
1974, President Ford told Israel that the United States
would continue with its support.
The following month the Saudi minister of state for
foreign affairs, Omer al-Saqqaf, once more visited the
United States and reported that he was well pleased with
his talks with the new administration.
In late September 1974, the representatives of the
Arab states at the United Nations met Secretary of State
Kissinger to discuss with him their views on the problem.
In October he visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. He
also visited Saudi Arabia to brief King Faisal on his talks
with the other parties. " According to the Saudi petroleum
92	 jgJjgn_Post,	 June 1974.,
93 Nixon, op.. cit.., p.. 102
94 U.SDejjent of State £(ulleti, 23 September 1974, p.
42.4.
95 Arab Report and Record, 1-15 October 1974, p. 438.
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minister, Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia persisted in
believing that the solution
"is in the hands of the American government..
The Arab leaders met in Rabat in October 1974. Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates pledged
themselves to provide	 billions to Egypt, Syria,
Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in
order to enable them to continue their struggle against
Israel. At the same summit meeting, the 20 Arab heads of
state unanimously recognized the PLO as the
"sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people on any liberated Palestinian territory."
They also persuaded King Hussain of Jordan to abandon his
claim to be the spokesman of the Palestinian people. Later
in the same month, the General Assembly of the United
Nations also recognized the PLO as the representative of
the Palestinians, with only Israel, the Dominican Republic
and Bolivia voting against
This was important for the PLO and for the Palestinian
cause and may have been behind President Fords calling on
Israel on 29 October 1974 to enter into negotiations with
either Jordan or the PLO..' The moderate Arab states,
however, interpreted this as a significant shift in United
States policy on the conflict.. In fact, no major change in
policy ensued.
96 Sobel, Lester A. Cod) oco-rna jrici_in the Middle East,
Nw York: Facts on File Inc. , 1980, p. 55.
97 rab Rort and Record, 16-31 October 1974, p.. 465;
Coc:ressionalQuart prly Weekl y Report, Vol. XXXIII,
No. 36, 6 September 1975, p. 1909.
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99 Orayson, op. cit.., p. 117.
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Kissirger again visited the area in February 1975. In
addition to visiting Cairo and Jerusalem, he went to Amman,
Damascus, and Riyadh. The Secretary's visit
"was described as a preliminary mission to determine
the possibility of negotiating a further interim troop
disengagement between Israel and Egypt."
The Americans described Kissinger's meeting with King
Faisal on 15 February as being about
"the U.S. plan for long-term oil agreements between
the producers and consumers at lower prices."
In the months before his assassination, King Faisal
was deeply concerned about the future of Jerusalem. If he
was able to contemplate the possibility of abandoning the
goal of the liberation of Palestine, it was inconceivable
that he should acquiesce in the occupation of Jerusalem, a
holy place of Islam. He called for a jehad (holy war) to
liberate the city, and resented the failure of the United
States to support him. Hence Kissinger's statement, made in
January 1975, that the United States might have to use
force to prevent the Arab states from using oil as a
political weapon. '
He lent strong support - both financial and diplomatic
- to Arafat and his leadership, which gave him influence
within the PLO, particularly its moderate wing. He had a
powerful voice and played a active part in the affairs of
the entire Middle East.
On his assassination, he was succeeded by his brother,
Khalid, and another brother, Fand, became crown prince. To
the surprise of the whole world, King Khalid stated that
1	 Sobei, oi. cit., p. 83.
111 Arab Report and Record, 1-15 January 1975, p. 60.
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Saudi Arabia would accept the right to exist of the state
of Israel, the first Saudi king publicly to do so.
Saudi'-American relations were not affected by the
assassination of King Faisal, nor did America's pDlicy on
Israel change. If anything, the United States was more
determined and supportive than ever in the mid-197's. On
21 May 1975, seventy-six members of the senate signed a
letter to President Ford requesting more support for Israel
and affirming,
"We believe that a strong Israel constitutes a most
reliable barrier to domination of the area by outside
parties.
This was in fact in line with the thinking of the Secretary
of State who believed that a strong Israel would prevent
war and serve American interests in the area.'
Thanks to his so-called "shuttle diplomacy" between
the capitals of the area, on 4 SeptemLer 1975 Kissinger
persuaded Egypt and Israel to reach an agreement, according
to which Israel yielded to Egyptian demands that it
withdraw from the Sinai mountain passes and return the
oilfields in Abu Rudeis, in return for Egypt making several
political concessions. President Ford regarded this as a
"constructive contribution" to peace in the region. Once it
was signed, Kissinger went on to visit Saudi Arabia to seek
Saudi support for it, which was in due course announced by
the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal.'-
102 Conqrea:.ional Quarterly Weekly Repoi-t, Vol. XXXIII,
No. 22, 31 May 1975, p. 1153.
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2Meanwhile the agreement was strongly attacked by the
radical Arab states.
Following the signing of this agreement, Saudi Arabia
was forced by the political situation in the Middle East to
adopt a neutral position on the area's policies. The main
factor affecting Saudi policy was United States policy on
the Middle East. In the course of the 1976 presidential
campaign, both the Democratic and Republican parties
declared themselves in favour of more support for Israel.
On 27 1uly 1976, the Senate voted by a majority of 86 to I
to penalize American firms cooperating with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Saudi Arabia responded to this
determined American stance by raising its level of oil
production and taking the lead in setting moderate oil
prices against the will of the rest of the members of OPEC.
Saudi Arabia increased its prices by V...compared to the lø/.
increase adopted by the majority. Z
The Saudi Foreign minister, Prince Saud, stated in
early 1977 that the Saudi policy on oil prices and
production was based on the expectation of a moderate
American policy towards the Middle East dispute. i8 But
after a meeting with Secretary of State Vance, he also
stated that Saudi Arabia's moderate stance on oil had
nothing to do with the Palestinian issue.
Prince Saud visited the United States on 5 April 1977,
followed by Crown Prince Fand, who arrived in Washington on
23 May 1977. He told the Carter administration that in his
iC	 jnd_Roc.prd, 16-M December 1976, p. 762.
106 Ibid, i6-31 January 1977, p.
	
; ibid, 1-14 February
1977, p. 89.
107 Ibid, 1-28 February 1977, p. 129.
view the Arab-Israeli conflict affected Arab-American
relations and expressed his satisfaction that the United
States could persuade the new Israeli government to modify
its stated policy on the occupied territories. 1e
In August 1977, Secretary of State Vance visited the
area, including as usual Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to
break the deadlock. After his meeting with him, Prince
Saud, the foreign minister stated that the American efforts
were enccDLtraging.i	 He made a return visit to Washington
on 22 October 1977, his main concern being the growing
influence of the Soviet UnioR in Africa.
A month later, President Sadat announced to an
astonished world that he was "ready to go to the end of the
world to achieve peace," and subsequently accepted an
invitation to visit Jerusalem on 19 November 1977.
This visit changed the political situation in the
region. Most Arab states expressed their opposition to
Sadats initiative. Sadat responded by breaking off
diplomatic relations with Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria and
South Yemen.
Saudi Arabia found itself in a dilemma it could
neither Join the radical Arab states in their condemnation,
nor side with Sadat in his new approach to the problem. It
therefore issued only a very limited public response,
giving no indication that it opposed Sadats policy. Not
for the first time, Saudi Arabia waited until the storm
raging around Sadat had abated and then aligned itself with
1øP fl?I, 1.6-31 May 1977, p. 406.
109 Ibid, i-'i August 1977, p. 644.
110 El-Sadat, gp. cit. , p. 644.
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him once again. In a bid to gain Saudi Arabia's public
support for Sadat's policy, Secretary Vance visited Saudi
Arabia on 14-13 December 1977.. President Carter renewed
this attempt during his visit on 3 January 1978. Both
failed. ''
The United States prepared for the next step in the
Sadat-Begin negotiations and invited both leaders to Join
President Carter at Camp David. On 9 August 1978, Alfred
Atherton, American ambassador-at-large visited Saudi
Arabia in an attempt to gain Saudi support for the Camp
David negotiations, which he won. 1 ' When the Camp David
agreement was signed on 17 September, however, Saudi Arabia
aligned itself with other Arab states in opposing it. This
apparent change of heart reflected above all the nature of
Saudi policy, which was influenced by the situation in the
area, with strong Arab pressure leaving.it no alternative.
The entire situation in the area had in fact changed.
The United States left the Shah's regime in Iran to its
fate: on 30 November 1978, President Carter announced that
the United States would not intervene in internal Iranian
affairs. The Saudi royal family felt that the United States
was failing to protect its allies.. They were also only too
aware of the progress the Soviet Union was making around
Saudi Arabia, in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. The
Saudi royal family therefore faced the future with some
trepidation.
111 So r b 1port. and Rocord, 1-31 December 1977, p. 994
JiCJ, 1-15 January 1979, p 17
112 Grayon,	 r-	 cit. , p. 132.
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Against this background, Saudi policy was to maintain
some distance between Saudi Arabia and the United States,
which marked the end of an era in American-Saudi relations.
Relations between the two governments during this
period, 1973-197e, can therefore be summarized as follows.
Firstly, t.he main aim of the October war of 1973 was
to draw the attention of the United States to the need for
a political compromise in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In
this it was successful. The United States realized the need
for an intensive diplomatic effort to win stability in the
area, with the immediate objectives of ending the war and
lifting the oil embargo.
Secondly, the Saudi government persisted with its
diplomatic initiatives to convince other Arab states that
political compromise was in the hands of the United States.
It supported all American attempts to seek agreements
between Israel and Egypt as well as between Israel and
Syria.. The American and Saudi governments succeeded in
limiting the role of the Soviet Union in the dispute.
Thirdly, because of his religious convictions, King
Fal sal was deeply concerned about the future of Jerusalem
He may have been able to contemplate the possibility of the
existence of the state of Israel, but he could not tolerate
the occupation of the third holy city of Islam. In this he
differed from the United States. With his assassination in
1975, however, this ceased to be a major issue in the
di spute..
Fourthly, when King Khalid and Prince Fand came to
power, they supported all American initiatives on the
problem, and Sadats negotiations towards a bi-lateral
compromise agreement with Israel.
Fifthly, the Saudi government supported the Camp David
negotiations, but when an agreement was reached, it sided
with other Arab states in opposing it as a result of strong
pressure from them and the widespread popular opposition of
the Arab world.
In general it can be said that the two governments
worked for diplomatic compromise. They had some differences
during King Faisal 's reign, particularly over Jerusalem,
but after the latters death, the kingdom became an active
ally, working within the Arab world for an American
solution.
The role of Saudi oil in the conflict
The idea of using oil as a political weapon was not
new.. Since the 194's, there had been calls for denying oil
to the West.. In June 1946, the Arab League held a meeting
in Syria at which several resolutions were passed, one of
them calling for oil to be used as a political weapon. This
proposal did not, however, receive serious consideration
for several reasons, the main one being Saudi opposition..
Saudi Arabia believed that such a policy would create
diffjcultje for the Arab states and that there should be
no connection between oil and politics,' 	 taking account
of the fact that since the discovery of Middle East oil,
the major international oil companies controlled all oil
114	 , Gocrge, Oil nd th State in the Middle
st, Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1960, p.. 188..
operations, prices and marketing, plus the fact that the
West was not dependent on oil for all its energy needs.'
When Egypt was attacked by Britain, France and Israel
in 1956, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries cut the flow
of oil to Britain and France.. Despite the fact that during
the Suez war, Europe's dependence on oil increased to about
25% of its energy needs 118 , this limited embargo failed to
affect their economies, since the United States was able to/
provide Britain and France with the oil they needed. This
attempt to use oil as a political weapon therefore failed.
The defeat of the Arab states in the third round of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the June war, shed a new light
on the potential' of oil as a weapon. When President Nasser
of Egypt claimed that the United States and Britain had
Joined Israel in its attack, nationalist Arab countries
vigourously called for the use of oil as a political
weapon. For the first time the United States was the
principal target.. Saudi Arabia was not in favour of this,
being convinced that Western European countries were still
not sufficiently dependent on Arab oil.. Under strong
pressure, however, Saudi Arabia joined other Arab states in
cutting off oil shipments to the United States, Britain and
West Germany.
115 Sherbi nq , Nai em and Tesl er , Mark, (ed) Arab Oil , New
York Pracqer, 1976, p. 266..
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Up to this point, Saudi Arabia had always refused to
consider using its oil as a political weapon. '-7 It came as
no surprise therefore that wltin two months it had
announced the end of its boycott.. European countries had
not suffered despite the fact that Middle East oil had
become more important to the West - almost replacing coal
in the world's industrial energy requirements since
1965. ''
There were several reasons for the failure of the
boycott.. In the first place, the United States, the main
target of the embargo, was not hurt by it. In the second
place, there was no actual shortage of oil because the
companies managed to redistribute stocks from other
countries. '' And in the third place, the Arab oil states
were unable to sustain the cost of the boycott.
"King Faisal was informed by his finance minister that
there was no more money in the till, and that for once
ARANCO was unable to help."1
In fact, Saudi Arabia had never enforced the embargo
strictly, having Joined it reluctantly. Eventually, Saudi
Arabia satisfied Nasser that oil should be used
"positively"..' 1
 In other words, Saudi Arabia gave
financial support to the front-line states, and the other
Arab oil states were persuaded to lift their embargo.
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To consider the 1973 oil embargo in more detail, it
must be appreciated that at the beginning of the 1970's
significant changes in the structure of the oil industry
had occurred. These changes included the disappearance of
surplus production in the United States, the increased
dependence of both the United States and other
industrialized nations on Middle East oil, and growing
government control over the oil industry. The United States
recognized the importance of Saudi oil in meeting its
increasing demand.
Until 1973, Saudi Arabia made it clear that it sought
no connection between oil and politics. In November 1972,
the Saudi petroleum minister, Vamani, stated:
H must say that we do not bell eve in the use of oi 1
as a political weapon ... We believe that the best way
for the Arab to employ this oil is as a basis for true
cooperation with the West, notably with the United
States. In this way very strong economic ties are
established which wIll ultimately reflect on our
political relations."'
As has been shown, Saudi Arabia was able to convince
other Arab states to establish good relations with other
Western courtries and to trust in America's ability to find
a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the United
States failed to fulfil this hope, not only declining to
press Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territory, but
even supporting Israel with sophisticated arms and
equipment.
122 Uni td States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
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In early 1973, the Saudi government realized that the
Middle East was heading towards another round of war. In
April 1973, the king therefore sent his oil minister,
Yamani, to Washington to warn the American administration
that in the absence of any change in American Middle East
policy, it was impossible for Saudi Arabia to meet the
United States demand for expanded oil production. This
warning was ignored.
At the same time, pressure for the use of oil as a
political weapon was accelerating in the Arab world. King
Faisal was "not able to stand alone much longer".	 On 23
May 1973 in Geneva he secretly met the ARAMCO partners and
told them
"that time was running out. He would not allow his
kingdom to become isolated because of Americas
failure to support him, and he used the phrase, You
will lose everything'."''
The United States paid no attention. President Nixon
appeared on television to remind Arabs of the difficulties
which Dr. Mossadeq of Iran had faced twenty years before
when Iranian oil was boycotted by the West and of the
subsequent overthrow of the government, and to warn that
"the Arabs risked losing their markets if they tried
to act too tough".t
Sut the oil experts knew only too well
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"the predominant fact of life in the energy picture
that the problem is not whether oil will find
markets, but whether markets will find oil?"
When the October 1973 war began to turn against the
Arabs, the pressures on King Faisal to cut off oil
shipments to those countries supporting Israel began to
mount. President Sadat sent a special emissary to Saudi
Arabia and other oil countries asking them to put pressure
on the United States to halt its arms shipments to Israel.
Some Saudi princes also urged King Faisal to use Saudi oil
in the war.t
Saudi Arabia, however, was still opposed to the idea
of an oil embargo against the United States. There was some
indication that relations between the United States and
Saudi Arabia were improving. King Faisal kept in close
touch with the American administration. He sent at least
two letterg to President Nixon and Secretary of State
Kissinger to urge the American government to tone down its
support for Israel. 1
	After his meeting with the foreign
ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco on
17 October 1973, President Nixon spoke briefly with the
Saudi minister, Omer al-Saqqaf, who subsequently told the
press that their talks had been friendly and "fruitful" and
that he put his faith in the Nixon administration to bring
about peace.	 King Faisal was still hoping that the
United States would not force him into a position where he
had to use oil as a weapon.
128 New Voik Times, 7 October 1975.
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On 16 October 1973, the Arab oil ministers held a
meeting in Kuwait to consider the role oil might play In
the war. They
"decided that each Arab oil exporting country should
Immediately cLit its oil production by a rate not less
than 57. from the September production level, and
further increase of 57. from each of the following
months. - .
It was thanks to Saudi Arabia's moderating influence
at the meeting that such a decision was reached and the
total embargo against the United States called for by
members of OAPEC was averted. 1.5
The following day, on 18 October 1973, Saudi Arabia
cut its production by 107.. Meanwhile the United States
increased its military aid to Israel, and on 19 October
President Nixon asked Congress to allocate $2.2 billion in
military aid to Israel. This put King Faisal in precisely
the position he had wished to avoid, and on 20 October,
Saudi Arabia announced that It was halting all oil exports
to the United States in the light of the increase in
military aid to Israel. This decision affected not only
direct exports but also Indirect ones via world refineries
supplying the American market or the United States navy.'
Saudi instructions to ARAMCO divided consumer countries
into three categories "friendly" countries - Britain,
France, Spain, all the non oil-producing Arab countries,
and all Muslim countries - were to receive oil at the
September level; "hostile" countries - the United States,
132 Au 1 opjt., p. 109..
133 S •ehan, Edward R. The Arabs Israel i s and Ki ssi nqer A
secret. Hir ofAmerican Diplomacy in the Middle
East, New Yor-k Readers Digest Press, 1976, p.. 69.
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the Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, South Africa and
Rhodesi a - were to receive no oi 1; and all other countries
were classified as "neutral". Saudi Arabia's conditions for
lifting their restrictions were the liberation of the Arab
territories occupied during the 1967 war; the restoration
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and the
liberation of Jerusalem. But in the beginning of December
1973, this attitude showed signs of moderating when Sheikh
Yamani announced that Saudi Arabia would lift their embargo
if Israel began to withdraw from the occupied territories.
A few days later he said that the embargo would be lifted
if Israel accepted the principle of withdrawal. This
considerably weakened the Arab oil countries' bargaining
position,i' since it appeared that the king was not at one
with his own oil minister about the aims of the embargo. In
late December 1973, he called on all the Muslims to
mobilize their resources to liberate Jerusalem from Zionist
forces.'' But the moderate line carried the day and the
Arab oil countries decided to end their monthly oil
production cuts in December 1973.
When Egypt and Israel, thanks to American mediation,
reached an agreement on the disengagement of their forces
on 17 January 1974, it was plain that the lifting of the
embargo would soon follow, which it did on 18 March, at the
request of President Sadat and Sheikh Yamani. The goals of
the Arab countries had not been met, but the embargo had
had other positive results. Western Europe had adopted a
neutral position on the Arab-Israeli conflict; Britain and
135	 op.ci, pp. 421-423k
i3	 port rid Record, 1-31 December 1973.
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West Germany had banned arms shipments to the Middle East;
American transport planes were not allowed to land Dfl
British, Turkish, Italian, Spanish or Greek territory to
supply Israel with American arms during the war;'.	 the EEC
called for a solution based on the United Nations security
council resolution no. 242,1	 which was also supported by
Japan.
It was the United States, however, that had been the
target of the embargo and its policy on the Middle East had
not budged. The embargo did, however, have a psychological
effect, because it was quickly followed by massive
increases in oil prices, which rose by 4OOX.'
On 2 October 1974, Sheikh Yamani stated that if a
political solution to the conflict were found, then oil
prices would fall, and went on to say that if Israel did
not withdraw from the occupied territories, the region
would be plunged into another war which would
"have a very dangerous effect on prices as well as on
the supply of oil."1
It is clear from the events which followed that Sheikh
Yainani was not sincere in saying this.
Secretary of State Kissinger told a meeting of the
International Energy Agency in Paris on 17 May 1975,
"The embargo and price rises of 1973 taught us how
vulnerable we had become. We saw that neither the
supply nor the price of a central factor in our
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ecor)omies was any longer under our control.. Our well-
being and progress had become hostage to decisions in
which we could not take part.'4
As the largest oil-producer, Saudi Arabia did play a
major part in setting oil prices and levels of exporting,
opposing any increases in prices.. In December 19Th, it
raised its prices by only 57., in defiance of the 107.
immediate rise agreed by OPEC.. It also increased its oil
production in 1979 to offset the fall in Iranian
product 1 on..
In summary, it was clear that Saudi Arabia wished to
avoid using oil as a political weapon. The American failure
to repay Saudi Arabia's moderating influence on other Arab
states by putting pressure on Israel to withdraw from
occupied territories and its continuing and indeed
increasing support for Israel gave King Faisal no
alternative but to join the the Arab oil embargo. Because
of Saudi Arabia's huge oil production, it was important to
the Arab cause that they should join the embargo, and
equally Saudi Arabia was instrumental in getting it lifted
andin moderating OPEC policies.
Conclusion
Saudi-American relations with regard to the Arab-
Israeli conflict can thus be summarized as follows.
142 3tebbi.n c , Ric.hard P.. and Adam, Elaine (ed) American
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Both governments believed that Israel had the right to
exist within secure borders and to this end both worked for
a political compromise.
They differed over the future of Jerusalem as a result
of King Faisal's more rigid religious convictions, but
after his death in March 197 this ceased to be a major
stumbling block.
The Saudi government had a moderating influence on
other Arab states, particularly Egypt1
After the Israeli victory in the 6-day war, the
American administration believed that Israeli military
superiority would maintain the stability of the region.
Thus it did little to pursue a political solution to the
problem.
President Sadat and King Faisal planned a limited war
to compel the United States to acknowledge the need for a
political solution.
After the October 1973 war, Saudi Arabia supported all
American diplomatic initiatives to find a political
compromise, including the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in
Camp David, but when an agreement was reached, the Saudi
government j oined the widespread Arab opposition.
In general, Saudi Arabias role as America's advocate
on the Arab side of the conflict was an important one.
Saudi Arabia prevailed on many Arab states to moderate
their attitudes and policies on the conflict. On occasion,
however, the United States - misreading the political
reality of the region - asked Saudi Arabia to adopt
24
untenb1e priition	 This is what occurred over the Camp
David agreement.
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CONCLUS I ON
The Si>t-Day War of 1967 marked the beginning of a new
phase in the modern history of the Middle East region.
Nasser, defeated in that war, was from then on to pay more
attention to Egypt's internal problems than to wider
Arabian issues. He was forced to withdraw his troops from
Yemen, which had been a thorn in the side of the Saudi
government. He also needed to obtain the financial support
of the conservative camp within the region in order to
rebuild his forces and to bolster Egypt's weak economy. He
therefore abandoned the radical policies which had for over
thirteen years dominated the area. Riyadh then became a
rival centre for Arab	 political activities to Cairo. At
the same time one of the aftereffects of the Sit-Day War
was to strengthen radical movements in the Arab world.
Moreover the war had increased the dependence of Arab
states on the Soviet Union especially in the field of
armaments. During the same period Britain withdrew from
South Yemen, and in January 1968 announced its intention to
withdraw from East of Suez in 1971, mainly due to financial
considerations. This created the so-called 'security
vacuum	 From the Saudi point of view, the British presence
had been sufficient to protect its eastern ailfields as
well as the straits of Hormuz. The United States ws at
this time deeply embroiled in Vietnam.. The British decision
to withdraw could therefore scarcely have come at a worse
time for Saudi Arabia and for other smaller Gulf states. In
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197, however, conservative •forcs in the region were
strengthened by various events Nasser died and was
succeeded by the pro-Western and conservative Sadat; Assad
of Syria, a moderate leader, gained full power in Damascus;
and King Hussain succeeded in crushing the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Jordan. These
circumstances allowed King Faisal, with his fifty years'
foreign policy experience, to move into the position of
leader of the conservative or moderate camp in the Arab
homel and.
The October war of 1973 and Saudi participation in the
oil embargo lent the Saudi government renewed strength.
These allowed it to give the impression that it supported
popular demands For oil to be used as a political weapon
for the achievement of Arab goals. They also led to an
increase in oil prices. Saudi Arabia's high oil production
and the new high prices combined to make of the kingdom a
financial giant. From this point on, Saudi Arabia could
wield its formidable financial power in pursuit of its
political aims. It adopted the so-called "Riyal diplomacy",
intending thereby to serve conservative forces in the area,
Western interests in general, and those of the United
States in particular. With regard to oil, the main focus of
United States' relations in the area, the Saudi government
did its utmost to resist the call to limit production in
order to force prices up in the late 60's and the early
70's. When on 16 October 1973 the majority of Arab oil
producers called for an immediate embargo, the Saudi
government confined itself to a "/. per month cut in
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production. Two days later, when other states announced
their boycott of oil shipments to the United States, the
Saudi government announced only a 107. cut. Even when Saudi
Arabia did join the embargo, It allowed ARAMCO to continue
oil shipments to United States' refineries in the
Caribbean. When OPEC pressed for a price of 13.33 in late
December 1973, the kingdom insisted on limiting the
increase to 11.65. By March 1974 it was making great
efforts to convince fellow OAPEC members to abandon the
embargo, and in this it succeeded in May. In June 1974,
OPEC members called for an increase ranging from $4 to $7-
11 in the basic (national revenue) price per barrel in
order to cut oil companies' profits the Saudi government
managed to contain this increase to only 1.57.. In September
1974, it once again managed to hold a further price
increase to 3.57. in the face of calls for major increases.
It continued to pursue the same policy throughout 1975,
resisting price rises and cuts in production. In 1976 it
confronted such demands by threatening to resume maximum
production. When in December a 107. price rise was agreed,
Saudi Arabia assented only to a 57. rise. Similarly in the
following year, 1977, still in the light of the same
policy, it agreed in July to limit its production to 8.5
million barrels per day only in exchange for a price freeze
till the end of the year, In 1978, the proposal to index
the dollar against other foreign currencies in the face of
oil recession and glut was resisted by Saudi Arabia. And
when events in Iran caused a world price panic, again It
was Saudi Arabia which increased its production to over 10
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million barrels per day. During the entire decade, the
kingdom had moreover held out against the nationalization
of the oil companies, arguing during the 60's that the oil
producers were not capable of managing their oil operations
and would •fail if they attempted to do so. It continually
drew attention to what had occurred when Iran had tried to
nationalize its oil companies in the early 50's. When Iraq
and Lybia successfully did so in the early 70's, Saudi
Arabia pursued the idea of participation, by which it meant
part ownershi p with the oil producers thanks to share
ownership. The kingdom first proposed a 207., and then a 407.
stake, and negotiations with ARANCO were to extend over
more than 10 years. Only in the early 80's did the company
come under state ownership, with ARAMCO contracted to
manage its operations under a special assignment.. In short,
Saudi Arabia was the moderate voice within OPEC and strove
to defend Western interests in the oil world.
In the field of diplomacy, the kingdom's efforts were
directed towards maintaining and enhancing conservative
forces in the region and in the Third World. Saudi Arabia
succeeded in persuading Sadat to expel Soviet advisors from
Egypt in July 1972. It agreed to fund military sales to
Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen. It provided heavy financial,
aid to these countries, as well as to Syria and other Arab
conservative states. It applied financial pressure on North
Yemen and Somalia to reduce their dependence on Soviet aid.
It provided aid to Zaire and financed the presence of
Morrocan troops there. It also gave aid to Pakistan, South
Vietnam, national China, and to anti-Marxist forces in
.'- _,
Africa and Asia. Finally it played an important part in
persuaciing more Arab states that the solution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict lay in the hands of the United States and
heavily financed the moderate wing of the PLO, notably the
Fateh organisation. In short, Saudi Arabia virtually became
an active American client state in the Middle East, in the
Third World, and in OPEc. In return, however, what did the
kingdom hope to gain from the United States? Unquestionably
the main Saudi objective was the security of the kingdom.
Was there then any commitment on the part of the United
States to defend Saudi Arabia?
Before attempting an answer to this question, several
facts should be borne in mind
In the first place, the kingdom, with its huge land
area and access to three seas, occupies an important
location within a critical region, the modern history of
which is characterized by instability. Since World War II,
the area has witnessed four major wars, and numerous cotps
in various states, and has moreover become a battleground
for the ideological conflict between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
In the second place, the establishment of the kingdom
in the early decades of this century was the result of
tribal conflict within the peninsula, whereas the British -
the dominant power in the area - were more concerned with
the Gulf coastal areas than the interior. Ibn Saud, who
mistrusted the British because they supported his rival,
Shrif Hussain of Hejaz, succeeded in maintaining the
Independence of his kingdom until his death in 193. At the
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same time, the kingdom emerged from the historical
conjunction over three centuries of the Al-Saud family with
the Wahhabl movement. The Saudi state is thus a tribal
state with religious legitimacy, and its king a tribal
leader. His decisions remain personal and his main duty is
to uphold Saudi authority and maintain the security of the
kingdom.
In the third place, despite the wide effect on Saudi
life of the country's sudden huge wealth, Saudi society
still embraces the values of a tribal culture with
religious roots. Little has been done to develop any
political structure in the kingdom there is no parliament
and no constitution and there are no political parties. The
authority of the king is limited only by a consensus within
the House of Saud, which remains the central political
actor. In general, the political system continues to rest
on traditional relationships between the House of Saud, the
religious leaders, and the tribes. In these circumstances,
there is little choice but to turn to the West for
protection, and the only Western state powerful enough to
provide this is the United States.
In the fourth place, the central concern of the United
States' relations with Saudi Arabia is oil. For more than
fIfty years, as far as the Americans were concerned Saudi
Arabia spelt oil. Recognising the predominance of British
influence in the area, the United States vigorously pursued
the so-called "open door" policy in order to be able to
participate in oil activities in the area. For its part,
the main concern of Saudi Arabia's relations with the
United States was with its security. This lay behind King
Abd al-Aziz's move to encourage the United States to play
an active political role In the area from the earliest days
of the new kingdom's existence. Even his attitude to the
Palestinian problem was coloured by this overriding
consideration. It also explained why It was the United
States who gained the entire Saudi oil concession. Ibn
Saud's son, King Saud, pursued the same policy despite the
fact that he had some difficulties with the United States,
due mainly to the overall situation in the area rather than
to the new policies he adopted. But in the final analysis,
it was King Faisal who sought a strong relationship with
the United States in order to obtain an American commitment
to Saudi security. To summarize, the main concern of the
United States was oil; that of Saudi Arabia, its security.
During the period under study, (1968-197S), Saudi
Arabia confronted no real threats to its security. But in a
region beset by problems and conflicts, the Saudi
government's perception was that It was surrounded by
threatening factors, a perception which was further fuelled
by the British withdrawal from the area in 1971. The United
States shared this perception. Their mutual interests
included the guaranteed flow of oil to the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan; the containment of the influence
of the Soviet Union; the containment of the spread of
nationalist Ideology and influence; the enhancement of
Saudi defense capabilities; the promotion of the internal
security and stability of Saudi Arabia and of other states
in the region friendly to the United States; the
.- E?
encouragement of cooperation between conservative states
with a view to maintaining stability in the area; and the
achievement of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.. At the same time, as we have already noted, the
"major preoccupation of the Saudi government was its
security, whilst that of the United States was the
guaranteed flow of oil to America and other Western
countries.. The Saudi government played an Important part in
the Middle East, and In the world at large, in defending
Western interests in general and those of the United States
in particular, especially after 197.. The Saudi government
did its best to project to regional powers the impression
that it enjoyed an American commitment to protect it.. In
fact no such commitment existed, mainly because of pressure
from the United States Congress.. In other words, the Saudis
failed in the basic objective of their relations with the
United States.. The security of the kingdom thus remained
the major area of difference between the two governments..
The huge American sale of arms and services, which
some observers considered to be evidence of a de facto
American commitment to Saudi security, did not result in
the creation of any real military power for Saudi Arabia,
mainly because of a lack of skilled manpower.. The United
States was in fact aware of this and continued to regard
Iran and Israel as its major foreign policy tools in the
area.. Its huge arms sales were not therefore intended to
create strong Saudi forces, but rather to further its
petro-dollar policy.. For its part, the Saudi governments
major objective was to manipulate the United States into a
.:.. .J
i:)cDs 'Li on	 ere 1. t found i tsei f deeply involved in Saudi
sc::ui-ity.. Dut in this, it also failed. This involvement not
only roused strong objections in the American Congress, but
also enabled the Israeli lobby to obtain obtain more
financial and military support for Israel. Moreover,
Amen can military sales 1. ay behind the arms race in the
Gui f regi on. In short, Amen can arms sales to Saudi Arabia
were strongly related to its petro--dollar policy and did
little to enhance Saudi security.
Th final issue relating to Saudi security was the
Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Saudis, the conflict lay
behind the instability and the strength of the radical
movement in the area, and they therefore strove for a
political solution to it. Saudi Arabia supported all
American diplomatic initiatives to find a political
compromise, including the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in
Camp David, but Arab pressure forced it to pay lip service
to the widespread opposition to these in the area. Having
said this, there is little doubt that the Saudi government
played an important role in moderating the attitudes and
policies of many Arab states with regard to the conflict.
Thus although Saudi Arabia joined the oil embargo in 1973
under- pressure from other Arab states, its participation
enabled it to play an important role and it was without
doubt instrumental in getting the embargo lifted. In short,
Saudi Arabi a p1 ayed the part of America '5 advocate On the
Arab side of the conflict.
In the final analysis, the Saudi government did its
utmost to obtal r an American commitment to its security. It
r r
wr in
	 :tive Aineric:an acJvocte both in the Middle Et nd
I ri the ThI p d Wo p i ci. It ;trove to give the I rnpresai on that
ii di ci in f:t. enjoy the pro.en:ti on oc the Uni ted Stte
While this could only he established in regard to specific
instances, Saudi relations with the United States were
sufficiently public to enable the Kingdom to maintain a
certain measure of deterrent capability which ultimately was
based on American power and prestige.
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